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ANALYSIS OF THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
Hungarian Statistical Review, Special number 6. 2001.
MONEY SUPPLY, GDP AND INFLATION:
THE DYNAMIC ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF MACRO-EQUILIBRIUM* 
TAMÁS MELLÁR1 – GÁBOR RAPPAI2 
The paper investigates some theoretical problems of the Hungarian economy. The funda-
mental question is, whether the Hungarian economy meets the requirements of a modern, de-
veloped market economy at the end of the transition period. In order to answer the underlying
question the authors present several macroeconometric results, based on quarterly analysis of
macroeconomic time series concerning the interrelations of GDP, money supply, velocity and
inflation. No unanimous answer to the basic question is given, nontheless interesting findings
for the relevance of some theoretical macromodels, the equilibrium–disequlibrium situation of
the economy and the causal relations of some macrovariables are revealed. 
KEYWORDS: Quantity theory of money; Disequilibrium analysis; Econometrics.
he study of the economic relations in the transition period is of both theoretical and
practical importance. The two theoretical problems which require clarification are the
following: a) has the transformation of the country into a market economy been com-
pleted, i.e. is the transitory stage over for the Hungarian economy; and b) is the emerging
new system identical with the highly developed market economies, or should it be con-
sidered as something special, a ‘third way’ formation? The two questions are, of course,
not independent from each other. It would hardly be possible to give comprehensive, and
in many respects unquestionable answers, therefore it seems more useful to focus re-
search on certain special areas and use the findings to facilitate the understanding of the
nature of the new system. The present study follows this approach by attempting to ana-
lyse the equilibrium–disequilibrium of the macro level monetary processes with the help
of empirical tools.
The determinant significance of the monetary processes did not become self-evident
until after the transformation into the market economy. Attention was, however, focused
mainly on the microeconomic processes in the finances and the money market rather than
* The study was written within the framework of the research programme No. T 019925, of the Hungarian Scientific Re-
search Fund (OTKA) entitled. ‘The econometric analysis of the macro-economic relations of transition.
1 President of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
2 Associate professor of statistics, at the University of Sciences Pécs.
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on the macro-level interrelationship between the monetary and real processes or the
changes in the equilibrium. The authors of this study attempt to apply econometric tools to
the analysis of this area, which has so far been less broadly investigated either from theo-
retical or practical (economic policy) aspects. The following three issues will be dealt with. 
1. The relationship between the money supply and the GDP, with special regard to the
fact that money can be active, i.e. used for the purposes of monetary policy, or can be
passive, playing a neutral role in the shaping of macroeconomic processes.
2. The interrelation between the supply of money and the changes in the price level,
the impact of the changes on the money supply on inflation, and the influence of inflation
on the money demand and supply.
3. The changes in the money demand and supply, the study of the equilibrium on the
money market, periods of disequilibrium on the money market: their changes in time and
the macro-economic problems they refer to.
There are several factors making it quite difficult to perform the investigations proposed
by the authors. The first and most important of these is the lack of a firm theoretical foun-
dation which could serve as a basis for the analysis. This is the consequence of the transi-
tional condition. The second difficulty is the lack of adequate, homogeneous data sets, and
reliable, high quality macro-data, that could be the unquestionable starting point for the
empirical study. Thirdly, the application of the econometric methods including testing
raises various methodological problems. (Not to mention only the most obvious of these:
our data-base contains not more than 40 observations, which makes the findings of the sto-
chastic time series modelling less convincing. However, it can hardly be accepted that the
‘optimal’ size of the data-base does not allow macroeconomic modelling for at least twenty
years to come.) In spite of all these difficulties we do believe that certain statements will
prove to be true and some of the analyses will be useful in the future as well. 
TESTING OF THE BASIC INTERRELATIONSHIPS
AND THE SURVEY OF THE DATA
In this section we introduce the basic variables of the study, give a short description
of their change in time in the period of transition and analyse their causal interrelations.
Quantity theory of money and the velocity 
As a starting point for the analysis, the basic interrelationship of the quantity theory of
money was used:
                                                             YPVM   /1/
where M means the quantity of money, V is the velocity of money, P is the price level
and Y represents real GDP. Following the conventions, the logarithms of the variables is
given in lowercase letters, consequently the previous relationship /1/ can be transcribed
as follows:
                                                           vypm   /1a/
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Several theoretical assumptions have been put forward to interpret the changes in the
four variables. Monetarists say that the velocity of circulation remains constant – espe-
cially in the long run – and real GDP will change according to its potential growth path,
consequently changes in money supply and price level are closely related. Keynesians
state that the velocity cannot be considered as constant, and the adjustment of the price
level is slow and comes with some delay, but the quantitative adjustment is much faster
and more vigorous, therefore significant interrelation actually develops between money
supply and the GDP. Which of the two theoretical assumptions can more appropriately be
applied on the Hungarian conditions is hard to tell a priori, on a theoretical basis. The an-
swer for this question can be attempted only after the analysis of macroeconomic data.
For the period between 1991–2000, a relatively homogeneous quarterly data-set serves as
a basis for the empirical studies.3 
Figure 1. Time paths of the basic variables
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V
3 All these data available for the whole period can be found in the official publications of the Hungarian Statistical Office
(except for the GDP, because quarterly GDP data are available only for the period 1996-2000). The GDP quarterly data for the
period preceding 1996 were estimated from the annual data by Viktor Várpalotai. The detailed methodology of this estimation
is given in Várpalotai (2000). With regard to the sensonality the variables are seasonally adjusted (except for the interest rate).
The definitions and the observed time series of the variables can be found in the Appendix.
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The first step was the exploration of the data generating processes (DGP) of the four
basic variables. Three of them are observable (see the Appendix), while velocity of





where dP  is the quarterly GDP deflator. Since this GDP deflator was partly estimated
from annual data, we mainly use quarterly consumer price index for P in the rest of this
paper. The only exception is the real money, were the GDP deflator will be applied as
dPM . The changes of the four variables over time are shown in Figure 1. 
As the graphic representation of the basic variables suggests, these processes cannot
be considered as stationary, so the level of integration was determined by means of hy-
pothesis testing. The DGP of the basic variables was explored by the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF). Table 1 shows the findings of the tests. The data-generating processes
of the individual variables were specified separately (to find out whether they contained
constant terms, or trends). The model was chosen on the basis of partial t-tests. Table 1
contains the test values calculated for the optimal model.
Table 1
ADF tests for the basic variables
Variable Level First difference Second difference
M -2.882 -2.674* -6.506***
Y -1.949 -4.631*** -6.338***
P -2.760 -6.344*** -14.278***
V -2.746 -3.246* -5.537***
Note: The random walk null-hypothesis is to be rejected * at 10,  at 5, and  at 1 percent level.
Table 2
ADF tests for the logarithms of the basic variables
Variable Level First difference Second difference
m -2.438 -3.493* -6.010***
y -2.333 -4.464*** -6.428***
p -2.323 -4.198*** -12.523***
v -2.720 -3.121** -5.552***
Note: The random walk null-hypothesis is to be rejected * at 10,  at 5, and  at 1 percent.
It can be seen that of the basic variables, the GDP and the consumer price index
measured as the percentage of the first quarter of 1991 and representing price level, are
most probably integrated of order 1. In the case of money supply and velocity, the null
can be rejected only at a 10 percent level in the case of the first differences, i.e. the vari-
ables can be interpreted as integrated of order 2. This ‘uncertainty’ in the quantity of
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money is probably due to the structural break (the ‘Bokros package’) experienced in the
first quarter of 1995. It will be ‘transferred’ to the other variables as well, since the ve-
locity was simply transformed using the other variables and equation /1/.
Since later, in the course of analysis, the original variables will be replaced with their
logarithms (see, for example equation /1a/), the mentioned tests were performed for the
transformed variables as well. Table 2 shows that the conclusions to be drawn from the
tests are in perfect agreement with the statements made about the original variables. 
Let us examine now in more details the changes in the velocity (see Figure 2) The
time sequences lead us to two conclusions (in addition to the fact that its expected value
is not constant, as can be seen in the analysis of the order of integration): on the one
hand, there was a significant decrease after the change of regime, due to the transforma-
tion crisis, and later, in the period of consolidation, it returned to the former level; and, on
the other hand, its value got stabilised in the second part of the period under considera-
tion (there were only small deviations).
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What kind of factors can be related to the change in the velocity? First of all, the in-
terest rate (r), because the trends in the costs of keeping money must have a decisive im-
pact on the duration of keeping the money. On the other hand, the co-integration test has
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shown that although there is a relationship between the velocity of circulation and the
nominal interest rate, or real interest rate (rr, nominal interest rate – rate of inflation), the
direction of the relationship is not positive, but negative – in contrast with the expecta-
tions – and the error correction mechanism does not function properly either. 
A more thorough look at Figure 2 will help us to find an acceptable explanation of
this phenomenon. The figure shows quite clearly that both the nominal and the real inter-
est rates decreased significantly in the early period of the transition; the decrease of the
former came as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis, while the latter for
the same reasons and because of the increasing inflation. Later, after 1992, both showed
an increase, while inflation slowed down and this process continued until the end of
1994. Actually, up to this point the trend was the same as in the case of the velocity of
money. After 1994, however, inflation highly increased again, while both interest rates
fell significantly. This accelerated inflation was not caused by a setback in the perform-
ance of the economy, but by the change in the economic policy, therefore the velocity did
not decrease again, but stabilised around the given level. This short historic overview
leads to two conclusions: on the one hand, a distinction between the period before 1995
and the period after it will make the close relationship between velocity and interest rates
even more obvious. On the other hand, considering that the changes in the real interest
rate were not caused by the inflation, but by the nominal interest rate, one can suppose
that the velocity is more strongly related to inflation than to the real interest rate. 
Let us examine now, whether these two hypotheses can be supported by the estimates.
The relationship between the velocity of circulation and the real interest rate was tested
again using a dummy variable, and the following co-integrating equation was set up.
DUMrrV  08364.000214.05799.0ˆ  ,
where rr is the real interest rate, DUM stands for dummy (the t-statistics were 4,05 and -







It can be seen that the real interest rate has different impacts in the two periods. This
role, however, is not equally strong; the negative role between 1990–1995 was signifi-
cantly stronger than the positive one played in the second period, that of stabilization. 
The co-integrating relationship between the velocity and quarterly inflation is quite
convincing, and the error correcting mechanism also operates adequately. As it was ex-
pected, the relationship is negative ( pV  2833.36849ˆ ) and there was no need to di-
vide the period into two parts.
The relationship of the three basic variables 
After the analysis of the velocity the three further variables of the starting equation of
the money supply /1/, i.e. the changes in the nominal money supply, the price level and
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the GDP will be examined. Since the velocity changes in time, it is not reasonable to as-
sume a stationary combination of these variables. It may, therefore, be more useful to
continue the analysis by setting up a VAR model, instead of co-integration. 
The VAR estimates of the three variables are considered to be quite adequate and re-
liable. There is, however, a fundamental problem, which jeopardises further analysis,
namely, that for each variable only its own lagged value was significant, the other two
were not, with two unimportant exceptions. These were: the GDP lagged by one and two
periods was significant for the money supply and the price level. On the whole, however,
this does not alter the previous conclusion: the changes in the three variables do not give
a coherent picture, consequently it may be more helpful to examine the pairvise relation-
ships. 
If we examine the relationship between the supply of money and the price level, it
seems to be true that changes in money supply is an I(2) process, while those in price
level is an I(1), but since the former was brought about by a structural break in the
middle of the period under consideration, we can reasonably expect to discover a co-
integrating relationship between them, even if certain restrictions are necessary. The
estimated equation (m = 3.447 + 0.799p, t = 23.11) shows that the relation is positive
and quite steady, the latter being also proved by the significant error correction equa-
tion. After the testing of the causal relation it can be established that the change in
money supply may be more caused by the change in price level than by the opposite
relation.
Table 3
Significance values of Granger causality test
Lags in the VAR modelX is not the cause
of Z 1 period 2 period 3 period 4 period 5 period
mp  0.0189 0.008 0.008 0.047 0.020
pm  0.5829 0.7570 0.1141 0.3522 0.5286
mp  0.2873 0.1668 0.5117 0.0504 0.0124
pm  0.6217 0.6086 0.6266 0.5343 0.2452
ym  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2980
my  0.0632 0.0633 0.0379 0.4683 0.7174
ym  0.0018 0.0116 0.0297 0.6207 0.5672
my  0.7209 0.3575 0.5136 0.4283 0.4996
In the course of further analysis the dynamics of changes, i.e. the relationship be-
tween the increase in money supply and inflation is examined. The co-integrating regres-
sion is estimated as
pm  7837.001431.0ˆ .
The estimated regression parameter can be interpreted in such a way that a 1 percent
increase in the quarterly inflation brought about a 0.78 percent (quarterly) increase in
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money supply. In good agreement with the former statements (see Table 3) the direction
of the causal relation remained the same, i.e. it is the inflation that causes increase in
money supply and not the other way round (the increase in money supply causes infla-
tion). This conclusion is drawn from the widely, but not generally accepted view that the
inflation experienced in the transition period was basically generated not by the demand,
but by the collapse of the supply side, and is to be considered as cost inflation originating
in the structural transformation. 
In spite of the revealed causality relations, we cannot be convinced that inflation is
the only factor influencing the increase in money supply. Table 3 drawn up on the basis
of co-integrating regression makes is quite clear that the high growth rate of the early
1990s cannot be attributed to the acceleration of inflation alone. The decrease in the ve-
locity could also play a role in the increase of money supply, among many other things.
A more detailed analysis of this issue would require a study of further money market
factors, but this would be beyond the scope of the present study.
Figure 3. Residuals of the co-integrating regression between
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Let us turn our attention to the relation between money supply and real GDP. Testing
the co-integration can be performed here as well, but with regard to our statement made
earlier about money supply and price level. The test found only a weak co-integrating
relation between the two variables, and the error correction mechanism does not work
either. In principle these findings do not contradict any theoretical hypotheses, because
the latter are usually concerned with the existence or non-existence of a relation between
real money supply (instead of nominal money supply) and real output. This is also sup-
ported by the causality analysis, which has failed to produce any significant result (see
Table 3). 
We continue with the analysis of the relation between the increments. The co-
integration test allows us to establish the following interrelationship: 
my  4352.00260.0ˆ
and the relevant error correction mechanism is also correct. Figure 4 presents this rela-
tionship and shows satisfactory adjustment, i.e. well behaving residuals.
 1 91  1 92 1 93 1 94  1 95 1 96  1 97 1 98  1 9 2 0
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Figure 4. Residuals of the co-integrating regression between
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The negative relation between the two variables can be attributed to the fact that at the
beginning of the decade production fell dramatically, leading to a very high inflation, and
consequently to an increase in money supply. In the second half of the decade, however,
consolidation resulted in increasing production, and a decrease in the growth of money
supply and inflation. In the case of 1-3 lags the analysis of the causal relation between the
rates of increase has shown beyond doubt that the rate of increase in money supply is
actually the cause of the GDP’s growth rate. Since there is a negative relation between
the two variables, it can by no means be considered as a manifestation of the Keynesian
stimulating monetary policy or of active money. What we have got here is rather the
negative impact of inflation: high or increasing inflation enforces an increase in the
growth of money supply, and, at the same time, impairs the conditions in real economy or
makes them more uncertain. As a result, the increase in GDP is also slowed down.
The co-integrating relation is in agreement with equation /1/ and also with the relation
established formerly between the velocity and inflation. Since my   is stationary,
pv  should be stationary as well, in terms of /1/. This requirement is not in contradic-
tion with the co-integrating equation between the velocity and inflation given previously.  
2. ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND SIDE
In this section analysing the demand side of two models, a traditional and the Cagan-
type money demand model will be treated. An interesting question of this investigation is
whether the adaptive or the rational expectations of inflation seem to be more plausible in
describing the Hungarian economy.
The traditional money demand equation 
We have so far examined the changes in nominal money supply as a basic variable
and its relationships. From an economic point of view, however, the time series analysis
of the real money supply is more important (M/P, or its logarithm m-p).4 Figure 5 shows
the changes in real money supply during the decade under examination.
4 In this case – as a second exception – the quarterly deflator index is used as variable P.
  1 91  1 92   1993  1 94  1 95   1996  1 97  1 98   1999  2000
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Based upon the unit root test it can be stated that the changes in real money follow an
I(1) process, (the ADF-test for the level of the variable being -2.740; the test value of the
first difference is -4.509.) Therefore the changes in real money can be described by an
ARMA (2, 1) model. Because the estimated roots of the dynamic process are less than
one, the process is stationary. The complex roots, on the other hand, indicate a cyclical
movement, though a cycle with a decreasing amplitude. 
In terms of the traditional, simple Keynesian money demand function, real money
demand depends on the nominal interest rates and real GDP, on the former in a negative
way, on the latter positively, with respect to the speculative and transactional demand. In
a general equation form:











If R is defined as a vector, which designates the yields of the alternative money hold-
ings, then we might use the portfolio-theory approach. Fundamentally, R means short-
term interest rates. It is a common assumption, that the money market is one of the most
flexible ones, and therefore the market always clears, i.e. demand equals supply. It is to
be stressed that in this approach this is a one-sided market adjustment, since the money
demand is the only one which adjusts to the money supply. Moreover, there is another
often used assumption, that money supply equals the quantity of money in circulation.
Using these simplifications we get the following simple, and empirically testable for-
mula:
                                         0,0),(  rY ffrYfP
M /2a/
In equation /2a/ there is another hidden assumption, which states that the demand for
money (the attitude of the actors of the market) remains unchanged even if the money
supply changes. (This is the essence of the Lucas-critique, which is neglected by this as-
sumption, and is totally avoided by the relation /2a/). 
Testing empirically formula /2a/ we used a dummy variable to separate the periods
before 1995 from the period after, the same way as we did previously. The results of the
  1991   1992  1993  1994  1995   1996  1997  1998   1999  2000
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OLS estimates of the model including real money, real GDP and interest rate variables
are the following:
DUMrypm d  0743.00065.03384.0497.5)( ,
where dp is the quarterly GDP deflator. Though all the parameters are significant, it is
difficult, however, to interpret the coefficient of y, because according to the conventional
interpretation the value of the transactional money demand coefficient should be some-
where between 0.5–0.8 (depending on the changes in the velocity). The discouraging re-
sults (e.g. 24.0, 44.02  WDR ) indicate, that the traditional concept of the de-
mand function cannot really be considered relevant to the Hungarian economy in the
transition period.
Consequently, it might be expedient to release the basic assumptions used so far.
First, we remove the assumption, that the behavioural rule determining the demand for











































The first equation defines the traditional behaviour of money demand, the second one
defines a Lucas-type supply function, the third – based on the rational expectations – as-
sumes that the actors of the economy know the rule of money supply, which is formu-
lated by the fourth equation. And finally, the fifth equation further maintains the assump-
tion, that the equality of demand and supply automatically exists without time lag on the
money market. From the five equations we can get the following reduced form:
                 tttt rayapmaapm 21221111210 )()()1()(   . /3/


























In these equations, however, the condition of the immediate adjustment of demand
and supply was ruled out, the parameter   shows the velocity of adjustment. 
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Further reducing these three equations we can get the following formula: 
                     tttt rayapmapm 2121110 )()()1()(   /4/
The two reduced forms show very similar structures, though their parameters are ob-
viously different. The common estimation of the two reduced forms is the following:
  ttttdtd urypmpm   0029.007517.0)(8293.09562.1 11 .
The parameters are all significant, 92.02 R  and 83.1WD . Unfortunately, the
structural parameters cannot be obtained ‘back’ from the estimated reduced form (under-
identified model). At the same time, however, with the testing of the stability of the pa-
rameters, we can answer, even if only indirectly, the question: weather the rule of money
supply has changed over time. In our case the Chow-test – using the most probable 1995
Q1 breakpoint – shows instability, moreover, the distribution of the residual variable of
the model is not normal. As a result, we cannot make any decisive statements about the
rule of money supply.
Testing the Cagan-model
In Hungary in the period of transition there was a significant inflation, which had dif-
ferent levels and was very varied in nature, yet was continuously present. This in itself
justifies, that we use the Cagan-type money demand model to determine the money de-
mand function. The model is defined by the following very simple relation:




t upabpm  1)( .  /5/
The demand equation expresses the empirically observed behaviour, that as the expec-
tations about inflation increase the demand for holding money decreases. Here b is con-
stant, u is the random variable, indicating the shocks, caused by the changes in demand and
the velocity, and the parameter a (since we work with log-variables) expresses the percent-
age decrease of money demand derived by 1 percent increase of the expected inflation.
We take two cases for defining the expectations: one is the adaptive, the other is the
rational expectations. First, let us take a look at the adaptive expectation, which accord-
ing to the widely accepted definition is:
                                               ett
e
t ppp   )1(1  . /6/
For the sake of simplicity let us assume that money supply equals the quantity of
money, and the adjustment of demand-supply can be defined by the simple form pre-
sented in the previous part:
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If we assume that the adjustment is immediate and perfect, that is 	 , then based
on the equations /5/ and /6/ we get the following reduced form:
                                   ttt papmbpm  1)()1()(  . /7/







Because the model is just identified, the structural parameters can be determined ex-
actly: 5284.2;1495.0;0174.8 
 ab . Based on this, we can conclude on the one
hand, that the last pieces of information play a relatively small role in the formation of
adaptive expectations (‘slow forgetting’), as opposed to the earlier expectations, on the
other hand a 1 percent increase of the expectations about inflation will bring about a two
and half percent decrease in the demand for money.
If the adjustment of demand supply is not perfect, then the following reduced form
occurs:






























tt upmpmpp   11 )(1221.0)(1986.02200.06353.0 .
Similarly to the previous case, this model is just identified, so we can determine the
structural parameters, which are the following: ;394.8;3852.0;30.8 
 ab
555.0 . Practically, only parameter a deviates significantly from the earlier estimates,
which indicates, that if there is no immediate adjustment between demand and supply,
just a gradual one (the adjustment parameter is less than 1 ), then as a compensation, the
elasticity of demand of the inflationary expectations will be much higher.
Considering the other type of expectations, the rational expectations, estimation of /5/
becomes very simple. Taking into account the definition of rational expectations:
111   t
e
tt pp
where   is a white noise variable, inserting this into equation /5/, and assuming, that
supply equals the real money supply and the adjustment is perfect, then we get the fol-
lowing form:




d aupabpapm . /9/
Because inflation is an I(1) process, the growth rate of inflation is stationary, and if
there is no demand shock, then the whole right hand side becomes stationary, conse
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quently the two elements of the left hand side must be co-integrated, with co-integrating
coefficient a.
Estimating this relation we get the following co-integrating equation:
ttt
d uppm  493.61431.8)(  .
The parameters are very close to those, estimated in the model of the adaptive expec-
tations. The error correction mechanism works well. Testing of the residuals showed, that
they may follow a normal distribution with expectation close to 0, which means that the
assumption of the rational expectations proved to be acceptable.
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE MONEY MARKET
After examining the demand side of the Hungarian money market, let us take a look
at the whole of the market, and the equilibrium relations dominating the market. This ob-
viously requires that the money supply function should be defined, which – opposed to
the demand function – possesses a significantly less theoretical base. After the specifica-
tion of the supply function, for the analysis of the equilibrium we must choose one of the
following two principles. 
– According to the equilibrium approach, the money demand and supply move to-
gether in the long-run (do not necessarily coincide, but the difference between them is
nearly constant), when either of these variables diverts from this equilibrium path – due
to an incidental shock – the mechanisms (perhaps automatisms) which return the market
into the state of equilibrium immediately switch on (error correction takes place). When
some influence (e.g. price increase) evokes a change leading to an increase of inflation,
then with the increase of supply the equilibrium will come about, and vice versa. 
– The disequilibrium approach on the other hand assumes that the difference between
demand and supply is not steady, not stationary (not constant), there are no forces on the
market that might stimulate demand or supply to ‘follow’ each other. A certain adjust-
ment variable (e.g. the real interest rate) continuously provides information about the
earlier relations of demand and supply, it decreases when the supply is prevalent, and in-
creases when the supply decreases. 
From modelling point of view this means that:
a) we specify the money demand and money supply function (when specifying the
demand function we obviously rely on our earlier argumentation);
b) we estimate – independently – the value of the target variable based on the demand
and the supply function, then by testing the co-integration of the two estimated variables
we analyse the equilibrium hypothesis;
c) after we have a satisfactory adjustment equation, we estimate the models in a dis-
equilibrium approach and carry out a specification analysis;
d) Based on the fit of the model estimated at two different approaches and on the
specification analysis, an assessment on the equilibrium–disequilibrium situation of the
economy can be set.
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The specification of the market model
Based on our earlier findings it becomes obvious that the study of the equilibrium
situation requires the re-specification of the money demand and money supply functions.
Our study with regard to the money demand function made it clear, that the demand for
real money supply depends on the GDP, on the inflation as well as on the interest rate.




t uDUMrpyD  43210  ,
where MtD  means the demand for money supply, DUM denotes the dummy variable,
(introduced earlier for the quantification of the impacts of the ‘Bokros-package’). From
the point of view of equilibrium the intended and the actual demand coincide in the long-
run, its value equals that of the supply, and the actual value of the real money supply (in
our earlier models we used the notation  tpm ). It is to be mentioned, that we did not
want to use a lagged endogenous variable in our model, because it could result in an
‘over-adjustment’ especially in a later disequilibrium model.
During the specification of the supply function we could not rely on theoretical con-
siderations as we did before. With regard to the whole of the period it would not seem
feasible to have a rule of money supply or a monetary policy with exclusive effect, so we
considered the two most obvious factors as basic variables: the domestic interest rate in-
fluencing the money supply of the commercial banks, and the interest premium influ-
encing the flow of foreign currency.5 Based on all these findings the final form of the




t uDUMrprS  3210
where MtS  corresponds to the quantity of supply, and trp  represents interest premium.
In both the demand and the supply function we took the logarithms of real money
supply, real-GDP, and the price level variables.
The estimation and the analysis of the equilibrium model
According to the equilibrium hypothesis, the demand for money and the supply of
money was in dynamic equilibrium during the past decade on the Hungarian money mar-






The results of the OLS estimates are the following (t-statistics are in brackets):
 








5 The definition of interest premium and the referring data are displayed in the Appendix.
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The coefficient of determination of the demand function is 0.498; while the corre-
sponding indicator of the supply function is 0.607. (It must be mentioned, that the values
of the Durbin-Watson d-statistic – a generally accepted diagnostic test – are very low for
both functions.)
The parameters of the models basically meet the theoretical expectations, with only
one exception, this is the negative sign of the interest premium. According to the logic of
the uncovered interest parity, the higher the interest premium is the more foreign cur-
rency will flow into the country, and after the exchange it will increase the quantity of
money, that is the money supply. If, however, the monetary authorities follow a strict and
consistent sterilising policy, that is they compensate for the foreign currency flow by
withdrawing corresponding amounts of money from the internal market, then we can
easily get a negative coefficient, because the withdrawal of money usually affects the
‘active’ money, while the foreign currency represents ‘passive’ money after the exchange
(see for example the privatisation purchases). Based on the estimation of the money sup-
ply function we can conclude that during the period examined, the Hungarian National
Bank followed a consequent sterilising policy.
Based on OLS estimates we carried out the ex-post forecasts of the variables of the
two equations, which seem to be co-integrated at a 5 percent significance-level (the value
of the Johansen LR-test function is 17.546). 
According to the co-integrating regression
   St
D
t pmpm  238.1878.1
where the superscripts indicate, which function the forecasts derive from. Figure 6
shows the changes in estimated demand and supply, and the actual real value of money
supply.
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The figure supports that demand and supply change together, so based on our findings
we can assume, that the market was in equilibrium in the long-term, the error correcting
mechanism prevailed itself.
The analysis of the disequilibrium model with regard to money markets
The essence of the disequilibrium concept is, that the market does not ‘clear itself’, that is
– as we called it earlier there is no error correction – the actual transactional quantity (in our
case the real money supply) is determined by the short side of the market at all times. The
specification of the disequilibrium model resembles that of the equilibrium model described









t uDUMrprS  3210
ˆ
   MtMtt SDpm ˆˆ ;min
 MtMtt SDrr ˆ1ˆ1  
where MtD
ˆ  and MtS
ˆ  mean the intended demand for money supply and the supply of
money respectively. The latter – in case of the disequilibrium model – might not necessarily
correspond to the actual supply. The model is completed by the minimum condition and a
so-called adjustment equation, in which we assume that changes in the real interest rates are
functions of the excess demand of the previous period. (Depending whether this equation
contains a random variable we have to use different methods for estimating the parameters
of the model).6 The maximum likelihood estimates are as follows: 
















6 Given that both equations contain the same explanatory variables, construction of the likelihood function is not trivial.
The details of this problem are beyond the scope of this study (see Quandt; 1988 and Rappai; 1989).
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It can be seen, that the parameters show only a slight deviation from the values esti-
mated earlier by the OLS method. Some of the striking differences are the result of the
large standard errors which make even the signs uncertain. All this indicates that the em-
pirical verification of the disequilibrium hypothesis is based on very precarious grounds.












Figure 7 shows the changes in estimated intended demand, and supply having a dis-
equilibrium conception, as well as the actual real money supply. We can see, that in the
past decade under examination the intended demand continuously and significantly ex-
ceeded the intended supply, and – due to the effectiveness of the short side of the market
– the actual real money supply as well. Nontheless it is true, that the ‘excess demand’
shows a decreasing tendency over time, but even then it cannot justify sufficiently the
dynamic changes and the interrelation of money demand and money supply. Based on
these findings, the disequilibrium hypothesis with regard to the period between 1991–
2000 cannot be considered statistically verified.
4. CONCLUSION
Since the observation period is too short, the results allow us to draw conclusions of
only limited validity. Nevertheless, the results of a many-sided model analysis provide
the possibility to make a few careful and not too rigorous conclusions.
1. From the point of view of monetary processes the period between 1991–2000 can-
not be regarded homogeneous. The Bokros-package of March 1995 has a relevance here
from two aspects: on the one hand, the artificial acceleration of inflation, and on the other
hand, the changing of the exchange rate mechanism. Its impacts can be well experienced
during the modelling of the different monetary processes.
2. According to the evidence gained from our empirical analyses, the changes in the
velocity of money in the transition period can be explained by the inflation rather than
the changes in interest rates. This specific situation could arise, because the change in
real interest rate (despite its high value) was basically determined not by the inflation, but
by the change in the nominal interest rate.
1 91  1 92   1 93  1 94   1 95   1 96   1997  1 98   1999   2000
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3. Our research rendered it possible that in the Hungarian economy, money did not
play an active, but rather a passive role in the period of transition. Our model-estimates
confirm that the increase and at a later stage the decrease of inflation was caused by the
decrease and the stabilization of real output (GDP) (with the exception of 1995, when in-
flation was artificially accelerated). The nominal money supply (with a short time-lag)
basically adjusted to the changes of inflation. 
4. Effectiveness of the two-factor, containing GDP and interest rate money demand
function – when it is assumed that the demand of money adjusts immediately and per-
fectly to the quantity of money (which is equal to the money supply as well) – cannot be
proven by empirical investigations. We can get far better results if we overrule the as-
sumption that quantity of money = money supply, and the immediate adjustment of de-
mand supply (money supply = money demand), and we transform the money demand
function accordingly.
5. The Cagan-type money demand function provided surprisingly good results, with
both adaptive and rational expectations. This might come as a surprise, because though
the level of inflation in the Hungarian economy was quite significant throughout the pe-
riod under consideration, yet there was no real danger of a hyperinflationary situation
(that is why the Cagan-model was originally developed for). One explanation of this
fairly good result could be, that the expectations about inflation played an important role
in the changes of the domestic inflation process.
6. With respect to the mutual relations between the demand for money and the supply
of money and to the balanced situation of the money market, the findings of our tests
firmly suggest that we accept the equilibrium hypothesis against the disequilibrium hy-
pothesis. Our estimates suggest, that the demand for money and the supply of money ad-
justed to each other relatively fast and well through the determining factors, and accord-





M2 GDPC GDF CPI 4 INFL INTEREST IPREM
1991 Q1 914.7 592.0 1363.0 100.00 34.2 31.94 23.06
1991 Q2 963.5 614.2 1398.4 109.17 37.3 28.05 28.47
1991 Q3 1018.1 623.6 1418.6 113.64 35.5 24.51 13.05
1991 Q4 1183.0 674.0 1481.9 117.66 33 18.49 16.78
1992 Q1 1311.8 666.6 1289.7 126.23 26.2 14.49 17.68
1992 Q2 1422.2 703.3 1333.3 133.46 22.2 9.72 10.11
1992 Q3 1519.8 724.8 1361.7 137.33 20.8 14.14 0.72
1992 Q4 1666.5 795.2 1433.9 144.26 22.6 22.61 -0.15
1993 Q1 1687.6 802.0 1265.3 157.38 24.7 24.10 -7.63
1993 Q2 1743.1 856.6 1318.2 162.37 21.7 23.65 -11.54
1993 Q3 1819.8 890.0 1353.5 167.81 22.2 25.46 -5.27
1993 Q4 1967.1 986.7 1438.2 175.11 21.4 30.44 10.41
1994 Q1 1957.5 1015.2 1294.3 183.83 16.8 32.03 7.68
(Continued on the next page.)




M2 GDPC GDF CPI 4 INFL INTEREST IPREM
1994 Q2 2041.3 1093.6 1359.2 192.10 18.3 33.07 -3.30
1994 Q3 2102.4 1138.2 1396.8 200.52 19.5 32.66 4.71
1994 Q4 2246.0 1258.1 1480.7 211.18 20.6 30.54 1.07
1995 Q1 2262.8 1298.4 1338.8 228.84 24.5 30.54 -8.24
1995 Q2 2343.1 1380.5 1391.5 250.30 30.3 24.13 9.97
1995 Q3 2481.1 1407.8 1407.7 259.69 29.5 23.94 11.07
1995 Q4 2715.4 1527.3 1476.0 271.76 28.7 22.73 9.64
1996 Q1 2759.3 1577.1 1346.7 292.03 27.6 22.24 6.67
1996 Q2 2891.1 1692.8 1401.2 310.43 24 20.76 5.44
1996 Q3 3043.0 1717.0 1420.3 318.63 22.7 20.02 4.16
1996 Q4 3318.0 1907.1 1521.0 326.97 20.3 19.41 3.53
1997 Q1 3268.8 1910.5 1377.8 346.87 18.8 19.28 3.34
1997 Q2 3399.0 2101.2 1468.5 367.21 18.3 18.80 3.43
1997 Q3 3593.4 2147.5 1501.6 376.01 18 17.34 2.05
1997 Q4 3975.3 2381.5 1601.5 386.14 18.1 19.27 4.17
1998 Q1 3901.2 2276.6 1438.4 406.18 17.1 16.21 1.99
1998 Q2 4050.1 2479.0 1540.5 423.40 15.3 15.62 -5.26
1998 Q3 4242.8 2548.1 1582.7 426.38 13.4 14.71 2.98
1998 Q4 4593.4 2783.7 1676.9 429.81 11.3 14.00 14.07
1999 Q1 4618.2 2567.4 1487.8 444.78 9.5 12.51 6.01
1999 Q2 4733.1 2802.7 1601.4 461.92 9.1 10.78 6.87
1999 Q3 4930.7 2906.3 1654.4 471.54 10.6 10.64 5.58
1999 Q4 5310.2 3212.1 1775.1 476.23 10.8 10.73 5.85
2000 Q1 5282.6 2913.3 1585.4 488.38 9.8 11.78 1.69
2000 Q2 5370.5 3166.2 1696.6 503.95 9.1 12.00 2.47
2000 Q3 5595.1 3237.5 1728.2 517.73 9.8 12.20 0.89
2000 Q4 5968.3 3563.6 1851.4 525.71 10.4 12.00 3.51
Note. Signs and abbreviations used:
M2 – M2 money supply (HUF billion).
GDPC – Quarterly GDP in current prices (HUF billion).
GDF – Quarterly GDP in 1995 constant prices (HUF billion).
CPI 4 – Quarterly consumer price index (1991Q1=100).
INFL – 12 month consumer price index – CPI.
INTEREST – Average yield of three month discount treasury bills, computed for annual level.
IPREM – Interest premium, computed from the relation of the so-called non-covered interest parity, ee
frrrp  ,
where fr  means the interest rate of the world market, ee  means the rate of devaluation of the domestic currency. 
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EMPLOYMENT RESPONSE TO REAL EXCHANGE
RATE MOVEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM HUNGARIAN
EXPORTING FIRMS* 
MIKLÓS KOREN1 
This paper  estimates the labor demand response of Hungarian exporting firms to real
exchange rate movements. The use of firm level export–import data enables the separation of
two channels through which the exchange rate affects labor demand. First, a real depreciation
raises the forint-equivalent price of foreign competitors, thereby boosting demand for the
firm’s export and, hence, the firm’s demand for labor. Second, by raising the cost of im-
ported inputs, a depreciation has an adverse effect on employment through the cost channel.
A higher marginal cost induces a decrease in production and thus shrinks labor demand.
Since firms with higher export share tend to import more, this latter negative effect might
offset the former positive one. The cost effect may be dampened if labor and imported inputs
are substitutes. 
The paper shows that the relative importance of the demand and cost effects is industry
specific. The short-run exchange rate and employment elasticity stemming from the demand
effect is around 0.04. This channel is most pronounced in the case of the Food and tobacco
industry. Machinery, on the other hand, exhibits a cost effect of roughly 0.04. Surprisingly,
there is no evidence that export share affects exchange rate exposure. 
KEYWORDS: Labor demand; Exchange rate; Panel data. 
he present paper addresses the question of how workers of Hungarian exporting
firms are affected by movements in the Hungarian real exchange rate. In particular, it ex-
amines the changes in labor demand attributable to exchange rate movements. To the
extent a weaker forint implies an expansion in Hungarian exports, firms may be willing
to expand their labor force. Besides the magnitude and speed of this demand-driven ad-
justment, we are interested in the cost side of the exchange rate. It is a common observa-
tion that Hungarian exporting companies use a substantial amount of imported inputs.
This means that a depreciation of the forint raises the marginal cost of production,
thereby affecting the demand for labor non-trivially. This paper attempts to separate the
demand- and cost-side effects. 
* This paper is a revised and updated version of my master’s thesis at Central European University. I wish to thank Gábor
Kőrösi for his extensive help as my thesis supervisor. I also thank János Vincze and two referees for their comments. Any re-
maining errors are mine.
1 PhD Student, Harvard University, Department of Economics.
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Using a panel of large Hungarian exporting firms from 1992–1996, the paper quanti-
fies the effect of real exchange rate movements on labor demand. Although this effect is
well documented for U.S. industries, we are unaware of any such empirical study con-
cerning transition countries. As these economies have opened up to international trade, it
is important to quantify how much their labor force is exposed to external market condi-
tions. The immediate observation that most Central and Eastern European countries have
limited the fluctuation of their exchange rate in one fashion or another does not render
the question irrelevant. Even if the nominal exchange rate is stabilized, the real exchange
rate faced by firms can vary remarkably depending on foreign and home market condi-
tions. As for the case of the HUF, we document firm-specific real exchange rates based
on product- and firm-level data on Hungarian exports and imports and show that there is
much more fluctuation in these rates than in the nominal HUF rate. Also, the recent ten-
dency of more flexible exchange rate regimes further justifies the analysis of exchange
rate movements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a brief survey on the
existing literature on U.S. estimations. Section 2 derives the estimable equations from a
standard dynamic model of labor demand. Estimation methodology and results are re-
ported in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes. There is an appendix describing the data
used and some of the technical derivations of the estimation technique. 
1. PREVIOUS RESULTS
In this section we present some of the empirical literature that have addressed a wide
range of questions concerning labor market adjustment to exchange rate shocks. Besides
net changes in employment (either in number of employed or in hours worked) and
wages, gross job flows are also analyzed. 
Employment and wage response
In one of the earliest papers, Branson and Love (1988) examine the effects of the real
appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the early eighties. Using industry-level data from 1970
to 1986, they estimate how a labor-cost based real exchange rate can explain changes in
U.S. manufacturing employment. They find a sizeable exchange rate effect, an average
elasticity of 0.11 for non-durable goods and 0.29 for durable goods.2 That is, a 10 percent
real appreciation of the dollar results in a 1.1 percent, respectively 2.9 percent decline in
industry employment. They also document that employment reacts very slowly, so the
long-run coefficients may well be three to ten times higher than the short-run elasticities. 
Burgess and Knetter (1998) estimate the reduced form of a simple dynamic labor de-
mand model for G-7 countries. They examine the elasticity of employment with respect
to exchange rates, as well as the speed of adjustment. They find that both of these rela-
tionships heavily differ among industries and countries. Their estimation for employ-
ment-exchange rate elasticity are rather mixed, ranging from 1.5 to +1.2.3 They con-
clude that in roughly 30 percent of the country–industry pairs there is a significant em
2 Branson–Love (1988) p. 249, significant coefficients only.
3 Burgness–Knetter (1998), Table 3, significant coefficients only.
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ployment response to exchange rates: an appreciation of the home currency results in loss
of jobs. Germany and Japan seem somewhat less responsive to exchange rate fluctuations
than the other G-7 countries. The stylized fact that the labor markets of Anglo-Saxon
countries (United Kingdom, United States, Canada) adjust faster is also confirmed. 
Dekle (1998) applies a partial equilibrium model of monopolistic competition on
Japanese manufacturing firms. He calculates industry specific real exchange rates as de-
mand shifters, by using industry specific GDP deflators and trade shares. Dekle founds
that there is a sizeable impact of real exchange rate changes to employment. He rejects,
however, that this impact is linked with the industries’ exposure to foreign markets (ei-
ther export or import shares). The estimated employment/exchange rate elasticity ranges
from 0.71 to 1.26, but the speed of adjustment is rather slow.4 
In contrast to the result of Burgess and Knetter (1998), Campa and Goldberg (1998)
find very weak relationship between employment and exchange rates in U.S. manufac-
turing industries. They investigate both the demand and the supply of labor, measuring
job, working hours and wage responses to fluctuations of the U.S. dollar between 1972
and 1995. Using industry-level data, they find that wages respond significantly to ex-
change rate changes (with an average elasticity of 0.04), whereas the number of jobs and
working hours is virtually unaffected (with an elasticity of 0.01).5 In explaining the dif-
ferences in labor market adjustment among sectors, the competitive structure (measured
by the price over costs markup) and the external orientation of the industry (a higher ex-
port share yields larger labor demand increase in response to a real depreciation, while a
higher import share results in lower, or even in negative demand change) and the skill-
level of the labor force have proven to be the most important factors. 
Lebow (1993) criticizes those studying the behavior of tradable goods sectors alone.
He argues that the cross sectoral adjustment of labor supply (although mobility is imper-
fect in his model) affects the wage level of the nontradable goods sector, as well. The
overall effect of exchange rate on relative and aggregate real wage is thus ambiguous, its
sign depends on the degree of labor mobility and the share of the tradable sector in pro-
duction and employment. He also finds that wages are more responsive to export and im-
port prices than the real exchange rate. 
Job flows
The use of industry-level employment stock data can yield misleading predictions. In
the last few years it has become fashionable to address the question with the use of firm-
level flow data. Instead of number of jobs or total working hours, research is directed to-
wards job creation and job destruction of firms and entry–exit decision of workers. The
simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs (resulting from heterogeneity across firms)
may cover a substantial part of labor market adjustment, even if net employment is un-
changed. These gross job flows may be correlated with the firm’s external exposure. 
At the individual worker’s level, employment stability has got little to do with net
employment flows. Newly created jobs may require very different skills from those that a
freshly laid-off worker has. Even in absence of these structural differences, higher gross 
4 Dekle (1998), p. 797.
5 Campa–Goldberg (1998), p. 24.
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job flows give rise to higher search unemployment. This is why the analysis of gross
flows is essential in understanding the labor market consequences of real exchange rate
movements. 
Analyzing U.S. job flows, Gourinchas (1998) finds that although net industry em-
ployment responds very little to dollar exchange rate movements, there is a substantial
response of job destruction and creation rate within the industries. A weaker dollar im-
plies both less job creation and less job destruction, and, conversely, a strong dollar
means more job adjustment. Goldberg, Tracy and Aaronson (1999) incorporate another
important margin of labor market adjustment, the worker’s switching of industry. They
document that roughly half of the job-changers change their two-digit industry as well.6
The authors use matched samples from the Current Population Survey, which contains
individual-level data on employment, too. They estimate a probit model to explain the
job or industry switching of the worker by industry specific export and import real ex-
change rates, and also examine the asymmetry of these effects. They find that manufac-
turing workers’ likelihood to switch industry is largely effected by the import real ex-
change rate, that is, an appreciation reduces the likelihood of switching. The relationship
is most pronounced in the non-durable goods sector and in sectors with high import
shares. For non-manufacturing workers, both export and import exchange rates influence
the probability of industry switching, while the probability of job changing remains unaf-
fected. This means that sectoral composition of the labor market is responsive to ex-
change rate movements. 
Similarly to Gourinchas (1998), Klein, Schuh and Triest (2000) turn to gross job
flows in U.S. manufacturing industries during 1973 and 1993. They calculate job creation
and destruction rates from firm-level employment data, showing substantial heterogene-
ity across industries in this respect. They find that the differences are connected with the
sector’s external exposure. Interestingly, this connection is asymmetric: whereas job de-
struction increases with an appreciation of the dollar (a 1 percent appreciation causing a
0.47 percentage point higher destruction rate), job creation seems to be unaffected.7 This
may be due to asymmetric adjustment costs: creating new jobs is likely to be more costly
than laying off workers. The authors also find evidence that the responsiveness of job de-
struction is higher in industries more open to international competition. 
Goldberg and Tracy (2001) improve upon Goldberg et al. (1999) by incorporating a
wage equation in their estimation. This enables them to address the puzzling result that
wages are much more responsive to exchange rates than employment is (see Campa-
Goldberg, 1998, for instance). They show that these large wage changes are mostly asso-
ciated with job transitions (though they are not captured by industry-level data), that is,
workers remaining on the same job face little wage change. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section introduces the analytical framework used to derive the estimable equa-
tions. 
6 Goldberg et al. (1999), p. 206, Table 1.
7 Klein et al. (2000). 
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Product Demand
Consider a Hungarian exporting firm, competing in two markets, the domestic
(henceforth indexed by H) and the foreign (hence F). Demand for the firm’s products QD
depends on its price relative to its competitors, 
 HcompHFcompFD PPPPfQ , , /1/
and both relative prices have negative effect on the demand.8 If the demand elasticities
are constant in both markets, then markups are constant, too. This implies that the prices
charged depend  only (positively) on the marginal cost of production, hence one can







comp PRWPPgQ , /2/
where W is the wage rate, R is the rental cost of capital, and PM is the price of imported
inputs. All prices are expressed in domestic currency (henceforth referred to as HUF).





comp prwppq 543210   /3/
where lowercase letters denote logarithmized variables. We expect 1 and 2 to be posi-
tive while 3, 4, and 5 to be negative. 
Labor demand
With any static production function, labor demand of the firm is a function of the
production level, the wage rate, and the price of other inputs that either complement or








where L is the amount of labor demanded (measured in the number of workers) and Q is
the level of production. We will assume a log-linear form, 
                                               Mprwql 43210    . /5/
Here 1 is expected to be positive, 2 to be negative, while the signs of 3 and 4 are in-
determinate. They depend on whether capital and imported inputs substitute or comple
8 Insofar as Hungary can be considered a small open economy, the foreign disposable income does not affect demand for
Hungarian products. Specifications with foreign and Hungarian spending have been tested but none of them entered signifi-
cantly.
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ment labor. If the factors are gross substitutes then the coefficient is positive, otherwise,
if they are gross complements, it is negative. Substituting in for q from /3/ to avoid en-
dogeneity bias in the estimation yields, 
                                   
 












or, after redefining the parameters, 




comp prwppl 543210   . /7/
This is the static version of the labor demand equation that we wish to estimate. We
will also refer to the previous equation as xγ Tl   with γ  being the vector of coeffi-
cients and x being the vector of demand and cost shifters. 
There are three channels through which exchange rate affects labor demand. First, a real
depreciation raises the forint-equivalent price of foreign competitors (pFcomp), thereby
boosting demand for the firm’s export.9 This is what we call the demand channel. The ex-
change rate elasticity of labor demand, 1 is expected to be positive and increasing in the
company’s export exposure. Second, by raising the cost of imported inputs (pM), a depre-
ciation has an adverse effect on employment through the cost channel. A higher marginal
cost induces a decrease in production and thus shrinks labor demand. Third, depending on
the production function, an increase in imported material prices may cause substitution to-
wards labor to the extent that these two factors are substitutable in production. This substi-
tution channel dampens the effect of the cost channel. Their gross impact is summarized in
coefficient 5. The overall employment-exchange rate elasticity will be 1+5.10 
Let us now turn to a dynamic version of the previous model. 
Sluggish Adjustment
The static model of labor demand presented in the previous subsection is only valid in
absence of adjustment costs. However, there are significant costs of hiring and firing
workers. This means that the present employment decision is influenced by past em-
ployment and also by the expectation to future market conditions. Let us briefly examine
the dynamic considerations arising from adjustment costs. We will only consider net
changes in the labor force, leaving working hours unchanged. 
In general, the firm would solve the following dynamic optimization problem: 
 












x  , /8/
9 ‘Real’ deprecation means that domestic prices are unchanged.
10 It has been assumed that the wage rate and the rental cost of capital are unaffected by the real exchange rate. Although
wages can play a significant role in labor market adjustment to external shocks (see Campa–Goldberg; 1998), we anticipate that
this occurs over a longer horizon due to some rigidity in the nominal wages. As for the cost of capital, a liberalized capital mar-
ket ensures that it is relatively fixed.
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where  = 1/(1+r) is the firm’s discount factor, t is profit, lt is (log of) employment, xt is
a vector of exogenous variables (demand and cost shifters, among others, most impor-
tantly, foreign product prices and prices of other factors) in period t, C(·) is the adjust-
ment cost depending on the one period net percentage change in employment,
lt = lt  lt1. 
The simplest specification of adjustment costs is the most widely used quadratic
form: 
  2lclC  ,
where c is a parameter representing the size of adjustment costs. Together with a quad-
ratic profit function, this assumption ensures that labor demand evolves according to the
following dynamics:11 
      st
s
s
tt lll t 


   x
*
0
1 E11  , /9/
where l * is the optimal level of labor demand that would prevail itself in absence of ad-
justment costs, and  is a positive parameter depending positively on the magnitude of
adjustment costs. Observe that optimal employment is a weighted average of previous
period employment and present and all future optimal employments. 
Now the question remains how expectation on future market conditions, xt+s’s can be
specified. In the estimations we will assume that the exogenous variables follow a first-
order vector-autoregression, that is, 
t
s
sttE xAx  ,




* . If the Leontief inverse of A exists then /9/ simplifies to 







Here θ  denotes the vector of directly estimable short-run (or contemporaneous) pa-
rameters. However, we might also be interested in the long-run parameters, . If we know







We will apply the previous dynamic framework to estimate the production equation,
/3/, too. Since adjusting the production level can indeed be a costly decision (We have al
11 See Nickell (1986), p. 502–504 for the details of the algebra.
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ready discussed the role of hiring and firing costs, but adjustment costs also occur in in-
vestment and disinvestment), it is right to estimate /3/ in a dynamic setting. In this case,
present production will also depend on last-period production, so lagged production will
enter the labor demand equation, too. 




tcompttt prwppqll ,543,2,1110   , /11/




tcomptt prwppqq ,543,2,110    . /12/
These are the equations to be estimated. We are interested in 	1, the demand-side ex-
change rate elasticity of employment, 	5, the cost-side elasticity, and their production-
equation counterpart, 1 and 5. 
These are only the short-run elasticities. To see the magnitude of the long-run elas-
ticities, we must take the speed of labor demand adjustment and the expectation for fu-
ture market conditions into account. The sample is too short to forecast exogenous vari-
ables so we are not calculating long-run elasticities based on the VAR approach outlined
former. A crude measure can be obtained if we assume that all the exogenous variables
follow a random walk (i.e., A=I). The respective demand- and cost-side exchange rate
elasticities of employment are 	1/(1) and 	5/(1). 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the following section I first describe the data and the econometric methodology
used, then discuss the main empirical findings.
Data
The dataset consists of a panel of Hungarian exporting companies from 1992 to 1996.
Data were matched from three different sources, the Customs Statistics, the firms’ bal-
ance sheet and earnings statement data, and Eurostat’s Extra-EU Trade Statistics. ‘For-
eign market’ of the firms is identified with the European Union because this is the largest
market segment that we have data on. This approximation is valid up to the extent that
Hungarian export is oriented towards the EU. The median firm in the sample collects 65
percent of its export revenues from the EU, and this number is above 99 percent for the
top decile, so we regard the use of EU data as a good approximation. 
The Customs Statistics dataset contains the annual export and import traffic of Hun-
garian firms, both in value (HUFs and U.S. dollars) and in tons, so we are able to calcu-
late unit value measures. The traffic is divided into product categories broken down to
HS6 (the Harmonized System) level. The use of the Harmonized System makes prices
and quantities comparable to European external trade statistics. Annual EU exports and
imports are given in ecus and tons for each HS6 category. This enables us to calculate
import and export unit values as a proxy for the average foreign price for each product.
These prices are then converted to HUF and are averaged for each firm as described in
Appendix 1. The companies were then matched with their balance sheets and profit and
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loss accounts, to obtain data on employment, sales and costs. Appendix 2 describes how
the variables were constructed. 
Those large companies were selected, whose performance depend largely on export
markets. A firm was chosen if it exported at least 100 million HUFs and possessed at least
100 million HUFs book equity in 1994. The dynamic nature of the model restricts us to use
only those companies who have data from consecutive years. Out of the resulting 356 firms
we selected those in one of the four most export-oriented industries: Food and tobacco (SIC
15 and 16), Chemical industry (SIC 23 through 26), Metallurgy (SIC 27 and 28) and Ma-
chinery (SIC 29 through 35). This limited the number of firms in the unbalanced panel to
266 with an average span of 2.7 years, which means 707 observations. 
Altogether, the companies in the sample represent a substantial fraction of Hungarian
exports (see Table 1). Their share is between one fourth and one third, although in 1992
there are remarkably few firms in the sample (31 firms with an export share of 8.4 per-
cent).12 Although the selection by size can introduce selection bias, the large degree of





1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Average span
(years)
Food and tobacco 8 28 43 44 51 67 2.6
Chemical 8 38 46 37 55 63 2.9
Metallurgy 5 23 28 29 29 50 2.6
Machinery 10 43 57 48 77 90 2.3
Total 31 132 174 158 212 266 2.7
Share in total Hungarian exports* (percent) 8.4 24.3 26.2 28.2 35.2 27.4
* Source: Statistical Yearbook of External Trade (1997–1998). Külkereskedelmi Statisztikai Évkönyvek 1997, 1998. KSH.
Budapest.
Since we have an unbalanced panel, we need to check whether falling out of the
panel is endogenous, in which case we would encounter serious selection bias in the es-
timation. Fortunately, the variables of interest do not explain fall-out from the panel (we
have estimated a probit equation to examine this problem), meaning that survival is in-
deed random. 
Table 2 summarizes the external exposure of firms within each industry. We report
the share of exports in total revenues as a measure of exposure to demand shocks, the
share of import costs in total costs to capture the cost-effect of the exchange rate, and the
share of foreign owned firms in the sample. This latter ratio may be relevant to the extent
that foreign owned firms respond differently to external conditions than domestic firms.
Sources of this difference may include greater market power in external markets and
12 This is most probably because of the accounting and bankruptcy reforms of 1992; a lot of firms have gone out of busi-
ness or changed their status and thus their tax registration number. Hence they cannot be linked into a panel and drop out of the
sample.
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transfer pricing between the multinational company and its Hungarian subsidy. After ex-
perimenting with several specifications (not reported in this paper), we were unable to









Food and tobacco 26.1 13.7 58.1
Chemical 47.6 29.5 59.8
Metallurgy 45.0 34.3 39.5
Machinery 65.8 40.3 58.3
Total 47.2 29.8 55.6
It is a surprising observation how much export and import exposure correlate. The in-
dustry with the lowest export share, Food industry (26.1%) has also the lowest share of
imports (13.7%), and, conversely, that with the highest export share (Machinery, 65.8%)
has the highest import share, too (40.3%). This amplifies the importance of looking at the
cost-channel of exchange rate: it may well be the case that a weakening HUF has a nega-
tive impact on employment because the price increase of imports outweighs the expan-
sion of demand. 
To get a sense of how the exchange rate and employment co-move, let us have a look
at Figures 1 through 4. They display cumulated change in the real exchange rate, the
firm’s external competitiveness, and employment averaged across each of the industries
(1993=100).13 
Figure 1. Mean employment and the real exchange rate: Food and tobacco industry 
(1993=100)
 Real Exchange Rate
Competitiveness
 Employment






13 Year 1992 has been omitted because there are too few observations to calculate meaningful averages.
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Figure 3. Mean employment and the real exchange rate: Metallurgy
(1993=100)






 Real Exchange Rate
Competitiveness
 Employment
Figure 4. Mean employment and the real exchange rate: Machinery
(1993=100)






 Real Exchange Rate
Competitiveness
 Employment
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The real exchange rate is average foreign price relative to domestic price (in common
currency), while competitiveness is measured as the foreign competitors’ price relative to
the firm’s export price (see Appendix 1 for more details on variable definitions). We can
see that the real exchange rate moves along a wide range during the years with the pat-
terns differing remarkably across industries. For example, Machinery has experienced
almost the opposite real exchange rate movements than the Chemical industry did. There
is also a large within-industry variation in the real exchange rate not reported in the fig-
ures. These findings call for the use of industry-specific, or even firm-specific exchange
rate instead of an aggregate macroeconomic measure. 
Also observe that in the case of Chemical industry and Metallurgy competitiveness is
less volatile than the real exchange rate although they move in the same direction. This
means that the firm’s export price reacts less to the exchange rate than the domestic price
does. This may be due to either nominal price rigidities, or local currency price stability
stemming from pricing-to-market behavior.14 
We see significant co-movement of employment and real exchange rate for the Food
and tobacco and the Chemical industry. In particular, a weaker forint is associated with a
labor expansion. No pattern is visible for Metallurgy and even a reversed response can be
seen in the case of Machinery. This may be due to the high import share of this industry:
a weaker forint raises the price of inputs, thereby lowering the demand for labor. Let us
now turn to an econometric evaluation of these findings. 
Methodology
Recall the estimable equation from /11/. We have subtracted li,t1 from both sides. 


















where i indexes firms, t indexes time, and uit is the error term. Let us discuss some of the
methodological problems of estimating /11a/. 
– Endogeneity of factor prices. If the firm’s size is not negligible relative to its factor
markets, then factor prices may be correlated with the error term. Consider a firm-
specific shock that raises the firm’s demand for labor. (Macroeconomic shocks are con-
trolled for by using time dummies.) This may well increase the equilibrium wage rate,
and may also alter the other factor prices. Since the cost of imported materials is meas-
ured as a European average price (see Appendix 1), it is not likely to be affected by a
small-country firm. In the case of capital, we argue that the large degree of capital mo-
bility equates capital costs across regions, so the individual firm has little effect on its
capital cost. This argument does not hold for labor, since it is rather immobile within
Hungary. Hence we used an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach to correct for the en-
dogeneity of wages. Current wage of the firm was instrumented by lagged wage and re-
gional supply shifters, as unemployment rate and labor activity rate. 
14 See Goldberg–Knetter (1997) for an overview of the pricing-to-market literature.
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– Firm-specific error. If there are omitted firm-specific factors that affect labor de-
mand (e.g., firm-specific assets, managerial skills), then the error term is correlated with
lagged employment, thus making the OLS estimation inconsistent. We can incorporate
firm-specific error terms if we estimate the model with one of the panel methods. A fixed
effect model is immediately ruled out, since the lagged dependent variable renders the
estimation inconsistent.15 A random effect specification can be employed, and the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator remains consistent in this case, as described in Appendix 2.16 
To tackle the previous problems, the following estimation procedure was adopted. First,
we fitted the wage rate on all the exogenous labor demand shifters herein, as well as supply
shifters, such as lagged wage and regional measures of unemployment and labor force ac-
tivity. We used the predicted wage instead of the actual wage in all of the model specifica-
tions later. This two-step procedure is equivalent to the standard IV-method if the second
step is a linear estimation. If it is not, then the estimation is still consistent by a method-of-
moments argument.17 However, the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimator may be
different if we treat the predicted wage as given and do not take into account that it was es-
timated in the auxiliary regression. It can be  argued that if the second estimator is close to
linear, this bias of the covariance matrix should be negligible. Otherwise, we should bear
this caveat in mind when testing the significance of coefficients.18 
To test the specification of the labor demand model, we also estimated an equation for
the production of the firm, using equation /12/ (and subtracting qi,t1 from both sides): 
qit = 0 + (
1) qi,t1+1 pFcomp, it +
                                                    + 2 pHcomp,it + 3 wit + 4 rit + 5 pM, it + wit. /12a/
If we have omitted variables important to both production and labor demand deci-
sions then the two error terms, uit and wit are likely to be correlated. This is why the
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique is to be applied. 
To test whether export exposure affects the demand channel of the exchange rate, we
split the sample in two parts: those firms whose share of exports in total sales is above 50
percent are termed ‘High export share’ firms, the others have ‘Low export share.’ A
dummy controls for high export share. The coefficient of foreign prices and domestic
prices are allowed to vary with export share. We would expect that a high export share
increases the effect of foreign prices and reduces that of domestic prices. 
Results
Table 3 displays the results of the random effect estimation. Since industries differ
with respect to their trade exposure and production function, we estimate the labor de-
mand equation for each of them separately. 
15 This is known as the incidental parameters problem, see Chamberlain (1984) for a discussion.
16 For a similar panel-problem while estimating investment response to exchange rates, Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) use
GMM instead of the ML procedure described here.
17 The first part of the moment function is the orthogonality condition of the auxiliary regression and the second part is de-
rived from the second step, e.g., a maximum likelihood estimation.
18 We have also tried the error component two-stage least squares procedure suggested by Baltagi (1995) and it did not
change the results qualitatively.
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Table 3
Random effect model, maximum likelihood estimates



























































































Short-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.0148 0.0393** -0.0064 0.0417* -0.0348
High export share -0.0039 0.1070* 0.0034 -0.0560*** -0.0487*
Approximate long-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.090 0.176** -0.057 0.241 -0.143
High export share -0.024 0.479 0.030 -0.324 -0.200
Restrictions
H0: demand = cost = 0 a) 3.53 6.47** 0.13 4.00 4.85*
Descriptives
Number of observations 707 174 184 114 235
2(16) a) 171.40*** 65.44*** 66.67*** 60.57*** 69.34***
 (vi) 0.1161*** 0.0000 0.1245*** 0.1549*** 0.1284***
 (uit – vi) 0.2144*** 0.1831*** 0.1520*** 0.1152*** 0.2735***
 (lit) 0.2690 0.2217 0.2187 0.2115 0.3455
R2 0.1785 0.3179 0.1929 0.1669 0.2352
Notes: All variables are in logs. The significance of coefficient or test: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
a) Likelihood ratio test, 2 distribution.
For all the industries except for the Food and tobacco industry we find that the firm-
specific error term is highly significant. It explains a large fraction of the variation in an-
nual change of employment. This validates the use of the random effect model. 
The short-run wage elasticity of labor demand is of the expected negative sign and
significantly different from zero in the case of Food and tobacco industry and Metallurgy.
As for the magnitude, it is somewhat smaller than that was found by Kőrösi (1998), who
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uses a slightly different dynamic formulation for labor demand estimation on a larger
Hungarian dataset.19 The coefficient on lagged production, 1, is rather high, that is,
significantly greater than 1. This means that the speed of employment adjustment is
fairly slow, just as in Kőrösi’s analysis (1998). Also note that lagged production enters
significantly into three of the industries, suggesting that production adjusts sluggishly,
too. Let us now turn to the parameters of key interest. 
Although foreign prices enter with a significant positive coefficient in the pooled
sample, it is only the Food and tobacco industry that has a significantly positive de-
mand-side exchange rate elasticity (0.0363 for the low export share firms). This means
that a 10 percent real depreciation of the HUF causes labor demand to rise by 0.36 per-
cent in the same year. This number is higher for high export share firms, although not
significantly. We do not find support for the hypothesis that export share affects ex-
change rate exposure.20 It affects neither the coefficient on foreign prices, nor that on
domestic prices. This may be due to several reasons. Firstly, as shown in Table 2, ex-
port and import shares are highly correlated across industries, meaning that a higher
export share also means more pronounced cost effect thereby offsetting the increase in
the demand effect. However, we expect the export and import shares to be less corre-
lated within industries (we do not test this because we only have a crude measure of
import share for separate firms) making this explanation unreasonable. Secondly, firms
exporting more to the EU may have more market power in their foreign market. Then
they absorb exchange rate fluctuations more in their markup than in their level of pro-
duction and employment. 
Import cost only affects labor demand of Machinery significantly. Here a 10 per-
cent HUF depreciation implies that employment is cut by 0.41 percent the same year. It
is important to note that this number may potentially be dampened by an incomplete
exchange rate pass-through. As documented by Goldberg and Knetter (1997), it may
well be the case that the price of imported inputs reacts less than one to one to ex-
change rate movements. 
The overall effect of exchange rate on labor demand remains ambiguous. The null
hypothesis that there is no effect whatsoever is only rejected in Food and tobacco in-
dustry and Machinery (the former exhibiting a positive, the latter a negative effect).
Low export share firms in the Food and tobacco industry and Metallurgy have a total
short-run exchange rate elasticity around 0.04. This number goes up to 0.11 for high
export share Food and tobacco industry firms and falls down to 0.05 for firms in Ma-
chinery. On the other hand, the speed of labor adjustment is very slow (the reported
1 coefficient and hence  is large), especially in the case the Chemical industry and
Metallurgy. This means that the long-run effect of exchange rate may be 4 to 9 times
higher than the short-run. The approximate long-run elasticities are also reported in
Table 3. 
Table 4 and 5 report results from the estimation of the employment and the produc-
tion equations. We use the SUR method to estimate the two equations jointly. That is, we
allow the two error terms to be correlated but we do not allow them to be firm specific.
19 Slaughter (1997) may also serve as a basis for comparison.
20 This negative result is in line with the findings of Dekle (1998) but contradicts those of Klein et al. (2000).
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This may introduce a bias in the estimates since, as we saw in the previous model, there
is a significant firm-specific component of the error term. Nonetheless, the parameters in
the employment equation are remarkably stable when compared to the random effect es-
timates, suggesting that this bias may be small. Short-run overall exchange rate elasticity
varies between 0.04 and 0.12, which increase to 0.13 and 0.42 in the long run. 
Table 4
SUR estimates: Employment equation





























































































Short-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.0167* 0.0358** 0.0093 0.0521** -0.0261
High export share 0.0018 0.1165* 0.0045 -0.0159 -0.0349
Approximate long-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.112* 0.130* 0.117 0.867 -0.120
High export share 0.012 0.423* 0.057 -0.265 -0.161
Restrictions
H0: demand = cost = 0 a 2.22 2.47* 0.56 2.90* 1.69
Descriptives
Number of observations 704 172 184 114 234
F (K, N–K–1) 11.02*** 7.23*** 3.43*** 1.73* 4.54***
 (uiti) 0.2468 0.1927 0.2002 0.2032 0.3125
 (lit) 0.2690 0.2217 0.2187 0.2115 0.3455
R2 0.1779 0.3142 0.2259 0.1912 0.2344
Notes: All variables are in logs. The significance of coefficient or text: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
a) Wald test, F distribution.
The production equation fits much better than the employment equation. Also, we
find that production adjusts slower than employment does. As expected, the error terms
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of the two equations are positively correlated. This may be due to the omission of vari-
ables affecting labor demand and the scale of production in the same direction. The coef-
ficients on domestic prices and rental cost are often significant with the wrong sign, most
probably because of the poor proxies that we use. 
Table 5
SUR estimates: Production equation



















































































Short-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.0271* 0.0214 0.0582* 0.1050*** 0.0341
High export share -0.0132 0.3254** 0.0120 -0.0202 -0.0276
Approximate long-run exchange rate elasticity
Low export share 0.287 0.126 0.459 1.415 0.471
High export share -0.140 1.921** 0.095 -0.272 -0.381
Restrictions
H0: demand = cost = 0 a 2.96* 1.34 2.92* 4.75*** 2.43*
Descriptives
Number of observations 704 172 184 114 234
F (K, N–K–1) 18.14*** 6.84*** 9.12*** 6.23* 10.29***
 (uiti) 0.4188 0.3827 0.3695 0.3558 0.4860
 (lit) 0.4806 0.4526 0.4521 0.4174 0.5334
R2 0.2548 0.3392 0.3796 0.3570 0.2161
Cross-equation tests
Correlation of error terms b) 0.4154*** 0.3946*** 0.4219*** 0.4509*** 0.4161***
H0: No exchange rate effect
in either equation a) 1.89 1.62 1.49 3.17** 1.78
H0: Constant returns
and no substitution effect a) 0.44 1.37 3.21* 1.55 0.22
Notes: All variables are in logs. The significance of coefficient or test: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
a) Wald test, F distribution.
b) Breusch – Pagan test, 2 distribution.
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Foreign demand affects production significantly in the Food an tobacco industry,
Metallurgy and Machinery. Demand effect ranges from 0.04 to 0.30. Import cost has a
significant impact on Machinery only. Embarrassingly, export share does not explain ex-
change rate exposure; only in the Food and tobacco industry do we find that firms with
higher export share react more to foreign demand. The overall exchange rate elasticity of
production ranges from 0.03 to 0.33 in the short run. The cross equation hypothesis that
exchange rate affects neither employment, nor production can only be rejected in the case
of Metallurgy, an industry, which shows no significant effects of labor response to ex-
change rate. 
We have also tested whether the coefficients on import cost are significantly differ-
ent in the two equations. If we assume constant returns to scale (1=1), this would
mean that there is some substitution between labor and imported inputs. In Table 5, we
report the test of the joint hypothesis of constant returns and no substitution. Only the
Chemical industry is significant, in which the coefficient of import cost is of the wrong
sign. 
4. CONCLUSION
The paper estimates labor demand of Hungarian exporting firms in response to real
exchange rate movements. The use of firm-level export–import data enables us to sepa-
rate two channels through which the exchange rate affects labor demand. First, a real de-
preciation raises the forint-equivalent price of foreign competitors, thereby boosting de-
mand for the firm’s export and, hence, the firm’s demand for labor. Second, by raising
the cost of imported inputs, a depreciation has an adverse effect on employment through
the cost channel. A higher marginal cost induces a decrease in production and thus
shrinks labor demand. Since firms with higher export share tend to import more, this lat-
ter negative effect might offset the former positive one. 
We find that the short-run elasticity stemming from the demand effect is around 0.04.
That is, a 10 percent real depreciation causes labor demand to rise by around 0.4 percent
the same year. This effect is most pronounced in the case of the Food and tobacco indus-
try. Machinery, on the other hand, exhibits a cost effect of roughly the same magnitude
but of opposite sign. Since labor demand adjustment is sluggish, the long-run effect of
the exchange rate can be an order of magnitude higher than the short-run. 
Surprisingly, we do not find support for the hypothesis that export share affects ex-
change rate exposure. This may be either because a higher export share also means a
higher import share and cost effect, thereby offsetting the increase in the demand effect,
or because firms exporting more have more market power in their foreign market. 
The results suggest that the analysis of market power deserves more attention. This
could be accomplished by a more thorough investigation of the pricing behavior of ex-
porting firms and its interconnection with employment decisions. 
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– Industries. Industries are identified by their two-digit classification. Food and tobacco is 15 and 16,
Chemical is 23 through 26, Metallurgy is 27 and 28, and Machinery is 29 through 35. (Earnings statement.)
– Products.  A product is defined as a HS6 category. Though some of these categories are rather broad, this
is the deepest possible, internationally comparable classification. Prices of different products are then averaged
geometrically for each firm and year pair. (Customs Statistics.)
– Production. The level of production is defined as the value of sales at 1991 HUF prices. Export and do-
mestic sales are deflated by the appropriate industry producer price index. Since material inputs are incorpo-
rated into the model, total sales, not value added is used to measure production. (Earnings statement, Statistical
Yearbook of Hungary, 1993, 1995, 1997.)
– Foreign price. Foreign competitors’ price is calculated as the CIF (Cost Insurance Free) value of total
import shipments to the European Union divided by the net weight of the shipments (unit value). The values are
originally expressed in ecus, and are converted to HUF with a firm-specific exchange rate using the following
procedure. 
Because sales are unevenly distributed throughout the year, different firms face different average nominal
exchange rates within a year. Since the value of export shipments is reported in both dollars and HUFs, we have
a firm-specific HUF–USD exchange rate for each product. From this we can calculate the estimated month of
shipment within the year (as if the shipment were made in a single month), and use that month’s average HUF–
ecu exchange rate to convert EU-prices to HUF. This procedure ensures that we do not impose a common, av-
erage exchange rate on the firms thereby losing information. The EU prices of products are then averaged for
each firm and year to get firm-specific foreign price indexes. We use geometric average with the net weight of
exports as weights. (EUROSTAT, National Bank of Hungary.)
– Domestic price. The domestic producers’ price index in the 4-digit SIC industry of the firm. (Statistical
Yearbook of Hungary, 1993, 1995, 1997.)
– Real exchange rate. Real exchange rate is measured as the price of foreign competitors relative to do-
mestic prices. If relative foreign prices go up, the real exchange rate rises, that is, we have a real depreciation.
(EUROSTAT, Customs Statistics.)
– Competitiveness. With data on the actual unit value of each shipment, we are able to construct a better
measure of external competitiveness. This is calculated as the price of foreign competitors relative to the export
price charged by the firm. (EUROSTAT, Customs Statistics.)
– Wages. Total labor cost over average annual number of workers. (Earnings statement.)
– Capital cost. Capital cost is proxied by depreciation cost divided by the stock of fixed assets. Here we
follow the lead of Kőrösi (1998), who uses the same proxy in his labor demand estimations. (Earnings state-
ment, Balance sheet.)
– Price of imported inputs. The ecu price of an imported product is calculated as the FOB value of exports
of the product from the EU divided by the total net weight. It is converted to HUF as outlined former. A price
index is calculated as a weighted geometric average of  individual prices. (EUROSTAT, Customs Statistics.)
2. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Let vi denote the firm-specific error term of the equation. Assume that the error terms are jointly normally
distributed and are independent of the explanatory variables. In particular, 
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that is, the error term (uit) is independent of the exogenous variables and past employments, conditional on
knowing the firm-specific omitted variable, vi. In the estimation we treat li0, i.e., the first realization of employ-
ment as given, and express all the distributions conditional on it.21 
21 Here we have also assumed that vi is independent of li0. For a more general error structure and an endogenous treatment
of li0, see Chamberlain (1984, 1999).
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The joint density of the error terms for firm i conditional on the firm-specific omitted variable is the prod-
uct of the per-period conditional density functions. 
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The marginal probability density function of (the vector) ui is obtained from the joint density of vi and uit
(which is the product of the previous two densities since vi and uit are independent) by integrating out vi. 
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is its covariance matrix. 
One may observe that this likelihood contribution for firm i is the same as in a model without a lagged de-
pendent variable with the minor difference that the standard panel likelihood is a product of independent mar-
ginal densities while here we have a product of conditional densities. Since the functional form is the same, the
standard maximum likelihood estimation procedure can be used for this dynamic version of the model. 
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PRICING INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
IN PREMATURE CAPITAL MARKETS:
THE CASE OF HUNGARY*
IBOLYA SCHINDELE1 – ENRICO C. PEROTTI2
This paper investigates the determinants of underpricing at initial public offerings in the
Hungarian Initial Public Offerings (IPO) market in 1990–1998, a period of transition from
socialist to market economy and immaturity of the domestic capital market. The evidence
suggests that political issues played a significant role in the process: we have found greater
discount at privatization IPOs than at private issues, and a positive relation between under-
pricing and the proportion of shares offered for compensation coupons. These findings rein-
force the hypothesis that governments in transition may pursue political objectives by selling
shares at discount. Besides, the results show larger initial returns at early IPOs compared to
later issues, which implies a negative relation between the discount and the maturing of the
capital market. Most of the asymmetric information theories, empirically justified for well-
developed stock markets, receive no support. Some results suggest that the transition related
determinants of underpricing disappear as the securities market becomes more mature.
KEYWORDS: Initial public offerings; Underpricing; Privatization.
 common feature of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) in capital markets all around
the world is that firms systematically sell equity at significant discount compared to the
true value of the company. Empirical evidence suggests that investors’ initial return,
the percentage price change between the offer price and the first day closing price at
the stock exchange, is usually higher than 10 percent, and in many cases it reaches 45-
50 percent.
This paper investigates the structure of Initial Public Offerings of shares in Hungary. As
in other capital markets IPOs in Hungary appear to be underpriced, so that buying shares at
the offer price at issue and selling them on the first day of trading post flotation provides in-
vestors a positive return on average. In the period 1990–1998, approximately 60 companies
offered shares publicly in Hungary. These issues were underpriced by 22 percent on aver
* We would like to thank Gábor Kőrösi for his encouragement and valuable suggestions during the realization of this proj-
ect, as well as György Martin Hajdu for his useful comments. Discussions with seminar participants at the Summer School in Fi-
nancial Markets, at the Central European University, helped also to improve the paper. Financial support from PHARE ‘97 is
greatly acknowledged.
1 PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam.
2 Professor at the University of Amsterdam and Fellow at Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
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Belgium 28 1976–1989 10.2
Chile 19 1982–1990 16.3
France 187 1983–1992 4.2
Korea 347 1980–1990 78.1
Malaysia 132 1980–1991 80.3
Portugal 62 1986–1987 54.4
Spain 71 1985–1990 35.0
United Kingdom 2 133 1959–1990 12.0
United States 10 626 1960–1992 15.3
Source: Ibboston–Ritter; 1994.
The paper seeks to establish whether this significant level of underpricing in the early
period of development of the Hungarian market reflects the usual factors suggested by
classical IPO theories or rather some specific features of the transition from socialist to
market economy. In the period 1990–1998, economic transition is a distinguishing char-
acteristics of the capital market in Hungary: a large proportion of IPOs is related to pri-
vatization and the market is at a premature stage of development.
The next section reviews classical theories of IPO pricing and reveals the specific
characteristics of the Hungarian IPO market, which provide a background for our hy-
potheses. The second part of the paper describes the characteristics of issues in Hungary
and details our empirical results.
1. THEORETICAL ISSUES
In this section we introduce theories of underpricing based on asymmetric informa-
tion. These theories allow us to built several hypotheses. Further on the privatization
and transition-related factors of underpricing are reviewed with a particular attention to
the Hungarian case. At the end of this section the specific privatization-related hy-
potheses are given.
Theories based on asymmetric information
Several theoretical models conclude that underpricing results from asymmetric infor-
mation among groups of agents taking different roles in the IPO process. Underpricing is
then an incentive used to stimulate the uninformed group to act in the interest of the in-
formed one.
Asymmetric information may exist between a firm and its investment banker. Baron
(1982) considers a principal-agent model for new issue underpricing based on this type of
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information asymmetry. The investment bank being an agent of the firm has superior in-
formation concerning its value. His compensation is a function of the proceeds from issue
and the post-flotation price. The price discount, therefore, serves to induce the investment
banker to put enough effort in advising and selling the firm's shares. Evidence found by
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) on investment banks going public, however, refuted
this model. Underpricing proved to be significant at IPOs by investment banks as well,
even though no asymmetric information existed since issuers acted as their own agents in
the going public process.
Another approach to  underpricing has focused on differential information of investors
participating in the IPO market. Rock’s model (1985) is based on information asymmetry
between two groups of investors: informed and uninformed. The informed group knows
well the prospects of firms and therefore is able to avoid buying low value IPO shares.
Uninformed people have no information on firms’ value, which results in a bias in their
purchases towards less profitable equity issues. Anticipating this rationing bias, the unin-
formed group has no incentive to participate in buying shares. Underpricing is necessary
to make this group enter the IPO market. 
Rock’s explanation was extended by Beatty and Ritter (1986) who studied the degree
of underpricing as a function of ex-ante uncertainty concerning firm value. An increasing
in uncertainty should be associated with a raise in information asymmetry, and thus with
higher underpricing. As a proxy for this uncertainty, Beatty and Ritter use the post floata-
tion variability of the share price. A positive relationship is found between this proxy and
the discount involved in the offer price. As small firms have more volatile prices, this
model may imply a negative relationship between firm’s size and the level of discount.
This hypothesis is supported by empirical studies on equity issues in the United States
where large firms’ offerings seem to be less underpriced. Thus measures of informational
asymmetry such as size and post flotation price volatility should be regarded as explana-
tory factors for underpricing.
Signaling theories of underpricing focus on another type of asymmetry: differential in-
formation between firms and investors. These models assume that it is the selling entre-
preneur who has superior information about the value of the IPO firm. To overcome ad-
verse selection, companies with favourable prospects are interested to signal their value
and thereby convince potential investors to buy shares. Signaling models for IPOs differ
in the mechanism through which signaling occurs.
The first mechanism is signaling by equity retention. Leland and Pyle (1977) claim
that firm value is positively related to equity retained at initial share issues. Managers
of profitable companies intend to convey information about their quality to outsiders:
retaining equity might be a signal of high quality. Since managers of firms with less
attractive prospects have incentives to mimic good quality by issuing the signal, mis-
leading signals have to be costly. Retaining equity can serve as a credible signal, since
it is costly for firms that produce lower than average results. The higher the level of
equity retained by the owners of a low value firm, the lower is the value of their resid-
ual investment and the higher the undiversified risk of their portfolio. Signaling good
quality by ownership retention is then only in the interest of high value firms. This re-
sult is strongly supported by several empirical tests (Downes–Heinkel; 1982, Ritter;
1984, Keasey–McGuinnes; 1992).
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Underpricing is another type of signalling mechanism. Signaling by equity retention
implicitly assumes that the firm has only one opportunity to sell equity in the short term.
In practice, most entrepreneurs sell off their equity holdings in several stages.
Models suggesting that firms underprice initially to let investors realize larger pro-
ceeds from secondary issues were proposed by Welch (1989), Allen and Faulhaber
(1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). Pricing initial offerings at a discount is a credi-
ble signal of firm quality: only good firms are expected to recoup the loss due to initial
underpricing.
A firm that retains a large proportion of its equity may not need to discount substan-
tially the offer price. Observing equity retention, investors rationally think the firm makes
a good investment since managers have information on the firm’s true quality. Alterna-
tively, when the issuer wants to sell a large proportion of its ownership, underpricing is
necessary to convince investors that the firm is of high value. Equity retention and under-
pricing might thus be substitute signals, which ceteris paribus, implies a negative relation-
ship between them.
Besides underpricing and quantity retained, firms have other signals available. In the
context of an IPO, original shareholders can signal firm’s quality by the name and reputa-
tion of advising agents they hire. Advising agents of high reputation may reinforce the
public’s confidence in high firm value and bring about a reduction in asymmetric infor-
mation and thus required underpricing. Several papers in the literature discuss the relation
between pricing and quality of the advising agents. Titman and Trueman (1986) consider
the choice of an auditor as an important signal, while Booth and Smith (1986) emphasize
the quality of the underwriter. The correlation between these variables and firm's value is
well supported by empirical findings (Keasey–Short; 1997).
Indebtedness may be a further factor referring to the future prospects of firms, since a
high level of debt discourages equity investment (Myers; 1977, Jensen–Meckling; 1976).
Thus indebted firms may face hurdles to signal high value at an IPO. As a consequence, it
could be expected that a more indebted firm should underprice its share issue to a greater
extent.
Hypotheses built on IPO theory
The previously reviewed theories imply a number of hypotheses that serve as a basis
for our empirical investigation:
1. Underpricing negatively depends on firm’s size. Large firms price their issues more
accurately. We consider firm size (ASSET)3 as the balance sheet value of total assets of
the firm preceding the issue.
2. The level of underpricing is a positive function of risk (RISK), which is to be
measured by the ex-post variability of share price returns.
3. Underpricing and equity retained by the issuer (RETAINED) are negatively related,
since they are substitutable methods of signaling high firm value.
3 Further reference to each explanatory factor is under the name indicated in brackets. See the Appendix for a more detailed
description of the explanatory variables.
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4. Underpricing is lower when the advising agents of the issuing firm have good
reputation. Thus we hypothesize a negative relationship between the quality of under-
writer (DBROKER) and underpricing.
5. The more indebted the firm, the more its shares are underpriced at an IPO. High
level of indebtedness (DEBT), potentially a bad quality signal, must be outweighed by
other means, like underpricing. A positive relationship is hypothesized therefore.
Privatization IPOs
In our sample, many IPOs represent privatization sales. This raises the question
whether other factors than those cited in the classical literature contribute to explain the
underpricing phenomenon in Hungary.
A theoretical model of IPO pricing at privatization is proposed by Perotti (1995). This
explanation suggests that underpricing and equity retention serve the goal of signaling
commitment of the selling government to a privatization policy without future redistribu-
tion of asset value. The provision of informative signals for the public is necessary be-
cause at the time of privatization, significant uncertainty exists about the government' s
real intentions towards the firm to be sold. For political and social reasons, governments
in transition might engage in value redistribution, which may take place via taxation, indi-
rect interference, through regulation or entry-deregulation. 
A committed government is more willing to bear the costs of a delay in the final sale
by retaining a part of the shares, as well as the costs of underpricing the issue. Gradual
sales imply that the government is willing to bear the risk of a falling price after the sale,
suggesting that it does not expect any change in its policy. When fast privatization is a
prime objective, however, the government needs to sell quickly a large proportion of the
shares, underpricing is needed as a costly signal of commitment. Thus ownership reten-
tion and underpricing are substitutable signals for the government to convey its political
commitment. If the privatization program is not reversed, stock prices should rise over
time and the government may earn substantial amounts when selling shares at subsequent
issues at a smaller discount (Laeven–Perotti; 2001).
In the absence of large political uncertainty, privatization sales may not be underpriced
to a higher degree than private issues. For several countries, however, there is much in evi-
dence that privatization offers are more underpriced than their private issue counterparts
(Jenkinson–Mayer; 1988, Perotti–Guney; 1993). Dewenter and Malatesta (1996) compare
returns on initial privatization offers and on private IPOs in several countries with different
levels of capital market development. Although their evidence indicates that in the United
Kingdom privatization IPOs are underpriced more than private issues, they have opposite
findings for other countries. While they cannot identify a general tendency for privatization
sales to be more underpriced than private IPOs, they do find that issues subject to larger po-
tential political risk are characterized by a greater discount.
Besides the goal of credible privatization, underpricing may result from other political
objectives of the government. The most important of these considerations are buying po-
litical support, targeting dispersed ownership, giving ownership to employees, and pro-
moting capital market development. A hypothesis advanced in the literature is that under-
pricing may serve these goals (Schmidt; 1997, Biais–Perotti; 2001). 
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Privatization IPOs in Hungary
Apart from explanations discussed in the corporate finance and privatization litera-
ture, specific characteristics of the privatization process in Hungary could also have an
impact on the pricing of issues.
The privatization experience in Hungary can be characterized as following a variety of
approaches. The methods applied in a particular stage of transition depended on the pref-
erences of the ruling government. The transformation of ownership rights started in 1988.
Selling companies through initial public offers became common only in the later stages of
privatization. In 1990 and 1991, most of the initial offers were share sales or capital in-
creases by private firms. Only 3 out of 13 issues were privatization IPOs, while in the
years 1992–1994, 14 issues out of 18 were sales by the State Property Agency (SPA), the
organization responsible for privatization of the state property. From 1995, ownership
transformation through IPOs became more widespread, partly as a consequence of the
implementation of the Law on Privatization (1995). Table 2 shows the distribution of
IPOs in our sample, which is a good reference for the number of issues in different stages
of the privatization process.4
Table 2
Distribution of IPOs in the sample, 1990–1998
Year Privatization Private issue Total
1990 1 3 4
1991 2 7 9
1992 2 0 2
1993 5 2 7
1994 7 2 9
1995 5 1 6
1996 2 3 5
1997 4 4 8
1998 1 2 3
Total 29 24 53
An important feature of the privatization process in Hungary is its fundamental rela-
tion to restitution. Compensation of families, which suffered expropriation under the so-
cialist regime, was a primary goal of the governments during the transition era. The main
form of compensation was free distribution of the so-called ‘compensation coupons’
which could be exchanged for ownership in firms under privatization at initial share is-
sues. These coupons were introduced to the Budapest Stock Exchange and were traded at
prices usually significantly below face value. In spite of the fact that they were interest
paying securities, in some periods their market value did not exceed 40 percent of the
face value.
At most of the initial issues, compensation coupons were counted in the share price at
full nominal value plus accrued interests. Buying coupons at the market price (or receiv
4 Table 2 is based on a group of 53 initial offers, which is somewhat less than the total number of IPOs in the period 1990–
1998, but representative for the distribution of issues. Section 2 gives an explanation on the difference.
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ing them for free) and exchanging them for shares at IPOs, brought substantial additional
returns to investors above the proceeds from classical underpricing. Thus, selling shares
for coupons resulted in a special form of targeted underpricing at privatization IPOs. The
proportion of stocks offered in exchange for compensation coupons provides therefore
reference whether compensation policy and its related political objective had some role in
underpricing the issues.
Aiming at maximizing privatization revenues, the SPA organized its sales in several
rounds.5 To improve the market’s sentiment, at initial offers a large underpricing was ap-
plied, while substantial revenues were generated by decreasing the discount at later share
issues. When aftermarket share performance is an important consideration, equity reten-
tion and underpricing may be thus positively correlated at the initial sale. When uncer-
tainty concerning the government’s future policy is high, a large initial underpricing is
needed to improve investors’ confidence. At the same time, most of the shares should be
retained for later offers at which the discount may be set smaller. If over time political
risk is resolved, gradual sales generate higher proceeds (Laeven–Perotti; 2001). This con-
fronts the implication of Perotti (1995) that after controlling over political risk, under-
pricing and equity retention are substitutable signals of commitment. 
A core characteristic of privatization in Hungary was the choice of selling companies
to (usually foreign) strategic investors through private placements. The presence of stra-
tegic investors may refer to the possibility of more efficient restructuring and may there-
fore create more confidence from the public and a higher demand for shares. If the pres-
ence of strategic investors increases the public’s confidence in the firm, their equity share
and underpricing might be substitutable signals of high value, which generates a negative
dependence between the two. The proportion of shares held by strategic investors after
the issue might thus be an interesting explanatory variable.
Another goal of the privatization process was the allocation of shares to employees.
Selling underpriced shares to employees helps to create support from insiders, which is an
essential condition for the success of privatization. Without employees’ acceptance, a
change in ownership might be impossible to realize. In Hungary, at several IPOs a signifi-
cant fraction of shares was separated and offered exclusively to the firm’s employees. Such a
practice creates strong labor support for privatization and stimulates employees to contribute
to an efficient company operation following the ownership change, which were necessary
conditions for the success of transition. The proportion of shares offered to employees
should therefore be included as a possible explanatory factor in the investigation on IPO
pricing.
Another distinguishing feature of the privatization process in Hungary may be the role
it played in the creation of the country’s stock market. Governments during transition re-
garded the goal of capital market development as of primary importance, since a liquid
stock market may provide funds for corporate investments and attract foreign capital. The
substantial number of privatization IPOs (see Table 2) and their large proceeds (see Table
3)6 compared to the revenues from private issues indicate that privatization indeed con-
tributed to the creation of the stock market in Hungary. 
5 Maximizing proceeds from privatization was an important objective of the governments in transition, since Hungary needed to
pay back all of its debt accumulated during the socialist era, for which the financial means came primarily from privatization.
6 Table 3 is based on our sample. See description of the sample in Section 2.
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Table 3




1990 36 750 27 786 64 536
1991 8 613 35 346 43 959
1992 44 237 0 44 237
1993 37 837 15 775 53 613
1994 181 408 1 336 182 744
1995 244 399 6 316 250 714
1996 251 324 106 508 357 832
1997 1 136 788 64 869 1 201 657
1998 6 691 106 172 112 863
Total 1 948 047 364 108 2 312 155
We claim that on markets in a premature state, one needs to underprice more than
on markets in a more progressed stage of development. This hypothesis is supported by
evidence that underpricing is much larger in developing countries than in efficient
capital markets (see Table 1). 
This phenomenon may imply that IPOs occurred in the early 90-ies in Hungary, soon
after the reopening of the stock exchange and thus in a primitive capital market, were
priced at a greater discount than later issues.
‘Privatization-related’ hypotheses
Privatization and the process of transition certainly influenced the development of
the IPO market in Hungary. Thus we need to consider further hypotheses that relate
underpricing to the former discussed ‘transition- and privatization-related factors’.
6. Privatization IPOs are more underpriced than private issues. In our sample, we
distinguish privatization offers from private issues by a dummy variable (DPRIV).7
7. The proportion of shares sold in exchange for compensation coupons (COM-
PENS) is positively related to underpricing.
8. Underpricing and equity retained at the initial issue are correlated. When revenue
maximization is the main objective, a positive relationship may exist. These variables
are however negatively related when the principal consideration of the government is
signaling its commitment to a sustained privatization policy.8
9. The greater the proportion of strategic investors in the ownership structure, the
lower the discount. Our measure is the post-IPO ownership share of strategic investors
in the firm (STRATEGIC).
7 This hypothesis does not unambiguously originate from the transition state of the economy. Greater underpricing at privati-
zation IPOs is also a characteristic of several developed stock markets.
8 Hypothesis 8 is a modification of the original statement about the relation between underpricing and retained equity (hy-
pothesis 3).
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10. The greater the proportion of shares that the firm’s employees own following an
IPO (EMPLOYEE), the higher is the discount at the issue.
11. The more developed the capital market, the less underpriced the issue. The later
the IPO occurred in the sequence of issues at the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE), the
lower is the discount at sale. We identify each issue by a counting variable (DSE-
QUENCE), which is to be increased by one at each subsequent IPO.
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, first the methods of the investigation are briefly summarized. This is
followed by the description of the data used and the remaining part is devoted to a de-
tailed analysis of the estimations. 
Methodology
To estimate the relationship between underpricing and the explanatory variables, we
apply simple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) methodology. We justify our choice by sev-
eral test statistics on residual series, which we include in the tables (see Table 5 and 6)
showing our results. The definition of the dependent variable, underpricing, is an impor-
tant methodological issue in IPO studies. Underpricing is usually defined as the percent-
age change between the offer price and the first day closing price of the trade. This meas-











0,iP  is the offer price at issue i , 
1,iP  is the closing price of share i  on the first day of trading on the Stock Exchange.
However, actual stock market tendencies may influence prices to a large extent.
Therefore, an adjustment is necessary to make in order to see the real value of the dis-
count. As it is customary in the literature, we estimate regressions for adjusted under-
pricing, which is the difference between raw underpricing and the percentage change in










where 0,iINDEX  is the closing value of the market index on the last day of subscription
of IPOi and 1,iINDEX  is the closing value of the market index on the first day of quota-
tion of the shares issued at IPOi.
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Description of Data9
Our dataset is built on the entire population of IPOs occurred in Hungary before Janu-
ary 1999. 53 share issues are considered, which is somewhat less than the total number of
IPOs in this period. Altogether 67 companies offered shares publicly in Hungary after the
reopening of the Budapest Stock Exchange in 1990, until the end of 1998. We disregard
14 issues for the following reasons:
– 6 out of the 14 were offerings of shares of investment funds or specialized asset
management companies. Considering that portfolio management companies bear different
characteristics than companies in the usual production and services industries, their
valuation may require a different approach. Therefore, characteristics of the underpricing
phenomenon in relation to these companies might also substantially differ.
– Another 8 issues (most of these firms were soon de-listed) are disregarded, because
data were not available either on the issue or the firm itself. For most of these firms, the
number of stock exchange transactions was insignificant for a period of at least six
months following the issue (in a few cases even underpricing could not be calculated).
In conclusion, the dataset includes almost all IPOs in Hungary. Therefore, although
the sample size is somewhat small, significant variables identified in regressions must
have explanatory power as the sample represents almost the entire population.
Among the 53 initial issues, 29 are privatization IPOs and 24 are private share issues
(capital increase or private sale). Adjusted underpricing is 22 percent on average in the
entire population. Privatization IPOs are underpriced by 31 percent on average; while for
private issues the average discount is only 10.7 percent. Thus the hypothesis that private
issues tend to be priced more accurately seems to hold in the IPO market of Hungary.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics on underpricing







Sample size 29 29 24 24 53 53
Mean (percent) 30.4 31 6.8 10.7 19.7 21.8
Standard deviation (percent) 34.3 38 25.3 35.3 32.5 37.9
Minimum (percent) -20.4 -20.4 -52.2 -58.4 -52.2 -58.4
Maximum (percent) 102.4 110 63.5 110.4 102.4 110.4
Taking adjusted underpricing into account, the maximum level of the discount in the
population is 110.4 percent. At the same time, 15 initial issues were overpriced (negative
underpricing). The lowest value is –58,4 percent. Among the overpriced issues 7 were
privatization IPOs and 8 were private sales.
9 The authors collected data from issued prospectus of IPO firms, annual financial statements of companies, and time series
of share prices and the BUX index, all of which were provided by the Information Center of the Budapest Stock Exchange. The
Company Fact Book, which contains information on companies floated in Hungary, was also a useful source of information. 
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Among the 53 Initial Public Offers, 11 implied pure capital increases, while in case of
the other 42 issues an (at least partial) sale of already existing shares occurred.
Estimation
Tables 5 and 6 in this section present our empirical results. They show regression es-
timations for adjusted underpricing as a dependent variable. Each column represents a
different regression. Values for the estimated parameters are in rows; t-statistics are in






















































Sample size 53 44 42 34
F-statistics 3.74*** 6.77*** 3.41*** 6.45***
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40
White heteroscedasticity 1.31 0.62 1.71 0.93
Durbin–Watson statistics 1.81 1.76 2.06 2.37
Residuals’ skewness 0.40 0.26 0.53 0.86
Residuals’ kurtosis 3.26 3.21 2.85 3.18
Chow forecast test at 44 2.86*** 2.64**
* 10 percent significance level.
** 5 percent significance level.
*** 1 percent significance level.
Note. t-statistics in brackets.
The sample size may differ in the regressions presented. Table 5 shows four regres-
sions that constitute two pairs. Both regressions in a pair are based on the same explana
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tory variables but they are built on different samples. REGR 1 considers the entire sample
(53 observations), while REGR 2 concerns share issues exclusively in the period 1990-
1996, and thus builds on a smaller sample (of 44 observations). The same holds for the











































Sample size 53 44 53 44
F-statistics 4.38*** 6.63*** 2.16 3.78** 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.34 0.04 0.11
White heteroscedasticity 0.69 0.38 1.19 1.37
Durbin–Watson statistics 1.83 1.86 1.48 1.43
Residuals’ skewness 0.35 0.26 0.54 0.78
Residuals’ kurtosis 3.11 3.10 2.98 3.84
Chow forecast test at 44 2.24** 1.59
* 10 percent significance level.
** 5 percent significance level.
*** 1 percent significance level.
Note. t-statistics in brackets.
The reason for using different samples to estimate underpricing is the following. We
claim that in Hungary, the primary characteristics of capital market development differ
before and after January 1997, which may influence IPO pricing to a great extent. The
early period of transition, 1990–1996, saw a balanced expansion of the stock market,
characterized with a progressive upward movement of the market index (BUX) and low
volatility. On the contrary, in the more mature phase of market development after 1997,
the index exhibited extremely high volatility and market crashes (see Figure 1). On the
one hand this is a consequence of international economic and financial market develop
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ments: the Russian and Asian financial crises seriously affected trading at the Budapest
Stock Exchange during 1997–1998. On the other hand, the relatively large number of
shares quoted (see Table 1) in this period, high liquidity compared to earlier stages, and
the high values of the index indicate a more mature phase of development of the capital
market for 1997–1998. We find justification by stability tests that features of IPO pricing
indeed differ in the two periods and that the determinants of underpricing can be more
easily explained for the earlier, rather smooth phase of market evolution.
The sample size may differ for another reason. When retained equity (RETAINED) is
chosen as an explanatory variable, only a small number of observations (42 in the entire
period) can be used for estimation purposes (REGR 3 and 4).10 The reason for this is that
equity retention applies only to sales of existing shares. For the group of capital increase
IPOs, the relation between equity retention and underpricing cannot be tested.
Concerning the structure of our estimations, we are limited by correlation among the
explanatory variables. Offers for compensation coupons occurred only at privatization
IPOs, thus we need to estimate the relation of COMPENS and DPRIV to underpricing in
separate regressions. Firm size is also correlated with the privatization dummy, since pri-
vatization IPO firms are typically of greater size than privately owned issuing companies.

































































































In most of the regressions, explanatory variables have a strong joint effect on adjusted
underpricing (significant F-statistics). The best explaining variables are COMPENS and
DPRIV, which are significantly independent of the sample size. Both have the positive
hypothesized sign. This supports our hypotheses that compensation for expropriation un-
der socialism substantially affected IPO pricing and that privatization IPOs were under-
priced to a greater extent than private issues in the Hungarian stock market. 
10 In regression 3, the sample size is 42 instead of 53. 11 observations are excluded from the estimation because equity re-
tention is irrelevant (capital increase IPOs).
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By far the most significant and highest value coefficient estimate concerns the pro-
portion of shares offered for compensation coupons (COMPENS). This indicates that un-
derpricing occurred particularly in case of those privatization IPOs that allowed for buy-
ing shares in exchange for coupons. At sales for coupons underpricing remains hidden in
a sense, since its targeted value is implied in the low coupon price instead of a low an-
nounced issue price. This is especially true if we take into account (as discussed earlier)
that at certain issues coupons could be purchased at the BSE at a price substantially be-
low face value and that they were counted at their nominal value increased with interests
at the exchange for shares.11 This may reinforce our hypothesis on governments in transi-
tion pursuing political objectives by the means of underpricing. Especially targeted un-
derpricing may encourage more people to obtain share ownership at IPOs, since it allows
for a purchase of shares at an extremely low cash price. Support by a new middle class of
citizens might bring substantial political benefits for the privatizing government. Higher
discount at privatization IPOs may thus be further evidence on the government’s incen-
tives to gain popularity.
The large initial underpricing at privatization deals may be related to the govern-
ment’s consideration for the IPO shares’ post-flotation performance. In case of many
companies, the SPA applied the strategy of gradual sales on the stock market accom-
panied with substantial underpricing at the initial public offer. The objective was to
achieve a smaller discount and generate large revenues at subsequent share issues. This
strategy to privatization is theoretically justified in Laeven and Perotti (2001): when
the company is sold gradually, later sales are priced more accurately reflecting the
resolution of political risk.
Governments in transition may have an incentive to sell shares at discount to signal
their commitment to a privatization policy without future interference (Perotti; 1995).
Only a committed government can bear the costs of the initial underpricing of privatiza-
tion shares. Equity retention can be another means of signaling credibility, thus equity
retained by the government at issues should be negatively correlated with the discount
(Perotti–Guney; 1993). In our estimations the coefficient of retained equity has a negative
sign, but underpricing is not significantly affected by this variable.
Greater discount at privatization issues may also refer to the desire of achieving dis-
persed ownership structures. Governments in transition may aim at creating widely dis-
persed ownership of public firms in order to bring liquidity to the capital market and thus
to give strength to its development. We claim that the substantial underpricing at privati-
zation IPOs in Hungary was to a large extent to stimulate the expansion of the stock mar-
ket. This is supported by the finding that underpricing was smaller at later issues than at
early IPOs, especially in the more premature phase of stock market development (before
1997), as the negative coefficient of DSEQUENCE shows.
Estimations based on the entire population of IPOs in 1990–1998 (REGR 1, 3, 5)
suggest that the relationship between underpricing and the independent variables is unsta-
ble. This is shown by significant Chow forecast test statistics: in May 1997 (at observa-
tion 44), there may be a structural change in the estimated models. Re-estimation of each
11 Our data on underpricing involve this ‘hidden underpricing’ as well. See a detailed explanation on calculation of under-
pricing in the Appendix.
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equation for the sub-sample of issues in 1990–1996, (REGR 2, 4, 6, 8) gives better results
(higher coefficient values and R2, higher F-statistics). This change in the explanatory
characteristics of underpricing may provide evidence that the features of stock market de-
velopment differ before and after March 1997. Underpricing can be better explained for
the period 1990-1996, when a smooth, progressive expansion and small volatility de-
scribes the stock market. When the entire period of 1990–1998 is considered, our models
can justify only a smaller part of the variation in the discount. 
We underline that the balanced evolution of the stock market in the period 1990–1996
occurred at a low level of market development. From 1997 onwards the volume of trading
achieved much higher levels than ever before and volatility also increased to a large ex-
tent. Uncertainty implied by a more mature but still inefficient stock market may prevent
the establishment of well fitting regression models that could explain the pricing phe-
nomenon. At such a ‘low maturity’ phase, transition and privatization related explanations
might become inappropriate. At the same time, classical asymmetric theory models may
not apply yet.
Apart from higher explanatory power and better fit for the period 1990–1996, we find
justification for the relation between underpricing and the variable representing the level
of stock market development (DSEQUENCE). This implies that early IPOs were priced
at a greater discount than late ones, but this holds only for the period 1990–1996. This
finding justifies the idea that transition related underpricing disappears as the stock mar-
ket enters a more progressed phase.
We emphasize that almost all significant explanatory variables (COMPENS, DPRIV,
DSEQUENCE) relate to privatization, transition, and the immaturity of the capital mar-
ket. The finding that privatization IPOs are underpriced to a greater extent than private
sales holds for some more matured markets as well. Our estimations reject most of the
classical asymmetric information theories on IPO pricing. The coefficient of firm size has
a positive sign, which is opposite to our expectations. This may be due to the fact that in
our sample offers by large firms relate to privatization of state holdings, which may result
in higher underpricing. However, the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
Neither the relation between underpricing and risk, nor the dependence of the discount on
the quality of underwriter can be justified. Equity retention has no statistical significance
either.
The only asymmetric information theory that is reinforced by our estimations concerns
the leverage of issuing firms. Classical corporate finance theory claims that a high level of
debt may prevent refinancing projects and therefore implies a negative signal on the
firm’s future prospects. Indebted IPO firms should therefore use underpricing as a coun-
ter-signal to convince investors of their high value. For the period 1990–1996, we indeed
find a significant positive relationship between underpricing and debt level at firms issu-
ing shares in Hungary.
Since in the early transition period, bank debt was hardly available and therefore
rarely used by Hungarian firms, companies capable to obtain debt financing were better
than average. Thus we claim that for the Hungarian sample debt financing and under-
pricing should be complementary rather than substitutable signals of high value: only
good firms, able to raise debt, could recoup the costs of underpricing. This may explain
the positive relationship in our estimation (regression 2).
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3. CONCLUSION
The most important finding of this paper is that initial public offerings are underpriced
in Hungary just as in other countries. The level of this underpricing was approximately 22
percent in the period 1990–1998. This is higher than the average discount in countries
with well functioning stock markets but substantially lower than initial returns on several
premature capital markets (Ibboston–Ritter; 1994). 
The underpricing phenomenon in the period considered strongly relates to the transi-
tion state of the economy and the low maturity of the capital market. Particularly, privati-
zation of state owned companies, restitution, and thus the privatizing governments’ politi-
cal objectives play a central role in the determination of the discount. Asymmetric infor-
mation theories, many empirically justified for well-developed markets, do not receive
support for IPOs in Hungary.
The most important explanatory factor for the discount concerns compensation. The
higher the proportion of shares offered in exchange for compensation coupons, the
greater the underpricing at IPO. The low coupon price that characterizes most of the pe-
riod allows for a relatively high offer price and a low cash price of shares, at the same
time. Thus the discount is involved in the coupon price instead of the offer price itself.
We call this phenomenon hidden underpricing. 
We argue that hidden underpricing in a period of transition may be a policy by the
government to pursue objectives such as gaining political support, signaling commitment,
and stimulating the capital market. This result reinforces some privatization theories for
transition economies, such as Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti (1995), Schmidt (1996),
and Biais and Perotti (2001), and provides further justification for the empirical findings
by Jones et al. (1999).
Another main result of this paper is that privatization IPOs are underpriced to a sig-
nificantly greater extent than private sales. The average discount at issues by the State
Property Agency (the government institution responsible for privatization) was 31 percent
(adjusted for market variation), while private issues were underpriced on average only at
11 percent. This finding is in accordance with empirical results by Paudyal et al. (1998)
concerning IPOs in an emerging economy, Malaysia.
An interesting finding of our paper is that underpricing can be much better ex-
plained by factors advanced by the privatization literature when one considers offers
exclusively in the period 1990–1996. Estimations for the entire population of issues in
1990–1998 show less significance and smaller explanatory power. We claim that the
reason is that transition related explanations better describe the underpricing phenome-
non in the early transition stage, a period of smooth and balanced expansion of the
capital market, than in a more mature but still inefficient state of the stock market in
the years 1997–1998. At the same time in the immature stage, asymmetric information
theories are not yet appropriate. The evidence that IPO underpricing decreases with
market development and the fact that this holds only for the early transition period, re-
inforces our idea that transition-related underpricing slowly disappears as the securities
market becomes more mature. 
These results suggest that in a transition period, when privatization IPOs take place
within a primitive capital market, explanatory variables, which relate to the particular
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circumstances of the privatization process and the country itself are needed. The main
conclusion of this research is the strong significance of these privatization- and coun-
try-related explanations. 
APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Underpricing (UP): percentage return of investors if they buy at the offer price and sell at the first day
closing price at the initial issue.
Remarks: 1. When a significant proportion of shares was offered for compensation coupons (CC) and in-
vestors could buy coupons at the market price, the offer price is a weighed average of the compensation coupon
price and the cash price. The weight is the proportion offered in exchange for compensation coupons.
2. At several IPOs, only certified compensation coupons were accepted in exchange for shares. Certified CCs
could be used only by their original owners and were not traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange. However, an un-
official secondary market existed for these certified coupons so that private investors could buy them from their
owners at roughly 40 percent premium above the prevailing price at the BSE, and use them to purchase shares at
IPOs. Our raw underpricing measure does not reflect this premium in the coupon price and may thus, to a small
extent, overestimate the discount at privatization IPOs. Since prices at this secondary market are hypothetical, we
use the coupon price as quoted on the BSE in our calculations of the underpricing variable.  
3. If the introduction of the shares to the Budapest Stock Exchange occurred more than a month following
the issue, we considered the first day closing price deflated to its value at the time of subscription (for certain
times annual inflation was above 30 percent during the period under investigation).
Adjusted underpricing (AUP): difference between raw underpricing and the percentage change in the market
index between the date of subscription and the first day of trading (see a more detailed explanation in Section 2).
Assets (ASSET): total assets of the IPO firm according to the balance sheet closing the year preceding the
issue.
Risk (RISK): variability of excess returns on the share (post-floatation), expressed by the variance of the
differences between daily returns on buying and selling the particular share and daily returns on buying and
selling the market portfolio. 
Remark: As the expected return on a share depends on the performance of the entire market, and such
market risk is unavoidable in a premature market, the risk of an investment is better described by the difference
between the behaviour of a share and the whole market. We thus calculate the variability of excess returns on
shares compared to the market portfolio, represented by the BUX index, a weighed average of price changes of
the most often traded securities in the Budapest Stock Exchange.
Retained equity (RETAINED): ratio of the number of shares retained to the total number of shares owned
by the issuer. 
Reputation of the firm’s underwriter (DBROKER): a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issue is un-
derwritten by a foreign investment bank or brokerage house, or by a syndicate of at least three financial service
companies, otherwise its value is 0.
Indebtedness (DEBT): ratio of total debt to total assets as stated in the balance sheet of the year preceding
the IPO.
Type of the issue (DPRIV): a quality variable taking a value of 1 if the issue is a privatization IPO, and 0
otherwise.
Proportion of shares offered for coupons (COMPENS): the number of shares offered in exchange for
compensation coupons as a percentage of the total number of shares offered for sale at the IPO.
Employee ownership (EMPLOYEE): proportion of shares owned by employees following the IPO.
Ownership of strategic investors (STRATEGIC): the percentage share of the firm’s equity strategic inves-
tors own following the issue.
Level of stock market development (DSEQUENCE): a counting variable, which has a value 1 for the first
IPO in the sequence of issues, and the value of which is increased by 1 at each subsequent issue.
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INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
OF THE HUNGARIAN FOOD PROCESSORS
CSABA JANSIK1
The ultimate objective of the study is to measure the impacts of foreign capital in the
Hungarian food processing. The analysis was designed and carried out at meso-level, which
means that the individual food processing industries are in the focus of investigations. Yet,
calculations rely on corporate data, which were used to uncover the impact of foreign owner-
ship on company performance. 
The analysis sets forth with grouping the Hungarian food processing companies by their
ownership structure and comparing the performance of the two major groups of owners, for-
eign investors and domestic private capital.
The investigation of the dynamic performance gap concludes that foreign owned com-
panies surpass the domestically owned private companies in all the important efficiency and
performance categories. The major tendency of performance gap between the two groups of
companies has been of opening nature between 1995 and 1998.
KEYWORDS: Foreign investments; Food processing; Corporate performance.
he Hungarian food processing suffered from severe crisis in the beginning of the
1990s. Restructuring and privatisation of companies, and fundamental changes in the op-
erational environment exacerbated and deepened the recession, which culminated in the
beginning of the decade. The aggregate performance indicators of food processing have
improved since 1993. Although some of the figures stagnated or even slightly declined in
1998, a definite recovery characterised the overall performance of the industry in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. Table 1 presents value figures in dollars by using average annual
exchange rates. 
Foreign investors played and active role in reshaping the ownership structure of food
processing. By 1998, they acquired over 60 percent of the aggregate company capital in
the industry (see Table 1). This study intends to detect the influence of foreign capital in
the Hungarian food processing by searching what impact corporate ownership has made
on company performance. 





Indicators of Hungarian food processing between 1992 and 1998
Indicators 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Sales revenues (billion USD) 6.58 6.14 7.27 7.85 7.85 7.59 7.42
Export (billion USD) 1.01 0.83 1.05 1.40 1.52 1.65 1.55
Profitability (percent) -2.31 0.24 0.73 0.70 1.55 2.77 2.72
Labour productivity (thousand USD/capita) 36.61 40.68 49.25 56.76 59.83 58.65 55.91
Share of foreign ownership in registered
capital (percent) 31.82 43.09 47.95 52.66 52.92 60.44 62.62
Source: own calculations based on data of AKII (1997; 1998a).
The opening question of the analysis rises pursuing the previous research objective: is
the performance of either foreign owned or domestically owned food processors superior
to that of the other group? The hypothetical response states that ownership does have an
impact on company performance in the food processing and that foreign affiliates have
better performance indicators than their domestically owned rivals.
This hypothesis is built upon the finding that comparative advantages of the foreign
investors are soon after investing abroad internalised into their production subsidiaries
(Dunning; 1997). This results in an overall performance and efficiency growth at the
foreign owned companies, which – in the case of considerable foreign participation –
would have a measurable impact on the performance of the entire food processing.
Rare examples can be found in the literature that would feature empirical or account-
ing based impact analyses of multinational or other foreign subsidiaries in the Hungarian
food processing. Most studies consider food processing as one of the processing indus-
tries in manufacturing comparisons. 
Hamar (1995, p. 115) also viewed food processing as one in the set of all processing
industries. She attributed the rapid growth of food processing to the participation of for-
eign investments. Her study also documented a uniform cost structure in the industry.
In one of the most recent studies, Szabó (2000) introduced an interesting and novel
approach. He traced down the history of 38 large food processors between 1990 and
1998, which were transferred from state control to foreign ownership. The sample in-
cluded only those companies that had distinct equivalents in both years of observations.
This criterion eliminated several multinational enterprises from the investigations. The
restricted size of the sample may be the explanation for the surprising fact that the aggre-
gate growth of sales revenues and profit earnings at the sample companies stayed below
the industrial average. On the other hand, the growth of equity and total assets in the
sample surpassed the industrial average; it indicates quick development and the intensity
of investments. Besides, the companies in the sample were also among the best ones in
terms of productivity growth, which is a result of their internal rationalisation and inten-
sive labour lay-off (Szabó; 2000. p. 47).
The direction in the current article differs from the mentioned two studies in terms of 
1. the applied database includes the accounting information – excerpts from balance
sheets and income statements – of the complete set of Hungarian food processing com-
panies that is over two and half thousand enterprises between 1995 and 1998;
INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL 65
2. the analytical approach, namely the dynamic measurement of performance differ-
ence between foreign and domestically owned companies that gives novelty to the cur-
rent analysis. 
1. IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE FIGURES
In the first part of the calculations, performance of the companies is measured by
sales revenues, profit earnings, export sales, and investment activities. Sales revenues is
an essential indicator of corporate performance, since it embodies market power. In an
earlier analysis, market power was proved to significantly motivate the inflows and in-
dustry choices of foreign capital in the food sector (Jansik; 2000a, p. 83).
1.1. Indicators of corporate performance and data set
In the post-socialist economic environment, profit earnings have provided rather dis-
torted information on the performance of food processing companies. In the second half
of the decade, partly owing to the halved corporate tax rates, the profit performance of
the companies improved.2
Although experience indicates that food industrial foreign investors settle themselves
primarily to supply domestic markets, the traditional export performance also strength-
ened in the Hungarian food processing sector. The amount of investments is an indicator
that signifies the future objectives and anticipations of the companies.
The impact of ownership on corporate performance is first identified by segmenting
the companies. The database used in the study embraces all food processing companies
for four years from 1995 to 1998. The most recent data were used in the initial calcula-
tions; total number of observations in 1998 amounted to 2977, which narrowed to 2961
after eliminating the companies with zero registered capital. Two major groups were
identified according to the ownership structure of the companies: 1. majority-foreign
owned and 2. majority-domestically owned companies.
The segmentation was done on the basis of foreign versus domestic ownership share
in the registered company capital of each enterprise. 
1.2. Results of the company segmentation
Table 2 demonstrates the corporate figures of the companies in the two groups. Beside
aggregate figures, it also displays group averages. The data in the table confirms the ‘size-
superiority’ of foreign owned companies. The difference in sales revenues refers to the fact
that foreign owned companies are typically among the largest ones in food processing.
In terms of average profit and export sales, the superiority originating from foreign
ownership seems to be even more pressing than in the case of sales revenues, while aver-
age investments of foreign owned companies are nine times more than average invest-
ments of the domestic companies.
2 Nevertheless, many domestically owned companies are presumed to ‘hide’ their profit, while foreign owned companies
may tend to exercise hidden profit repatriation. Yet, the only available profit figures are official reported ones, which were also
used in the calculations.
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Table 2








Total majority foreign (N=398) 764.96 45.14 188.62 14.35
Total majority domestic (N=2563) 826.08 5.78 143.18 10.17
Average of foreign owned 1.9220 0.1134 0.4739 0.0361
Average of domestically owned 0.3223 0.0023 0.0559 0.0040
The mere data of Table 2 may well raise a doubt: since all large companies are in for-
eign ownership, the real reason for different performance is not the ownership type, but
rather the magnitude of companies. A two-step segmentation was to address this appre-
hension. The initial grouping attribute is the size of the companies by using their sales
revenues: the first group includes all companies, whose revenues exceeded HUF 100
million, the second group included all companies below that limit. The segmentation
follows the previously applied method afterwards. The objective of double segmentation
is to compare the foreign and domestically owned companies within their own size
groups. Table 3 shows the results of the analysis.
Table 3 






of investmentsSize and ownership
million HUF
Sales revenues above HUF 100 million
Total majority foreign (N=167) 760 953.8 43 886.9 187 560.2 13 720.7
Total majority domestic (N=718) 788 898.2 7 552.1 141 789.1 8 439.6
Average of foreign owned 4 556.6 262.8 1 123.1 82.2
Average of domestically owned 1 098.7 10.5 197.5 11.8
Sales revenues below HUF 100 million
Total majority foreign (N=231) 4 005.6 1 250.0 1 062.9 632.8
Total majority domestic (N=1845) 37 182.1 -1 770.5 1 393.1 1 734.9
Average of foreign owned 17.3 5.4 4.6 2.7
Average of domestically owned 20.2 -1.0 0.8 0.9
A little more than 40 percent of the foreign owned companies are situated in the
group of the large companies, their power continues to be evident (see Table 3). Al-
though they make up less than one-fourth of the number of the large companies, their
combined sales revenues still amount to nearly half of the entire large-scale group. Con-
sequently, the difference in average sales revenues between the two ownership types in
the group of large companies is more than fourfold. The difference in terms of average
profit is even considerably wider than in the case of sales revenues. It indicates that for-
eign owned companies are much more profitable than domestically owned ones. The dif-
ferences between group averages in the field of profit, exports and investments surpass
the magnitude of difference in sales revenues.
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The group of the small companies results in some unexpected findings as opposed to
the group of large companies. The average sales revenues of both ownership groups are
around the same magnitude; in fact, the figure of domestically owned companies is even
slightly higher than that of the foreign owned group. Due to the similar size among the
small companies, any difference in corporate performance can purely be attributed to the
differences in ownership structure. Further data inform about the superiority of foreign
ownership: foreign subsidiaries earned considerable profits compared to the losses of
domestically owned companies, their exports are nearly sixfold and the value of invest-
ments are threefold in comparison to the respective average figures of domestically
owned processors. 
Investment is an extremely important performance category in terms of future corpo-
rate growth. Investments of the foreign owned companies surpass the respective figures
of domestically owned enterprises in both company size groups. The difference is not
that surprising in the group of large companies, where capital strength of the large multi-
national enterprises is overwhelming. In the other group, small and medium-scale ven-
tures could be the ones that are mobile, flexible and perceptive to emulate the modern
techniques of foreign owned companies. They are believed to be the germ of a strong
Hungarian owned food processing segment and they are expected to constitute a com-
petitive group against foreign subsidiaries. Since these small Hungarian enterprises can
not easily compete with the large foreign ones in terms of innovation, product differen-
tiation or know-how, the only relevant way of corporate growth appears to be physical
investments. Therefore, it is regrettable to recognise that Hungarian owned small-scale
processors take such a low-key approach in investments. 
2. DEFINITION OF THE CORPORATE PERFORMANCE GAP
A difference in corporate performance has been verified to prevail between the
foreign and domestically owned food processors in Hungary; the corporate operational
data in the previous analysis confirm the existence of the gap. Therefore, the analysis can
be continued one step further and incorporate the dynamic aspect. The opening question
of the study now takes a modified form as follows: is the performance gap between
foreign and domestically owned food processors widening or narrowing over time? 
Figure 1. The concept of performance curves of majority foreign




















The dynamic concept of the performance gap is illustrated in Figure 1, where shaded
area signifies the gap. The widening or narrowing nature of the gap can be revealed only
through a care study of dynamic indicators. Such calculations require comparable data
for many years. Data availability limited the surveyed period to four years, from 1995 to
1998. Again, enterprises with zero registered company capital were eliminated from the
data set.
3. COMPARISON OF FOREIGN
AND DOMESTICALLY OWNED COMPANIES
In order to quantify the changes of the performance gap, a wider group of indicators
of corporate performance is computed. 
3.1. Relative performance indicators used in the comparison  
Calculations contain four profitability, one productivity and three other accounting
indicators:3 



















































r   /8/
3 The group of indicators were sorted out based on the traditions of the corresponding international literature; see Jansik
(2000b, p. 248–258.) for a detailed literature overview.
4 The indicator is identical to the category of Return of Sales – ROS.
5 The measure is not fully identical to Return on Equity – ROE indicator, since the figure of so called ‘own capital’ is used
in the denominator as a substitute for equity.
6 Labour productivity is usually calculated with value added produced by the company. However, when value added fig-
ures are unavailable, net sales/capita is an internationally applied proxy. The indicator does not directly denote labour produc-
tivity, but it expresses corresponding trends of the particular corporate performance aspect (Frydman et al.; 1999). 
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where
P(bt)i is the ith company’s profit before taxation,
Ri is the ith company’s sales revenues,
EXPi is the ith company’s export sales,
Ei is the ith company’s own capital,
TAi is the ith company’s total assets,
EMPi is the ith company’s labour force.
3.2. Results of the dynamic performance gap analysis
Pursuant to the definition explained in Figure 1, data in Table 4 show a snapshot of
the dynamic performance gap for t=1998. The numbers prove a significant disparity
between the performance of foreign and domestically owned food processors. Indicators
signify a notable advantage of foreign owned companies: their labour productivity was
twice, while their profit rate was seven times as high as the respective figures of
domestically owned enterprises.
The advantage of domestic ownership was disclosed in the case of one indicator, asset
efficiency. This indicator, however, carries rather illusive than real competitive
advantages. A logical explanation lies behind the domestic superiority in the case of asset
efficiency. Many domestically owned enterprises operate with almost fully or fully
depreciated assets. Hence, the lower value of denominator results in higher measures of
asset efficiency than in the case of foreign owned companies with their typically more
valuable or recently installed assets. The indicator of capital intensity already gives a
better understanding on real power relations. 
Table 4
Relative corporate indicators of majority foreign owned












1. Profit rate – ROS (percent) 4.94 0.70 2.74
2. Return on equity – ROE (percent) 12.56 2.8 8.59
3. Profit to assets (percent) 6.08 1.12 3.83
4. Profit per capita (thousand HUF /capita) 868.4 64.8 328.5
5. Labour productivity (million HUF /capita) 17,569 9,264 11,989
6. Own capital intensity (percent) 48.4 40.1 44.6
7. Share of export sales (percent) 24.65 17.33 20.85
8. Sales to assets (percent) 122.95 160.27 139.86
Source: the author’s calculations based on the data of AKII.
The dynamic approach of the performance gap is evidently more essential than a
static type of comparison. Data in Table 4 get full sense by placing them into the
dynamic context of a longer period.
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In order to illustrate the development of the gap in practice, Figure 2 shows the curves
of average sales revenues for foreign and domestically owned food processors in
Hungary. The figure confirms that the difference in average sales revenues between the
two ownership groups has been growing. Although such a chart of performance curves is
illustrative, it has to be admitted that the mere comparison of annual values may imply
the danger of inaccurate calculation of the gap.
Figure 2. Average sales revenues of foreign and domestically owned















1995                   1996                   1997                   1998                   1999
average sales revenues of foreign owned firms
average sales revenues of domestically owned firms
Since indicators of both groups of companies change over time, the comparison of
absolute values would really not capture the opening or closing nature of the gap.7
In order to resolve the issue, a similar methodology is applied that Pilat (1996)
developed at OECD to measure international productivity gaps. The performance of the
most productive country was fixed at unity (or at 100 percent), and the productivity of
other countries was expressed as its proportion. Productivity gap is defined by the
difference between the most productive country and the other ones. This approach allows
a reliable and accurate dynamic interpretation, even if the denominator changes in the
meantime, or the title of the most productive country is taken over by a new one.
Data in Table 5 were calculated by applying a similar concept to the productivity gaps
suggested by Pilat. In order to quantify the performance gap among the Hungarian food
processors, the figure of the better group was fixed at unity. The denominating base of
the proportion was the performance of the foreign owned companies in the majority of



















7 A simple arithmetic example enlightens the problem. Let us suppose two economic actors – enterprises or nations –
whose performance figures are compared for three subsequent years. Let the values of the better performer be 10, 12 and 15,
while the values of the weaker performer 2, 3, and 5, respectively. Then, the absolute difference between them will be 8, 9 and
10, which would suggest a widening gap. The performance gap given by the PGAP formula, however, will be 0.8, 0.75 and
0.66, or in percentage form 80, 75 and 66 percent. The values calculated on the basis of the PGAP formula confirms exactly the
opposite trend that absolute figures suggested, namely a narrowing performance gap. 
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where:
w
iP is the indicator of the i
th company in the ownership group with weaker
performance,
b
jP  is the indicator of the j
th company in the ownership group with better
performance.
The formula of PGAP determines that the figures of performance gap can take values
between zero and unity. Multiplying the values by 100, PGAP may also be expressed in
percentage form. Then, the arbitrary value of a PGAP=0.72 can be interpreted in two
different ways: the performance gap is 72 percent of the performance of the better group,
or the performance figure of the weaker group reaches 28 percent of the performance of
the better group. This latter one is an intermediate step in the calculation process. Due to
its demonstrative power, however, it is also included among the results in Table 5. PW is
expressed by the following two formulas:



















The values of PGAP and PW should be interpreted based on how they change over
time: descending values of PW or ascending values of PGAP would indicate the widening
of the performance gap and vice versa, ascending PW and descending PGAP values
would signify the narrowing of the gap.
Although access to data limited the time span of the analysis to four years, the
amount of computed indicators is sufficient to draw pertinent conclusions. The changes
in the performance gap demonstrated by eight corporate indicators disclose a dramatic
shift in the Hungarian food processing sector. All the profitability, productivity and
export indicators notify a distinctly widening performance gap: domestically owned
companies constantly keep falling behind foreign owned processors. In terms of capital
intensity, the lag has been stagnating since 1996, the only advantage of the
domestically owned companies is a stable superiority shown in the case of asset
efficiency. 
It would be early to alert on the basis of four year development of the performance
gap, although future prospects do not promise spectacular improvement for the
domestically owned processors. The figures in Table 5 reveal a notable disparity among
investment activities between the two ownership groups, which may continue to open the
performance gap also in the coming years. This danger equally shades the future of both
small and large domestically owned firms in the Hungarian food processing.
Results shown in Table 5 should be interpreted with caution also due to another fact.
Since the performance gap is calculated from group averages, the numbers conceal the
heterogeneity in the performance of group members. In the multitude of food processors,
there might be laggards amongst the foreign owned companies just as well as rapidly
developing domestically owned enterprises. 
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Table 5 
Performance gap between foreign
and domestically owned food processors between 1995 and 1998
1995 1996 1997 1998
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign DomesticIndicators/Elements ofperformance gap Formulas
majority owned companies













 11   ,
1.034 0.262 1.246 0.307 1.544 0.324 1.917 0.322
SL* PW 0.253 0.246 0.210 0.168
PG** PGAP 0.747 0.754 0.790 0.832










  , 0.07 1.06 2.23 1.07 5.03 1.04 4.94 0.7
SL* PW 0.065 0.478 0.206 0.142
PG** PGAP (0.935) 0.522 0.794 0.858











  , 0.16 3.56 6.32 4.35 11.68 4.26 12.56 2.80
SL* PW 0.045 0.689 0.364 0.223
PG** PGAP (0.955) 0.311 0.636 0.777













  , 0.08 1.60 2.94 1.66 6.22 1.68 6.08 1.12
SL* PW 0.048 0.562 0.271 0.185
PG** PGAP (0.952) 0.438 0.729 0.815













  , 6.5 63.9 277.8 83.0 777.2 92.8 868.4 64.8
SL* PW 0.102 0.299 0.119 0.075




















9 431.6 6 021.5 12 434.1 7 772.1 15 441.8 8 949.5 17 569.5 9 264.5
SL* PW 0.638 0.625 0.580 0.527
PG** PGAP 0.362 0.375 0.420 0.473











  , 47.34 44.98 46.62 38.07 53.26 39.55 48.39 40.07
SL* PW 0.950 0.816 0.743 0.828
PG** PGAP 0.050 0.184 0.257 0.172











  , 18.28 17.12 22.56 17.35 25.36 18.92 24.66 17.33
SL* PW 0.936 0.769 0.746 0.703
PG** PGAP 0.064 0.231 0.254 0.297
(Continued on the next page.)
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(Continuation.)
1995 1996 1997 1998















  , 110.5 150.9 131.8 155.0 123.6 162.2 123.0 160.3
SL* PW 0.733 0.850 0.762 0.767
PG** PGAP (0.267) (0.150) (0.238) (0.233)
* SL – Standardised level of weaker group.
** PG – Performance gap.
Note: the values of PGAP in parenthesis indicate the superiority of domestically owned group. 
Domestically owned food processors face three main options as far as their future is
concerned:
1. Catching up; in other words it is the alternative of survival. It is a function of initial
level of development but to a certain extent it also depends on industrial affiliation.
Those domestic companies may enter the group of up-comers that will narrow the
performance gap with the application of state-of-the-art technology and modern business
techniques. Capital for the development will hardly be available from own resources, it
will need to be mobilised in the domestic or international capital markets. Domestically
owned companies may develop competitive advantages by two ways: one is product
differentiation, and meeting uncommon or specific consumer needs; the second way is
special market strategy in a geographic sense, exploring the white spots of Hungarian
market, or specialising in export markets. 
2. Falling behind. Companies utilising outdated equipment and management methods,
and restrained marketing strategies will inevitably be forced on the way of dropping
back. These companies would have typically similar product mix to that of their large
foreign competitors; they lack resources for development and access to financing
channels.
3. Middle alternative. The middle alternative would involve co-operation or collusion
with large competitors. It is possible only for some companies with special status in
given industries. Large competitors may need co-operating companies because of market
distribution or other regional reasons. Middle alternative has a very limited applicability.
Its outcome is risky, since company acquisitions may soon cease the independence of the
smaller partner in any strategic alliance.
4. INDUSTRIAL IMPACTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The impact analysis of foreign ownership ends with unveiling industry-specific
tendencies. The foreign ownership share in the registered company capital represents
ownership structure (OSTR). The value of variable OSTR ranges from 0 to 1, this way it
expresses the division between foreign and domestic ownership. The impact of
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i OSTRaaPER 10 ,
where
j
iPER is the j
th corporate performance indicator in the ith industry,
iOSTR is the variable of corporate ownership structure in the i
th industry.
The following six corporate performance indicators were used to measure industry-
specific impacts: the categories of sales revenues, profit, export sales, investments, labour
productivity and asset efficiency. Estimations were run in all 12 industries, where the
number of observations allowed such calculations. Owing to the nature of OSTR
variable, the positive sign of estimated parameters indicate a larger impact – or in other
words the advantage – of majority foreign owned companies, while negative values
signify a bigger effect – or advantage – of majority domestically owned companies in the
case of the specific indicator. 
Based on the calculations so far in the article, the superiority of foreign owned
companies is anticipated in the first five performance categories, while the advantage of
domestically owned companies is more probable in the field of asset efficiency. Table 6
shows the sign of estimated parameters of OSTR variable in the cases of various indicators
and industries. The findings do verify the anticipations, the superiority of foreign owned
companies can be declared overwhelming with the exception of asset efficiency.
Table 6
The impact of ownership structure on selected corporate indicators


























































Sales revenues + + + + + + + + + + + +
Profit + + + + - + + + + + + +
Export + + + + + + + + + + + +
Value of investments + + + + + - + + + + + +
Labour productivity + - + + + + - - + + + +
Asset efficiency - - - - - - - - - - - -
The detailed explication of industry-specific disparities in the corporate indicators is
based on the results of regression analysis in the Appendix.8 The influence of foreign
8 Results also reveal the fact that the superiority in the case of several industries and indicators is statistically not
significant. In certain instances, low R2 are attributable to the fact that the relations measure the impact of one single variable,
the ownership structure. The current research did not strive for the expansion of the model. The purpose of the estimates was to
map the influence of the two major ownership categories.
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ownership on sales revenues is significant in all industries with the exception of milling
and baking, where foreign ownership is initially low.
The profit category shows a less pronounced impact of the foreign ownership, real sig-
nificant influence can only be detected in the vegetable oil and feed industry as well as in
the manufacturing of beverages. Results again verify the fact that foreign companies soon
adapted to the Hungarian conditions and they do not necessarily display the full amount of
profits. Foreign ownership determines the development of profits in a positive way, the
only exception is dairy industry. Most probably industry concentration and fierce competi-
tion for market shares deteriorated the profits of foreign owned companies; this is why the
fact of domestic ownership itself may result in higher profits than foreign ownership.
Export sales inform about the unequivocal superiority of foreign owned companies. The
fact of foreign ownership presumes more intense exporting activities in every industry,
most significantly in the poultry, vegetable oil, dairy, grain processing, confectionery and
brewing industries.
The result in the case of value of investments also refers to the strong activity of foreign
owned enterprises. Among the individual industries, the investments of foreign owned
companies are worth highlighting in the vegetable oil and feed industries as well as in the
manufacturing of beverages.
The explanatory power of ownership structure in the field of labour productivity and as-
set efficiency is scarcely significant. Foreign owned companies tend to be more productive
than their Hungarian rivals in the entire food processing, but principally in the dairy and
beer industries. Exceptions are the poultry-, feed-, and bakery industries, where domestic
ownership is the labour productivity increasing factor.
The influence on asset efficiency is mostly insignificant, although the sign of the pa-
rameters indicate the positive impact of Hungarian ownership in every industry. The result
is not at all surprising, what is more, it is in compliance with the respective calculations of
earlier studies about the entire set of Hungarian enterprises. Major (1996) reported the ad-
vantage of domestic ownership for the return on fixed assets. Szanyi (1998) explained the
phenomenon with the age and composition of assets, which differ considerably at the for-
eign- and domestically owned companies. The results of the current calculations lead to the
conclusions that the same patterns prevail also in food processing; the aggregate data of as-
set efficiency proved the tendency for the entire food processing industry (see Table 5).
The regression analysis in the individual food processing industries verified that foreign
ownership has an influence on corporate performance. This impact is insignificant in the
majority of the cases, but owing to the nature of the OSTR variable, the positive or negative
sign of its estimated parameter means the better performance of either one of the ownership
types. The results of calculations unveiled the advantages of foreign ownership in the case
of most industries. The superiority of foreign owned companies is especially strong in the
vegetable oil, dairy and beverages manufacturing sub-sectors. Hungarian owned companies
appear to be competitive in the grain and poultry processing sub-sectors.
5. CONCLUSION
The objective of the article was to analyse the impacts of foreign investments in the
Hungarian food processing. Subsequent to corporate restructuring and privatisation in the
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food industry, a pronounced disparity emerged between the foreign owned and domesti-
cally owned company groups in the second half of the 1990s. The majority-foreign
owned enterprises enjoy unequivocal superiority over the majority-domestically owned
ones in most indicators of corporate operation and performance. 
The dynamic analysis of performance gap enlightened the opening tendency of corpo-
rate performance gap. Between 1995 and 1998 the Hungarian owned food processors
could not reduce their lag. The dominance of foreign owned companies prevails also on
the level of individual industries with the exception of poultry industry and the entire
grain processing chain.
The superior corporate figures of foreign owned companies translate into constantly
improving performance of Hungarian food processing. The calculations suggest a defi-
nite overall positive impact of foreign capital in the industry.
Hungarian ownership appears to play an overwhelming effect on asset efficiency, al-
though it is a sign of worn out fixed assets. The phenomenon coupled with low invest-
ment activities casts an ominous shade on the future of Hungarian owned food proces-
sors. Nevertheless, catching up is in principle still a relevant option in the present condi-
tions and framework. After Hungary’s potential accession to the EU, the current
opportunities will most probably diminish. 
It is the responsibility of domestically owned food processors, how much they utilise
and take advantage of the spillover effects of FDI. Economic policy may alleviate the
size-based disadvantages of domestically owned enterprises with dedicated supportive
policy to small- and medium-scale enterprises and permanent requirement and incentives
for efficiency. The banking sector and capital markets can provide a solid ground for
more investments. 
These can contribute to the successful development of domestically owned proces-
sors. In order to catch up to the high-performers, they have to be committed to state-of-
the-art technology, perceptive to modern management techniques and risk-takers to im-
plement new investments. Developments should be made on the markets of particular
product groups, which are driven by stable or growing consumer demand, and where
there is reasonable room for expanding processing capacities.
APPENDIX
The impact of ownership structure on corporate performance


























































Constant (a0) 0.6947 1.4713 0.4854 0.0018 1.3360 0.7192 0.6811 0.1132 0.0794 0.1496 -0.0110 0.0340
OSTR (a1) 2.8660 11.843 1.2173 7.8600 3.7918 0.1560 2.9530 0.3281 2.8666 2.8291 7.0963 4.5054
R2 0.063 0.127 0.083 0.131 0.132 0.001 0.126 0.032 0.139 0.285 0.414 0.237
(Continued on the next page.)



























































Constant (a0) 0.1939 1.2609 0.0045 -0.0061 1.1464 0.0394 0.0238 0.0017 -0.0519 0.0126 -0.0831 -0.1888
OSTR (a1) 5.1056 5.2609 0.0407 0.9730 -1.2735 0.5737 0.3943 0.0215 4.6303 1.1273 8.8279 6.6215
R2 0.044 0.015 0.007 0.121 0.005 0.001 0.196 0.018 0.059 0.414 0.128 0.102
Export
Constant (a0) 0.1502 0.4684 0.1948 -0.0136 0.0702 0.0394 0.0212 0.0004 -0.0037 0.0234 -0.0029 0.0277
OSTR (a1) 1.1358 5.3645 0.7117 2.7982 0.5758 0.5737 0.5433 0.0723 0.8066 0.1842 0.5623 0.4044
R2 0.057 0.133 0.079 0.126 0.135 0.104 0.178 0.053 0.149 0.045 0.267 0.099
Value of investments
Constant (a0) 0.0052 0.0116 0.0098 0.0017 0.0125 0.0057 0.0008 0.0009 0.0036 -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0031
OSTR (a1) 0.0242 0.0717 0.0135 0.0204 0.0779 -0.0046 0.1260 0.0205 0.0096 0.3082 0.0953 0.2169
R2 0.047 0.073 0.015 0.166 0.072 0.003 0.351 0.030 0.033 0.390 0.207 0.124
Labour productivity
Constant (a0) 14.970 16.637 11.486 10.140 13.341 11.081 25.297 5.395 4.967 7.578 2.282 6.650
OSTR (a1) 4.327 -5.547 1.1293 14.948 20.127 58.095 -2.025 -712 6.189 26.156 26.783 7.006
R2 0.002 0.003 0.030 0.035 0.119 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.037 0.192 0.073
Asset efficiency
Constant (a0) 5.1 4.8 1.9 2.4 3.4 2.1 3.4 3.3 2.5 1.3 1.5 2.5
OSTR (a1) -3.8 -4.2 -0.3 -1.1 -1.4 -0.9 -2.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.7 -1.0 -1.4
R2 0.054 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.062 0.024 0.038 0.001 0.012 0.007 0.018 0.053
Note. Estimated parameters and coefficients of determination.
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MOBILITY OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN HUNGARY: 
AN ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL FOR REGULAR 
COLLECTION OF STATISTICS* 
ERZSÉBET VISZT1 – ZSUZSA PLANK2 – BALÁZS BORSI3 
This article is one of the first results of the work undertaken in the OECD working 
group. It targets to explore the measurement possibilities of labour force mobility and to lay 
the foundations for future cross-country comparisons. Highly qualified labour force, which 
has substantial impact on a country’s innovative performance is focused in the OECD work. 
The authors’ aim was twofold: to study the available Hungarian Labour Force Survey data-
base (1993–1999) to reveal the possibilities of these statistics used for analysing the mobility 
processes of the transition economy and to show development alternatives of the Labour 
Force Surveys. This way the mobility of the Hungarian highly qualified labour force is be-
coming reliably measurable and internationally comparable. 
KEYWORDS: Human resources; Innovation; Skilled labour mobility. 
lthough the human resource factor is often referred to in studies on innovation, 
due to the lack of availability of data the discussion usually goes little beyond general 
statements about its importance. The paper presents initial results based on the Hungarian 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), as an introduction to a discussion of possible ways of col-
lecting statistical data on the mobility of the human resources devoted to science and 
technology (HRST) in Hungary. First, we review the conceptual background and present 
the key results of our 1998 pilot study, before going on to propose possible methods for 
measuring HRST. Finally, in the tables of the Appendix, we summarise the advantages 
and disadvantages of the methods proposed. 
1. CONCEPTS AND CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCHES 
Studying human mobility from basic statistics is never an easy task. In Hungary, human 
resource statistics of science and technology development are far from complete; unlike the 
Nordic countries, Hungary does not collect register data. The Hungarian Central Statistical 
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1 Research manager of the GKI Co. 
2 Senior adviser of the HCSO. 
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Office (HCSO) collects statistical data on the number of employees with high qualifica-
tions, as well as on their sectoral, professional and other structural characteristics, but con-
tains only limited information on changes of workplace and migration. However, mobility 
of highly qualified workers – not only among but also within companies and institutions 
(including changes in positions and individual career paths) – is an important catalyst for 
research and technical development; it is thus reasonable to aim its measurability by statis-
tical methods. The NIS (National Innovation System) Focus Group on Human Mobility 
was initiated by the OECD with two aims: to map how the various OECD countries meas-
ure knowledge and the flows of knowledge which are important for innovation; and to ob-
tain statistical measurements which would be comparable across countries. 
The internationally recommended measurement methods – including the definition of 
mobility of human resources – are provided in the so-called ‘Canberra Manual’, com-
piled by the OECD (1995). According to the Manual, both those people with higher edu-
cation whose qualifications are considered to be important from the aspect of technical 
development and those who work in this field despite having a different educational 
background, should be considered as the target group for research on the human resource 
aspects of science and technology development. Statistical analysis of workers with high 
qualifications is a relatively new topic, not only in Hungary but also in many other coun-
tries, and the research projects launched so far have only been able to examine some parts 
of the field. 
2. USING THE LFS DATABASE  
TO MEASURE LABOUR MOBILITY IN HUNGARY 
When the EU-harmonised quarterly surveys of the labour force were first launched in 
Hungary, the main objective was to study the economic activity of households. Thus, 
mobility was not, and is still not, the focus of these surveys. In 1992, however, a number 
of amendments were made in the survey structure in line with international recommenda-
tions. Accordingly, we can now analyse to what extent the LFS databases are suitable for 
studying mobility in Hungary. For this study, we have followed the methodological rec-
ommendations of the OECD, paying special attention to the study by Mikael Åkerblom 
on mobility of the highly qualified labour force (Åkerblom; 1999). The findings are pre-
sented in the following. 
In 1993–1999, employment in Hungary shifted in favour of the young, with an in-
crease in the share of 20-29 year olds entering the labour market. On the supply side, this 
rise in the most qualified and flexible manpower is a good sign. Nonetheless, the fall in 
the number of employees in the youngest age bracket indicates that the younger genera-
tion increasingly prefers to remain in training and further education. At the same time, 
expectations for older employees have deteriorated significantly. 
In terms of labour force inflow by qualification, most of those entering the labour 
market had completed industrial and trade school and, by 1999, the second largest group 
comprised those with a specialised secondary qualification (‘other secondary school’ see 
in Figure 1). Thus, a substantial change in employment patterns is currently taking place: 
the low skilled – regardless of whether or not they have completed primary or secondary 
education (final examination at a high school) – are increasingly unable to find jobs. In 
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1993–1999, the share of highly qualified employees remained stable among those enter-
ing the labour market; this trend contrasts with that experienced in developed economies 
in the same period. 
Figure 1. Distribution of those entering the labour market 
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In 1993–1999, important sectoral changes took place, the results of which can be seen 
in the labour force outflow figures. The share of employees leaving the labour market de-
creased in manufacturing and agriculture, but it rose sharply in the sectors financed 
mostly by the state (education, healthcare, some cultural activities, etc.). There were two 
main reasons for this: public administration employees were laid off in an effort to 
achieve cost-savings; and wages in the public sector lag far behind those in the private 
(business) sector. 
The share of those changing their place of work was high in industries where em-
ployment was on the rise. One possible reason for this is that the most mobile labour 
force – the young and skilled – is seeking jobs in the developing industries; these indus-
tries also offer greater opportunities for trying out several workplaces. In industries 
where employment has fallen (education, transport, agriculture, public administration), 
mobility tends to be fairly low. Low mobility is obviously a drawback with respect to in-
novative capacities – knowledge flows – since it signals that shrinking sectors also lag 
behind in terms of human resources, leading to further disadvantages. 
The 1998 database was used to examine the suitability of the LFS for constructing in-
ternationally comparable mobility rates. It was concluded that both the ‘broad’ and ‘nar-
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could be computed. Broad mobility rates are expressed as the total inflows and outflows 
for the total number of employees, while narrow rates show the ratio of ‘job-changers’ 
only (as a percentage of total employees; net mobility rate concerns job changing among 
employees). 


























































































































Change in the number of employees 1999/1996 (left) Average net mobility rate 1996–1999 (right)
 
In 1998, 10 percent of employees changed their place of work; this share is approxi-
mately in line with the narrow rates of the EU-countries. The share for highly qualified 
workers, at 6.1 percent, is also similar to that in the developed countries. 
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The breakdown by gender – a basic distinction in international practice – is also avail-
able. The figures show that men are more mobile than women, both in the sample and 
among employees with higher education degrees. The Hungarian figures correspond to 
known international patterns in other respects as well: the younger generation is more mo-
bile, with no significant variations between genders, while among the older generation, men 
are more mobile than women. In both age brackets, the highly qualified are less mobile than 
the unskilled. 
In the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) industry (mostly high-tech-
nology sectors belong here, see the Appendix), mobility of the older (more experienced) 
generation is higher than in other industries, which may mean that the outflow of ‘know-
ledge’ via mobility is more intensive in this sector. Differences in the inflows and outflows 
of highly qualified workers reflect the attractiveness and perspectives of a given industry. 

















ICT sector Other sectors
 
* For an explanation of ‘highly qualified’ and the ICT sectors, see the Glossary. 
Figure 5. Rates of inflow and outflow of the highly qualified, 1998 
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The higher the rate of outflow, the lower the attractiveness of an industry; higher in-
flows reflect greater opportunities for the highly qualified. In 1998, education and agri-
culture had the lowest rates of inflow, while manufacturing and some service sectors 
(business services – real estate and financial services) had the highest inflow. Agriculture 
was not attractive to job-starters and experienced a substantial outflow. A similar situa-
tion prevails in education, while high rates of both inflow and outflow in services high-
light the dynamic changes taking place in this very fast-growing sector. 
The share of highly qualified workers reflects knowledge intensity and its growing 
economic importance; the LFS therefore enables us to track the weight and dynamics of 
employment among this segment of the labour force. 
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In the production sectors and some services (trade, catering and accommodation, 
transport), the share of employees with higher education degrees is low (10 percent and 
less). The public administration and healthcare sectors are more knowledge-intensive, 
with a share of between 20 percent and 30 percent; the business service sector boasts be-
tween 30 percent and 40 percent. The qualifications of employees in education are out-
standing: more than half of those employed in this sector have a higher education degree. 
Among the manufacturing industries, the chemical industry leads in terms of the share 
of employees with higher education degrees, although the food industry has caught up in 
recent years. However, in engineering – the sector with the highest performance in terms 
of output, productivity and exports – the share of highly qualified workers remains low at 
under 10 percent. These figures also refer to the R&D activity of the respective sectors. 
The figures shown were constructed from the Labour Force Surveys of the Central 
Statistical Office of Hungary. Our experimental analysis enabled us to show sectoral dif-
ferences between the broad and narrow (gross and net) mobility rates of employees. Due 
to the shortcomings of representativity, however, more detailed analysis using the current 
methodology of the HCSO was not possible. Misleading results would be obtained if, for 
example, the engineering industry was broken down into its sub-branches and employ-
ment categories, although this is clearly a very exciting field for future analysis. 
Figure 8. Number of employees and ‘job-changers’ 


































































































Changed employment and enters
Job leavers and changed employment  
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The overall net mobility rate in the 1990s was not high in Hungary, with substantial 
differences across sectors. The major structural changes which took place in the Hungar-
ian economy explain some of these differences: manufacturing – especially engineering – 
gained momentum as a result of foreign direct investment and the activities of multina-
tional firms. The most substantial depression took place in agriculture, which has a low 
mobility rate (4–5%). Structural changes are still underway in the engineering industry: 
the broad (or gross) rate of inflows and outflows stabilised at a high of 15 percent and 10 
percent respectively; more young employees are being attracted to this sector today than 
was the case in the past. 
Interesting changes are also taking place in some service sectors. In catering and ac-
commodation, the number of employees remained stable. However, as the number of mar-
ket actors – i.e. firms – is rising, mobility has picked up since 1996. In the state-owned, or 
government-dominated service sectors – public administration, education, healthcare – out-
flow is higher than inflow. Nonetheless, the narrow (or net) mobility rate is low due to the 
fact that these branches comprise many large organisations (especially in healthcare), and 
intersectoral mobility of teachers and medical professionals is poor. This is the case even 
though wages in these sectors remain below those in the competitive sphere. 
Figure 9. Number of employees and ‘job-changers’  






























































































Changed employment and enters
Job leavers and changed employment  
In summary, in order to study human mobility – which is an important factor in ex-
plaining the restructuring and innovation processes – there is a need for more detailed 
statistics. If two- or three-digit sectoral data were available (General Industrial Classifica-
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tion of Economic Activities within the European Communities – NACE or Standard In-
ternational Trade Classification – SITC) by profession (International Standard Classifica-
tion of Occupations – ISCO) and education and skills (International Standard Classifica-
tion of Education – ISCED), very interesting research projects could be undertaken de-
spite the relatively short time series available. To achieve this, the current practice and 
methodology of Labour Force Surveys need to be revised and developed. 
3. HOW TO GENERATE THE HRST DATABASE IN HUNGARY? 
In principle, the human resources devoted to science and technology (HRST) data-
base should include the highly qualified. Sources of relevant information available in 
Hungary are the HCSO censuses and micro-censuses which contain comprehensive data 
regarding education, orientation of graduate study and occupation. Censuses are held 
every ten years. In contrast with some European countries, the other possible registers 
(social insurance register, tax register, population register) do not contain complex in-
formation relevant to this subject of research and thus cannot be considered as a possible 
frame for sampling (in any event, current Hungarian regulations would not allow their 
utilisation). Only the census can provide the basis for the continuous sampling of indi-
viduals and households. 
In the light of the previous, we investigated three different implementation methods 
for developing the Hungarian HRST database: 
Method 1. Organising a panel from a representative sample of highly educated 
workers based on census data on the population with appropriate qualifications or oc-
cupation. 
Method 2. Supplementing the questionnaire of the Labour Force Circulation sur-
veys. 
Method 3. Supplementary data collection of persons with higher education degrees in 
conjunction with the Labour Force Survey. 
Data collection from a panel of people with higher education degrees 
The census enables the compilation of a comprehensive database from which an ap-
propriate sample may be selected and basic information gathered. However, time series 
could only be generated in one of the following two cases. An extended questionnaire 
containing questions on the various stages of the individual's career could be added to the 
census questionnaire. Accordingly, data could be analysed through a couple of years after 
the first questionnaire which would have to be filled in annually by the same sample of 
population. (This would, of course, imply legal and technical considerations, e.g. accord-
ing to the current legal regulation, personal data must not be identifiable after the survey 
etc.)  
Experts say that the questionnaire respondents would not have difficulties relating 
their position and workplace changes over the previous ten years of their careers, since in 
international comparison Hungarians do not change their workplace or position very fre-
quently. The survey should involve at least 10 000 people, representing 1.7 percent of the 
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total population with higher education degrees. A final decision on the size of the sample, 
however, would only be possible after testing.  
A major drawback to this solution is its high cost: data collection from panels tends to 
be very expensive. The sample has to be relatively large since a certain number of people 
are expected to drop out from one year to another. Complicated, time-consuming ques-
tionnaires require trained interviewers, which increases the wages to be paid to the inter-
viewers. More importantly, the selection and maintenance of the sample, and the constant 
development of methods for reconstructing the sample according to the original popula-
tion properties, increase costs considerably. Furthermore, processing by individual pro-
grammes or organisational procedures is more costly than in the case of a simple survey 
or continuous population survey.  
On the other hand, large amounts of data could be collected during the census, and 
this is one of the great advantages of this method. A relatively short supplementary ques-
tionnaire would therefore be sufficient, and is more likely to be filled in by the people in-
terviewed. Another advantage is that it is possible to include in the sample those people 
who were most co-operative during the census, especially during the first interviews. 
Supplementing the questionnaire of the Labour Force Circulation surveys 
Until 1993, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office collected data on Labour Force 
Circulation (LFC) from the institutional labour statistics. Since the late 1980s, how-
ever, organisational changes – liquidations, start-ups – have become so frequent that 
this method can no longer be applied. The reason for the introduction of a supplemen-
tary survey on Labour Force Circulation in the first quarters since 1994 – in conjunc-
tion with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data collection introduced in 1992 – was to 
make up for this deficiency (since then, data collection refers to individuals; the Ap-
pendix refers to this kind of data collection). Through interviews, the Hungarian  Cen-
tral Statistical Office collects data on those who quitted their employment, liquidated 
their private enterprise, entered new employment or started a private enterprise during 
the previous year. 
From the basic sample of the LFS, those who have changed employment constitute 
the sample for the Labour Force Circulation survey; sample sizes of the Labour Force 
Circulation supplementary surveys ranged from 4 200 to 7 200 between 1994–2000. The 
sample covered 327 people with higher education degrees. This sample is too small to 
enable the collection of reliable information on the mobility of people with higher educa-
tion, only a new survey can provide sufficient data to allow the more subtle characteris-
tics of the mobility of the highly educated to be analysed. 
Supplementary questions in the Labour Force Survey 
The Labour Force Survey is the largest continuous statistical survey of households 
in Hungary. The core questionnaire does not include questions on mobility. The related 
supplementary survey would gather information on the career paths of the highly quali-
fied workers included in the sample and on the motives underlying any change in em-
ployment. 
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The supplementary questionnaires could be distributed together with the core ques-
tionnaires, this is the a main advantage of this method. As a consequence, collecting ba-
sic information on the selected people or households and on the general characteristics of 
the labour market would not burden the supplementary survey. Furthermore, the sample 
of highly educated people belonging to HRST could provide retrospective information on 
changes in employment and other parameters (sector, position etc.). 
The address register of the Labour Force Survey consists of 12 775 districts of the 
census performed in 1990, including 751 settlements and 626 000 addresses. Due to its 
size (approximately 10 percent of the registered addresses), the sample is representa-
tive at regional level NUTS2 as well.  
The current sample of the LFS would enable some 6 000 people with higher educa-
tion degrees to be interviewed. The LFS contains sufficient data on education to allow 
groupings according to both the Hungarian classification and the ISCED ’97 (Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education – ISCED) international classification. The 
occupations of people aged 15-74 are coded on the basis of a detailed description. A 
three-digit classification of occupation, corresponding to the ISCO ’88 (International 
Standard Classification of Occupations – ISCO) international classification system, was 
introduced in 2000. In 2001, the Hungarian system will be enlarged to four digits to bring 
it in line with EU regulations. 
Any drawbacks caused by the rotational character of the survey could be eliminated 
by the introduction of characteristics: 1/6 of the 6 000 people – i.e. 1 000 people – 
would remain in the sample for one and a half years due to the rotating method men-
tioned. 
In the panel survey, interviewees would answer questions relating to 
– Qualifications and skills. 
– Changes in employment. 
– Reasons for changing employment: motives of choosing the new employment; 
changes in the activities performed at work. 
The panel survey would enable researchers to obtain information relating not only to 
the year in question but also to the professional careers of the respondents, thus facilitat-
ing analysis of the direction of knowledge flows over a longer period of time. 
This method is more cost-efficient than those described former, since only the fees for 
interviewers and handling of the database are calling for additional expense. 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES  
OF THE PROPOSED SURVEY METHODS 
Although the use of a separate panel (Method 1) of people with higher education de-
grees would enable in-depth analysis of mobility of the workforce linked with innova-
tion, the discontinuity of regular time series and the cost of the surveys make this method 
less feasible. 
Due to the small sample size, the Labour Force Circulation survey (Method 2) of 
those with higher education degrees would yield only superficial information and would 
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neglect the smallest organisations, the segment of the economy in which employment 
changes are most frequent. Admittedly, this is also a problem in the ongoing data collec-
tion on Labour Force Circulation, since many employees of small firms work in the un-
derground economy and are thus unlikely to provide information on their movements. 
Moreover, at the present time, numbers of employees and trends in employment cannot 
be estimated from the Labour Force Circulation surveys. 
In considering the implementation of the supplement to the Labour Force Survey 
(Method 3), which would appear to be the most reasonable statistical method of the three, it 
should be borne in mind that supplementary surveys can be extended by ad hoc surveys like 
the Labour Force Circulation survey. Another advantage of this method is that there would 
be no need to collect basic information, data gathering and processing costs would be con-
siderably lower than those for Method 1 and the survey questions would only need to be 
devised once since they would be repeated in succeeding surveys. 
APPENDIX 
1. Data collection from a separate panel of people with higher education degree 
Advantages Disadvantages Expenditures per survey 
– The new sample would allow an 
analysis matching most of the 
necessary needs. 
– The sampled people would 
probably not be identical to those 
having already participated in 
other surveys, therefore would 
be more willing to answer. 
– The new sample could be se-
lected on the basis of the census 
held in 2001. 
– Sample size (highly educated, 
according to age groups): 15–20 
thousand people. 
– The basic information needs to 
be gathered, which could be 
avoided if the survey supple-
mented an already existing one. 
– It could not be carried out before 
the second half of 2002. 
– Given that the survey is launched 
with an entirely new sample that 
cannot be combined with already 
existing surveys, initial costs 
would be considerably high es-
pecially on the first occasion. 
– Drop-outs are difficult to predict 
for the first 5-10 years, the sam-
ple may prove to be insufficient. 
– Sampling. 
– Developing statistical methods. 
– Questionnaire. 
– Methodological assistance . 
– Preparation of interviewers. 
– Fee of interviewers. 
– Statistical control of the responses. 
– Material costs. 
– Software development. 
– Data processing. 
– Writing up the survey. 
 
Total expected costs in the first 
year: euro 170 000  in the follow-
ing years: euro 34 000. 
2. Supplementing the questionnaire of the Labour Force Circulation surveys 
Advantages Disadvantages Expenditures per survey  
– Adding new questions to the 
supplementary Labour Force 
Circulation survey would make 
the development of a new survey 
unnecessary. 
– The survey would only yield data 
in the case of people, who 
change jobs in the given year, 
therefore insufficiency of sample 
size would not allow a more de-
tailed analysis. 
– Sample size (participants of the 
supplementary Labour Force 
Circulation survey in the first 
quarter of 2000): 327 people. 
 
 
– Preparation of interviewers. 
– Supplementary fee to interviewers. 
– Modification of software. 




Total expected costs: euro 14 000. 
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3. Supplementary questions in the Labour Force Survey 
Advantages Disadvantages Expenditures per survey  
– The supplementary survey would 
not need to collect basic infor-
mation. 
– Data gained from the Labour 
Force Circulation survey could 
also be used. 
– Data gathering and processing 
costs would be considerably 
lower than those of Appendix. 
– Questions in the surveys could be 
repeated in other surveys follow-
ing the first occasion. 
– The number of people, who re-
fuse answering, is expected to 
increase with the introduction of 
a further questionnaire. 
– Costly sample size (people with 
higher education degree in the 
core sample): 6 000 people. 
 
– Questionnaire. 
– Methodological assistance.  
– Preparation of interviewers. 
– Fee of interviewers. 
– Statistical control of responses. 
– Material costs. 
– Software development. 
– Combining data recording, collec-
tion, and control. 
– Processing. 
– Writing up the survey. 
 
Total expected costs: euro 24 000. 
Glossary of terms 
Gross (or wide) mobility rate: a percentage rate of all employees, it concerns every movement in the em-
ployment status, i.e. – beside job-changers – beginners and those, who die, etc. are also included in the gross 
rate of mobility. To put it simply, everybody, who enter or leave the labour market and change employment, is 
included. 
Highly qualified labour force: ‘highly qualified’ has two interpretations: one of them is associated with the 
abilities and experience of the employee, the other is associated with education. In this article and in most sta-
tistics ‘highly qualified labour force’ means employees with a college degree or higher. 
ICT (Information and Communication Technology) sectors: high technology sectors. By the OECD defini-
tion, they include manufacture of pharmaceuticals, manufacture of office machinery and computers, manufac-
ture of radio, television and telecommunication equipment, telecommunication. 
Net (or narrow) mobility rate: a percentage rate of all employees, it concerns only the actual job-changers, 
i.e. only those employees, who change employment. 
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CHANGES IN FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURE 
AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE IN FIVE CEECS* 
ANDREA ÉLTETŐ1 
The article analyses the structural changes of foreign trade between five Central and 
Eastern European countries and the EU. It points out that during the nineties, a significant 
shift has taken place towards technologically more developed products. The former speciali-
sation on low-technology, labour intensive goods strongly weakened and in certain cases 
new specialisation patterns have been developed among the high-tech products. The level of 
manufacturing intra-industry trade increased and this in several cases meant product quality 
improvement as the results of the unit value calculations showed. For these changes in the 
foreign trade structure those – high and medium-tech – products are responsible which are 
produced by foreign owned, multinational companies. FDI therefore exerts a determinant ef-
fect on the external competitiveness of Central European countries. 
KEYWORDS: Foreign trade, Foreign direct investment. 
he Central and Eastern European countries are striving for the European Union 
membership. In this case they will be part of the single internal market experiencing the 
advantages and drawbacks of the increased competition. The competitiveness of a coun-
try is often judged on the basis of its export performance on the foreign markets. The dy-
namics and the composition of the exports, the complexity and quality of the traded 
goods reflect the development of their domestic economy. In the era of globalisation and 
increasing competition this kind of competitiveness is getting more and more important.  
Recently, that a decade has passed since the basic political changes in this region, 
it is instructive to analyse the development of the foreign trade. The paper focused its 
analysis on those five Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-5) who were 
first selected by the EU to begin the accession negotiations: Poland, Estonia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The subject of the analysis is the foreign trade of 
these countries with the European Union. In this respect, this paper analyses the 
changes in the product structure, and specialisation trends emphasising the technologi-
cal level of the products.  
 
* The article is based on the research supported by the European Union’s Phare ACE programme No. P97-8112-R. The 
content of the publication is the sole responsability of the author and it in no way represents the views of the Commission or its 
services. 
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Among developed countries, a considerable part of trade is intra-industry trade, 
which means trade with similar, diversified manufactured products. This type of trade 
can be the exchange of the same goods on the basis of different packing or seasonal ef-
fects, can be the exchange of differentiated or substitutive goods or can be induced by in-
tra-industry co-operation. This article examines to what extent this kind of trade in-
creased in the CEEC-5 during the nineties, showing thus similar trends to the developed 
countries. Based on an in-depth analysis of the intra-industry trade patterns conclusions 
can also be drawn regarding the quality of the exported products. 
The foreign trade performance of a country – especially if its size is small – is often 
influenced by the strongly export-oriented activity of multinational and foreign firms. 
Multinationals give a determinant part of world trade at the end of the nineties and they 
have realised important investments in the CEEC-5 region. According to our hypothesis 
therefore, the changes taken place in the foreign trade, have been in great part due to the 
activity of the foreign investment enterprises in the countries. 
1. CHANGING FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURE 
At the end of the nineties the foreign trade of the CEECs has already been tied to the 
European Union, the geographical composition of exports and imports has been modified in 
favour of the EU. Apart from the geographical factor, there have been important changes also 
in the product composition of  foreign trade. These changes in the manufacturing product 
structure are in the center of the following analysis. 
The article uses the industry classification based on the method of OECD (1993) made 
in ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities) classi-
fication. Three groups were created in this classification: high-technology, medium-
technology and low-technology intensive products.2 All the calculations referring to foreign 
trade dynamics and indices are made at the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) 5 digit product level (3464 items) given by the EUROSTAT Comext database.3 
This is a level detailed enough to avoid all biases stemming from the aggregation of prod-
ucts. Data were converted afterwards to ISIC Rev3 classification, in order to apply the for-
mer mentioned technology grouping of sectors. (This sectoral approach has certainly limita-
tions because of the not sufficiently disaggregated data. Certain products manufactured by 
high-tech sectors are medium or low tech and vice versa. The OECD therefore developed a 
product approach, but only for the high-tech products. Though this approach has also its 
own limitations (Hatzichronoglou; 1997) the sectoral approach is applied here.) 
In analysing the technology-intensity of traded products, first the development of the 
high-tech group is followed. According to the OECD definition pharmaceuticals, telecom-
munication equipment, office machinery, aircraft-spacecraft, precision instruments and 
electrical machinery branch belong to this group. Figure 1 shows the development of the 
high-tech exports to the EU in the case of the CEEC-5 between 1993 and 1998.  
 
2 The indicator of technological intensity (weighted according to sectors and countries) is the share of R&D expenditures in 
output or value-added. At the end of the nineties based on the experiences the OECD revised the grouping (Hatzichronoglou; 1997) 
and divided the medium-tech group into two parts. Medium-high and medium-low groups were created, precision instruments and 
electrical machinery were put into the former one. However, the former grouping is applied in the paper. 
3 In this database the EU is the reporter country, so ‘CEEC-5 exports to the EU’ means the EU imports from the CEECs. 
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Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT Comext data. 
The first striking phenomenon is the extremely rapid increase in the share of high-
technology sectors in manufacturing exports in Hungary and in Estonia. This share was 
the highest in 1998 in Hungary, reaching 34 percent.4 The definite growth in the case of 
Poland and the Czech Republic is also remarkable. 
If we examine the detailed sectoral composition of the exports and imports it turns out 
that in all five countries in most cases the same sectors increased their export share during 
the period examined. The strong increase in high-tech exports is due to the electrical ma-
chinery, telecommunication equipment, precision instruments and office machinery. Certain 
medium-technology sectors also increased their share in all countries, like chemicals and 
plastics, but above all and the most effectively the motor vehicle branch.  
The share of low-technology sectors, however decreased rapidly, mainly due to the 
food and beverage, textile-clothing industries. These – traditionally strong – sectors in all 
country decreased significantly their share in the exports to the EU. In some cases it did 
not mean a decrease also in the absolute value of the exports but in some cases the abso-
lute value decreased too.   
In 1998 the share of high-tech products was almost the same in the Slovenian and in 
the Czech exports to the EU, around 17 percent. However, in the Czech case there was a 
considerable increase since 1993 while in the case of Slovenian one there is hardly any 
change. In the Czech exports the electrical machinery sector is responsible for the in-
crease. The share of low-tech product group decreased since 1993, due to the textile-
clothing sector. 
In the Slovenian exports the share of medium-tech products increased, which has 
been caused by the motor vehicle and machinery sector. Similarly to the other countries, 
a decrease in the share of low-tech products can be observed in the exports. This is 
mainly due to the textile-clothing sector. 
 
4 This figure can be compared to the extremely high Irish share, which was 37.9 percent in 1998. 
Percent 
FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURE OF FIVE CEECS 95 
Regarding the high-tech products it is interesting that in Hungary the traditionally 
important pharmaceutical sector lost some of its importance in the EU-relation, although 
in other, Eastern-European relations it gained positions. The medium-technology sectors 
also increased their share for which the motor vehicle branch is entirely responsible. The 
share of low-technology sectors, however decreased rapidly. 
Concerning the Polish exports, the share of high-tech products has also increased 
considerably between 1993 and 1998. The share of medium-technology group remained 
more or less the same, while the share of low-tech products decreased in the exports to 
the EU due to the food and textile branches. 
As far as Estonia is concerned, the telecommunication equipment (radio-TV sets) 
branch is the most important among the high-tech groups, but office and electrical ma-
chinery sectors also increased considerably their share. At the same time, the role of me-
dium-tech products drastically decreased in the exports to the EU, from 30 percent to 10 
percent. As an exception among the examined countries the share of low-tech products 
remained at the same high level (70%), textile, wood, and refined petroleum products are 
still important components of the Estonian exports. 
Table 1 
Share of product groups in the CEEC – EU trade 
(percent) 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Country,  
product groups 1993 1998 
Hungary     
High technology 16.26 18.43 34.54 25.88 
Medium technology 24.62 44.89 37.12 47.38 
Low technology 59.12 36.68 28.34 26.74 
Manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Estonia     
High technology 1.16 8.27 22.17 21.48 
Medium technology 29.07 32.28 9.54 24.17 
Low technology 69.77 59.45 68.28 54.35 
Manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Czech Republic     
High technology 11.21 21.42 17.11 23.82 
Medium technology 33.45 48.86 44.43 44.76 
Low technology 55.34 29.72 38.46 31.42 
Manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Slovenia     
High technology 16.20 12.19 16.97 14.23 
Medium technology 29.47 45.33 41.03 46.47 
Low technology 54.33 42.48 42.00 39.29 
Manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Poland     
High technology 6.78 15.60 13.59 17.58 
Medium technology 27.20 46.13 30.55 47.21 
Low technology 66.02 38.27 55.86 35.20 
Manufacturing 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT Comext database. 
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In the structure of the imports from the EU we can find that the share of high-tech 
products in the exports is considerably higher than their share in the imports in the case 
of Hungary and slightly in the case of Estonia and Slovenia. However, in absolute value 
this means only in Hungary more high-tech exports than imports, in the case of Slovenia 
the value of high-tech exports is slightly lower than the value of imports (although it was 
much higher in 1993), and Estonia imports considerably more high-tech products than 
exports.  
Generally speaking in terms of foreign trade and in terms of exports on the EU mar-
ket, the competitiveness of the CEEC-5 countries has improved in the nineties. This 
means that the export structure has become more similar to that of the developed coun-
tries, with more and more high-tech products in the foreground. Apart from the modern 
structure, another feature of the foreign trade among the developed countries is the rela-
tively high share of intra-industry trade. The following part analyses this kind of devel-
opment in the case of the CEEC-5. 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE  
In general, for the analysis of intra-industry trade (IIT),5 the index of Grubel–Lloyd 
(1975) is used. However, since the work of Greenaway – Milner (1994) two types of in-
tra-industry trade can be distinguished. The first is called vertical IIT, when the products 
traded are of the same type but different in quality, the other is the horizontal IIT, when 
also the quality of products is comparable. 
Separating vertical and horizontal IIT is important for many reasons. Regarding the 
effect of integration, in the case of countries which are of different development level, in-
tegration can enhance vertical IIT. In this case, products of the less developed country, 
which are of lower quality can be crowded out by better quality imports of more devel-
oped countries, thus the costs of adjustment can be high. Regarding this theory, empirical 
verification of the role of scale economies in creating IIT remained rather poor.6 Calcula-
tions showed that generally vertical IIT is much more significant than horizontal IIT, 
therefore interest has grown in analysing and explaining vertical IIT.  
Falvey (1981) pointed out that difference in quality among similar goods (that is ver-
tical IIT) on the supply side is caused by the differing capital/labour ratio of their produc-
tion. High-quality products require more capital-intensive production techniques. On the 
demand side there is an aggregate demand for a variety of differentiated products, low-
income consumers will buy lower quality products, high-income consumers high quality 
products. A relatively labour abundant country will export the lower quality/labour in-
 
5 As it is well known, IIT is characteristic for the sophisticated manufactured products. Monopolies, increasing returns to scale, 
homogeneous consumer preferences in partner countries explain this type of trade. Intra-industry trade is especially intensive among 
developed countries, which trade with similar, diversified manufactured products. The more similar the factor endowments of the 
partner countries are, the greater the extent of IIT is. It should be mentioned that intra-industry trade is often mixed with trade within 
the production vertical. Thus, if a country imports motors and exports cars, it is not intra-industry trade although in a high enough 
aggregation level both products belong to the ‘vehicles and components’ category. Therefore proper disaggregation is very impor-
tant in the measurement of intra-industry trade. It should be clarified that intra-firm trade – between a multinational parent company 
and affiliates – can be of intra-industry type but not necessarily, intra-firm trade is not a part of intra-industry trade and vice 
versa.(Fontagné et al.; 1995). The propensity for intra-firm trade differs according to industries and also depends on firm and coun-
try-specific factors, among them the size of FDI involved (see Dunning; 1993). Applying intra-firm trade multinational companies 
can manipulate the terms of trade, tackle the different tax systems of governments. 
6 For details see Blanes-Martín (2000). 
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tensive version of the product (aiming low-income consumers abroad) and will import 
the higher quality product (for high-income consumers on the domestic market). Thus 
IIT is explained by comparative advantages. From another aspect Davis (1995) also 
shows that IIT can take place without increasing returns and imperfect competition. In 
that case the emphasis is on technical differences among the countries which determine 
specialisation on one or other types of intra-industry product.  
As it was mentioned, the basic indicator used to measure intra-industry trade is the 
Grubel-Lloyd index. The definition of the index for a given product group ‘i’ is the fol-
lowing: 
















The index for the whole economy (or a sector group) is the weighted average of the 
product group indices according to the weight of the product groups in foreign trade 
(Wi). X and M are exports and imports respectively: 











The value of the index can vary between 0 and 100, a higher index means a higher 
level of IIT. Note that the less detailed aggregation is used, the higher the value of the 
index is, IIT should therefore be calculated at a very detailed level of classification.7 
In the method of separation of IIT into horizontal (HIIT) and vertical (VIIT) types 
quality differences of exports and imports are used.8 If the export and import unit value 
differ by less then 15 percent then IIT is horizontal (the traded goods are of the same 
quality), if the difference is bigger in such a way that export unit values are higher then 
IIT is high quality vertical, otherwise IIT is low-quality vertical.9 
In the calculations we apply the SITC 5 digit level classification. The results were 
converted and grouped according to the technology-intensity level in line with the ISIC 
classification already used.   
Figure 2 gives a ‘general view’ of the situation in the five examined countries. The 
first observation one can make is that the share of intra-industry trade is in every country 
higher in 1998 than it was in 1993. The increase has been especially spectacular in the 
case of Estonia and Slovenia. Compared to the others, Estonia has still the lowest share, 
but shows the highest increase. For 1998 Slovenia had the second largest share of IIT in 
the trade with the EU. 
 
7 About problems of the GL indicator and other types of measures see Vona (1991) for more details. 
8 The principle of ‘bigger price, better quality’ can be criticised (for example some products can be overpriced), however 
there is no better method found out for signing quality differences.  
9 If 0.85≤ UVX / UVM ≤1.15 then IIT is horizontal. 
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The level of intra-industry trade was and is the highest between the Czech Republic 
and the EU. This means that in 1998 more than the half of the manufacturing trade was 
of intra-industry type. This is almost as high as the Spanish figure (58.8%).10 Regarding 
the types of IIT, in every country the vertical low quality IIT dominates, similarly to the 
international experience.11 Hungary shows the highest share in the vertical high quality 
type IIT (where the quality of the exported products is better than that of the imported 
ones) but Slovenia and Estonia also could increase this type of IIT. 



















Poland CzechRepublic Hungary Slovenia Estonia
VH – vertical high quality
VL  – vertical low quality
H – horizontal quality
 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT Comext database. 
Detailed calculations of IIT at the sectoral level are available in electronic format 
(www.ksh.hu/statszml). It can be stated that in the CEEC-5 in almost every branch, intra-
industry trade increased between 1993–1998. 
As regards Hungary, among the high-technology groups a decrease in (mostly verti-
cal low quality) IIT can be observed in the case of pharmaceuticals, but for telecommu-
nications equipment and electronic machinery a significant increase is manifested in 
 
10 Éltető (2000), p. 159. 
11 Obviously, if we regard the CEEC-5 trade separately with EU-members, we get a heterogeneous picture. Therefore, the 
level of intra-industry trade depends not only on the aggregation level but also on the country group we define. This phenome-
non is called ‘geographical bias’ by Fontagné-Freudenberg (1997) who argue that when different partner countries are put to-
gether, the sign of the trade balance for a given product may change from one partner to another and will show up as a ‘multi-
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horizontal IIT. Outstandingly high is the share of IIT in the office machinery branch 
(33.9%). In the case of medical, precision instruments low quality vertical IIT increased. 
In the case of low technology sectors, increase in intra-industry trade (although from a 
low level) is general and in several cases means an increase in horizontal or vertical high 
quality IIT (textile, paper, metals), which suggests quality upgrading. Regarding medium-
technology sectors, the situation is the same. The increase in vertical high quality IIT is es-
pecially spectacular in the case of transport equipment (except for railway locomotives).  
In the case of Estonia, the considerable increase of IIT was caused by the vertical low 
and high quality type. The latter increased mainly in the trade of high-tech products, tele-
communication, electrical machinery and pharmaceuticals. Among the medium-tech 
products transport equipment show an increase and plastic products a decrease of vertical 
high quality IIT. Regarding the low-tech group, intra-industry trade increased signifi-
cantly  in almost every product categories. 
In the Czech trade of high-tech products the Grubel-Lloyd index for pharmaceuticals de-
creased. This is similar to the Hungarian phenomenon though this decrease was due to the 
vertical high quality IIT. Horizontal IIT increased in the trade of telecommunication equip-
ment and vertical high quality IIT increased in medical precision instruments. In the trade of 
medium-tech products IIT (of vertical low quality) decreased quite significantly in motor ve-
hicles and manufacture of transport equipment, however in the motor vehicle branch there 
has been an important increase in horizontal IIT. Horizontal IIT increased in the trade of low-
tech products in textile, paper, refined petroleum, fabricated metals, and vertical high-quality 
IIT increased in the case of wood products; hinting to a quality upgrading. 
As it was mentioned, the level of Slovenian IIT with the EU increased to a great ex-
tent to 1998, which was mainly due to the horizontal and vertical low type of IIT. Verti-
cal high quality IIT increased in the trade of high-tech products, locomotives and other 
manufacturing but decreased in the case of non-ferrous metals, motor vehicles and plas-
tics. There are certain low-technology products where horizontal IIT is quite high, like 
paper, textile, basic and fabricated metals. 
Poland experienced a moderate increase in intra-industry trade. There were several 
product groups where IIT decreased, like pharmaceuticals, precision instruments, rubber, 
transport equipment, locomotives, etc. Horizontal IIT increased remarkably in telecom-
munication equipment, electrical machinery, motor vehicles. 
Analysing the increase of IIT, it is important to know the ‘technical’ composition of this 
increase. Stemming from the properties of the IIT index, an increase of intra-industry trade 
can be observed in certain cases if the trade balance improves but also if the trade balance 
worsens. The IIT indicator can increase if imports grow from a lower level than exports but 
exports remain similar. Therefore it is considered important to analyse what the increase of 
intra-industry trade caused in these countries. The developments of the trade balance of a 
sector are manifested in the foreign trade specialisation patterns of the countries. 
3. SPECIALISATION PATTERNS 
As it was introduced the structure of the foreign trade has changed considerably 
among the CEEC-5 and the EU during the nineties. Based on this one can presume that 
there have been  changes in trade specialisation patterns too. In this respect the index  
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=  , 
where Xi is the exports and Mi is the imports of sector i. For any aggregates SI is com-
puted as the rario of the aggregated numerator ( ( )∑ − ii MX ) and the denominator 
( ( )∑ + ii MX ), expressed in a percentage form. One can speak about advantages, or spe-
cialisation if the value of the index is positive. Because of the properties of the index, its  
positive value means a positive trade balance. 
Results of the calculation of SI indices for the five CEECs is shown in Figure 3. It 
can be seen that in 1993 four countries had clear specialisation on low-tech products, Es-
tonia was the only exception. To 1998 this specialisation vanished remaining only to a 
tiny extent in the Czech Republic. This means that in these low-tech branches the trade 
balance considerably worsened and turned into a deficit. 
Despecialisation on high-tech products at the same time decreased in the countries 
(except for Slovenia, which was in 1993 specialised on high-tech products but despecial-
ised in 1998). In the case of Hungary, the SI index has even turned to positive for 1998, 
which already shows a clear specialisation caused by the surplus in trade balance of the 
high-tech products. Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic improved their trade balance 
position considerably in high-tech products but could not turn this into positive. An im-
provement can be observed in the medium-tech group also, except for Estonia where a 
strong worsening of despecialisation can be seen. 






































Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT Comext database. 
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Regarding Hungary, at those – mainly low-tech – branches where Hungarian specialisa-
tion had been traditionally of a high degree (textile, food, wooden products, coke and petro-
leum, etc.) there are still positive indices but a radical decreasing or stagnating trend can be 
observed during the nineties. At the same time, new specialisation patterns appeared within 
the high-tech products, in office machinery and telecommunication equipment. In electrical 
machinery, specialisation remained existing. On that basis, one can say that Hungary has 
lost its specialisation in labour-intensive, low technology goods, but at the same time has 
been able to develop an important export activity in high technology goods. Exports have 
been increasing considerably faster than imports in these cases. 
Table 2 
Manufacturing branches where specialisation improved or despecialisation decreased  
(1993–1998) 
Poland Slovenia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary 
Radio-TV sets Office machinery Office machinery Office machinery Office machinery 
Electrical  
machinery 



















Rubber products Motor vehicles  
and parts 











Boats  Non ferrous metals   
  Motor vehicles   
  Boats   
  Fabricated metals   
In the case of the Czech Republic there is a strong improvement in specialisation to 
medium-tech products. As for of rubber products, locomotives, and motor vehicles the SI 
index had a positive sign in 1998 (in 1993 it was negative for the motor vehicle prod-
ucts). Among the high-tech groups there is also an improvement, except for pharmaceu-
ticals. In the case of the low technology group although specialisation remained, it has 
considerably deteriorated since 1993. 
Slovenia has also experienced the loss of specialisation on the traditional, low-
technology-intensive products. But also in other fields, generally, there is a decrease of 
the SI value in almost every sectors except for chemicals, locomotives and pharmaceuti-
cals. This hints to a general deterioration of the Slovenian trade balance with the EU. 
In the Polish trade there is no specialisation on high-tech products, although an im-
provement of the SI index can be seen at the electrical machinery branch. Among the 
medium-tech sectors in two cases we can see a clear specialisation, with positive SI 
value: by non ferrous metals and manufacture of transport equipment. The specialisation 
on low-tech products, which was apparent in 1993 has been lost for 1998. The SI index 
remained positive only for wood products and building of boats. 
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Estonia also does not show a positive SI index for the high-tech products, although 
the value for office machinery products improved considerably. Similarly to this, there is 
no one medium-tech product group either with positive index value. In the case of low-
tech products, however, we can find three fields of specialisation: textile-clothing, wood 
products and refined petroleum. In the latter two cases specialisation is quite strong.  
Having an overview on the foreign trade specialisation patterns (and trade balance 
situation), one can examine which are the sectors where the increase of the intra-industry 
trade has stemmed from the worsening of the trade balance. 
– Czech Republic: chemicals, railway and tramway locomotives, food, beverages, to-
bacco, textile, clothing, leather, paper and printing, basic metals. 
– Slovenia as there are only a few sectors where the trade balance improved, so it is 
no wonder that in the most cases the increase in IIT was caused by the worsening trade 
balance: office and electrical machinery, precision instruments, rubber products, motor-
cycles, food, beverage, tobacco, textile, clothing, leather, wood, paper, basic metals. 
– Poland: non ferrous metals, food, beverage, tobacco, textile, clothing, leather, pa-
per, refined petroleum, non metallic minerals, fabricated metals. 
– Estonia: pharmaceuticals, chemicals, rubber, plastic, transport equipment, other 
manufacturing, textile, clothing, leather, wood, paper, non-metallic minerals, boats. 
– Hungary: rubber products, food, textile-clothing, wood, paper and printing, petro-
leum, minerals, non-metallic minerals, basic and fabricated metals, boats. 
It is obvious from the list that in every country, at the big majority of low-tech prod-
ucts the increase of intra-industry trade has been due to the worsening of the trade bal-
ance. On the contrary, it can hardly be found any high-tech products where the IIT in-
crease stemmed from the growth of the foreign trade deficit. This means that in these 
cases the reason of the intensification of the intra-industry trade is something else. 
4. THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on foreign trade has been an increas-
ingly important issue in the nineties as for a continuously growing part of the interna-
tional trade is being realised by multinational enterprises (for an overview of theoretical 
evidence in this respect see for example (Cantwell-Bellak; 2000). In the early theories of 
foreign direct investment and multinational firms, FDI and foreign trade were considered 
to be substitutes. First Mundell (1957) built a model where both FDI and foreign trade 
were based on the price differences of products and production factors were determined 
by the different factor endowments of the countries. The product-cycle theory of Vernon 
(1966) was also based on this substitution principle, where foreign direct investment re-
placed the export as the product matured.  
Still based on the traditional comparative advantage theory, Kojima (1975) intro-
duced the concept of trade-oriented (pro-trade) and anti-trade-oriented FDI based on the 
theory of comparative advantages. According to this, one can speak about trade creating, 
or pro-trade FDI if the investment is undertaken from the home country’s comparatively 
disadvantaged industries into the host country’s comparatively advantaged industries. 
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Both countries gain from the following trade creation. In the case of anti-trade FDI, 
however, investment is undertaken by a firm of the home country’s comparative advan-
tage industry into the host country's comparative disadvantage industry. In this way the 
home country has an excess demand for importable goods and an excess supply of ex-
portable goods. The two countries are competing in importing and exporting capacities, 
thus FDI can even destroy trade. 
At the end of the seventies ‘new international trade’ theories emphasize, however the 
complementary relationship between FDI and foreign trade (see for example Krugman; 
1990 and 1991, Venables; 1996). This is the result of introducing new aspects in the 
models like increasing returns to scale, product differentiation, technology-differences 
among nations. Allowing for these factors and assuming identical relative factor endow-
ments Markusen (1983) proved that factor (capital) movements between two economies 
lead to an increase in the volume of trade. 
The different kind of investments have different effects on the foreign trade (Dun-
ning; 1993).12 The resource based investment aims to exploit some kind of natural re-
sources. The efficiency-seeker or export-oriented investment aims to exploit the low cost 
resources and to provide export markets by concentrating production to a few locations. 
These are ‘internationally integrated’ investments (Cantwell-Bellak; 2000, p.122.) which 
involve the local affiliate in the international corporate group. As they state, resource 
based and internationally integrated investments are generally net trade-creating since 
they establish international connections by trade.  
Those companies belong to the market-oriented investors, who invest in a country or 
into a region in order to supply these markets with their goods or services. The increase 
of the market or economic policy changes in the aimed country can promote the foreign 
company to invest. The aim of the investment is to preserve or gain market shares. The 
products made by the affiliate are sold in the local or regional market. These kind of in-
vestments can have both trade creating and trade replacing effects. Market-oriented firms 
may worsen the trade balance, if their exports are negligible and many of their inputs are 
imported. In principle, the size of the host country is likely to influence the trade strategy 
of foreign investors. Thus, big countries tend to be more suitable for market-oriented 
companies. Whereas small host countries appearing to be more suitable for export-
oriented FDI because, apart from having a small domestic market, they use to have a 
higher degree of openness (ratio of trade to GDP) than large countries. The country-size 
is just one factor, however. Generally, the export propensity of foreign subsidiaries de-
pends on a lot of industry and firm variables (see more details in Rojec; 2000). 
The foreign trade balance situation is and has been an important issue in the eco-
nomic policy of the CEECs. Presumably the contribution of foreign investment firms to 
the trade balance in manufacturing has been different in the time being. In the first half 
of the nineties the import of foreign participation (in many cases greenfield) firms was 
very high in great part required by the building up of production capacities. Later on, 
however,  the exports of these firms has become so significant that they exerted a posi-
tive effect on the foreign trade balance. Best examples for this phenomenon are the so 
 
12 The author differentiates among four main types: efficiency-seekers, resource-seekers, market seekers and strategic as-
set seekers. 
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called industrial free zones,13 where majority or completely foreign owned firms, multi-
national affiliates were established. These firms produced USD 2091 million surplus in 
1999, giving 43 percent of Hungarian exports and 30 percent of imports. The main direc-
tion of the exports is the EU. A considerable part of this trade consists of deliveries to 
other affiliates or to the mother company in EU countries (mainly Germany). 
To the end of the nineties foreign capital has a considerable weight in the manufac-
turing sectors of the CEEC-5. Foreign penetration in the industry increased rapidly in all 
fields, let it be gross value-added, net sales revenue, investments, employment, etc. The 
increase has been really spectacular in the case of exports. In 1993 foreign investment 
firms were responsible for 15-50 percent of the manufacturing exports in the examined 
countries and in 1998 this increased to 33-86 percent (see Figure 4). Hungary had and 
still has by far the highest share of foreign investment enterprises (FIE) in exports. Slo-
venia and Estonia are similar with around 35 percent and Poland and the Czech Republic 
with around 50 percent. 

















* The base year is 1994 in the case of Slovenia and 1995 in the case of Estonia. 
Source: WIIW database on foreign investment enterprises. 
There are certain sectors where the share of FIEs is very high in all of the countries: 
these are the telecommunication equipment, office and electrical machinery (high-tech) 
and motor vehicle branches (medium-tech). In the case of low-tech products the share of 
FIEs in exports is generally lower than the average but there are cases of quite high FDI-
participation (tobacco, paper). 
The available evidence on how FDI affected trade specialisation patterns of Central 
European host countries is rather scarce. In the case of intra-industry trade, according to 
certain studies it seems that FDI increases the share of IIT. Aturupane–Djankov–
Hoekman (1997) for example found on the basis of an econometric analysis of EU-
CEEC trade, after controlling for country-specific factors, a positive and significant rela-
tionship between FDI and both vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade. 
 
13 Based on the XXIV/1988 law of foreign investment companies with foreign participation may establish their own in-
dustrial-free zones under the control of the customs authorities, within which they are regarded as foreigners for the purposes 
of exchange control and foreign trade. There are around 100 industrial-free zones spread throughout Hungary, the majority of 
which belongs to the machinery industry. The regulation of these zones will have to be changed after the accession of the 
country to the EU (see Éltető; 1998). 
Percent 
Table 3
The ten most important export products to the EU in 1998 
(thousand euros and percentage of total exports)
Poland Slovenia Hungary Czech Republic Estonia
SITC euro share SITC euro share SITC euro share SITC euro share SITC euro share
78 120  762 860 4.75 78 120  693 082 13.31 71 322 1 877 844 12.89 78 120  1 472 892 10.10 76 432 144 831 8.23
76 110  444 331 2.77 82 119  208 879 4.01 75 270  637 267 4.37 78 439  346 706 2.38 33 440 82 638 4.69
32 121  426 217 2.65 78 219  103 915 2.00 76 381  507 533 3.48 82 119  306 375 2.10 24 820 81 239 4.61
82 116  410 771 2.56 78 439  92 336 1.77 78 120  431 248 2.96 78 432  227 825 1.56 24 740 74 871 4.25
82 159  280 495 1.75 68 412  76 601 1.47 75 997  369 257 2.53 77 313  192 010 1.32 33 419 72 191 4.10
68 212  276 225 1.72 77 521  64 993 1.25 77 313  362 130 2.49 69 969  164 344 1.13 24 752 64 403 3.66
78 219  256 554 1.60 71 690  60 607 1.16 76 110  327 014 2.24 24 820 154 078 1.06 33 430 57 487 3.27
32 500  219 538 1.37 77 586  57 589 1.11 78 439  261 510 1.80 69 119 152 546 1.05 75 997 57 211 3.25
63 599  200 670 1.25 78 432  52 833 1.01 75 260  210 548 1.45 93 190 129 317 0.89 76 493 33 321 1.89
78 439  199 641 1.24 74 315  51 488 0.99 71 323  207 536 1.42 71 631 109 376 0.75 82 159 30 954 1.76
Total 10 3 477 302 21.66 Total 10 1 462 323 28.08 Total 10 5 191 887 35.64 Total 10 3255469 22.33 Total 10 699146 39.71
Name of SITC numbers: 24 740: coniferous wood in the rough 24 752: non-coniferous wood 24 820: wood of coniferous species 32 121: bituminous coal, not agglomerated 32 500: coke
and semicoke of coal, of lignite 33 419: light oils from petroleum or bituminous minerals and products therefrom 33 430: gas oils, 33 440: fuel oils n.e.s. 63 599 manufactured articles of wood
68 212: refined copper 68 412: aluminium alloys, unwrought 69 119: metal structures and parts of iron and steel 69 969: articles of iron or steel n.e.s. 71 322: reciprocating piston engines of a
cylinder capacity exceeding 1000 CC, 71 323: compression-ignition engines (diesel or semi diesel) for road vehicles 71 631: electric motors of an output exceeding 37.5W, 71 690: parts for use
solely or principally with electric motors, generators 74 315: compressors used in refrigerating equipment 75 260: input–output units in data processing, 75 270: storage units for data
processing 75 997: parts of automatic data processing machines, magnetic or optical readers 76 110: television receivers, colour or sound and video recorders, 76 381:video recording or
reproducing apparatus 76 432: transmission apparatus for radiotelephony, radio broadcasting, incorporating reception apparatus 76 493: parts of television and radio broadcast receivers,
transmission apparatus for radio telephony 76 499: parts of sound recorders and TV image and sound recorders or reproducers, 77 313: ignition and other wiring sets used in vehicles, 77 521:
refrigerators, household type 77 586: electric ovens and cookers, cooking plates, grillers 77 821:filament lamps, 78120: motor vehicles for the transport of persons,78 219: motor vehicles for
the transport of goods, 78 432: other parts and accessories of motor vehicle bodies 78 439: parts and accessories for motor vehicles 82 116: seats n.e.s. with wooden frames 82 119:parts of seats
n.e.s. 82 159: furniture n.e.s. of wood 84 130: men’s jacket, woven, 84 140: men’s trousers, woven, 84 230:women’s jacket of woven textile, 84 270: blouses, shirts of woven textile,
85 148:footwear of leather, 85 190: parts of footwear 93 190: special transactions.
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As it was spectaculous, the most important and radical change has been the gain of 
high-tech products in the exports and in the trade specialisation of the CEEC-5. Let us 
examine the single products traded. Table 3 shows the first ten export products of the 
CEEC-5 to the EU.  
It can be seen that the most important export products are mainly telecommunication, 
electronic equipment, office machinery products (high tech) and several motor vehicles and 
components. In the case of Hungary the ‘first ten’ consists of only machinery and transport 
equipment products (SITC 7). These are the products which have caused the changes in the 
export structure, so behind the industries with spectacular development (like office machin-
ery or motor vehicles) in reality there are a small number of products. Exports in the nine-
ties experienced a high and increasing product-level concentration, which is also present at 
the company level.14 These products are overwhelmingly produced by multinational affili-
ates like IBM, Phillips, Renault, Volkswagen, Elcoteq or other major foreign firms.  
Keeping this in mind, one can presume that there is a correlation between the participa-
tion of FIEs in the exports of the manufacturing sectors and the export performance of the 
sectors. Table 3 shows a  set of possible correlation coefficients. This coefficients relate the 
1998 sectoral export-share of the FIEs and the sectoral export value quotient of 1998–1993. 
Such a way a positive correlation was found, although the extent of the correlation is not 
too strong and rather different according to countries. What is the reason of the fact that de-
spite the ‘obvious’ determining role of foreign companies in exports (seen on the product 
level) strong correlation can hardly be detected on the sectoral level? 
Correlation between FDI ‘penetration’ 
in exports and the export performance of the sectors 




Czech Republic 0.58 
Slovenia 0.46 
* Correlation coefficient: between the share of FIEs in the sectoral exports in 1998 and sectoral export value quotient in 
1998/1993. Number of observed sectors is 18 (12 in Estonia). 
The first reason is the lack of proper data. Available sectoral data on FIEs participa-
tion are too aggregated (ISIC 2 digit), they include sub-branches of different behaviour. 
The concept of Foreign Investment Enterprise is also too aggregated, it consists also of 
minority FIEs where the control is in domestic hands.  
The second reason lies in the nature of foreign investments. As it was mentioned, 
CEECs experienced a mixture of export-oriented and domestic market oriented FDI in-
flow. In several sectors, like food, certain chemicals, paper and printing, minerals, etc. 
FDI penetration is significant (because of domestic sale possibilities, gain of strategic 
positions, etc.) but the level of exports and the increase during the nineties have been 
rather small as compared to other sectors. 
 
14 74 percent of the total high-tech exports of Hungary originated from three companies (Phillips, IBM, GE) in 1997 and 
61 percent was the respective number for 1998. (Calculations based on the economic weekly ‘Figyelő Top 200’ database). 
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Apart from these, in case of Hungary the relatively low correlation can also be ex-
plained by the fact that in certain sectors the share of FIEs in the exports (FDI penetra-
tion) and similarly the export ‘quantity’ was already relatively high in 1993, so the in-
crease has been small up to 1998. (Examples can be the food-tobacco, and other trans-
port equipment sectors.) 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper observed the development of the five CEECs’ foreign trade with the EU. 
Apart from the simple export share analysis in the product structure it also examined the 
specialisation patterns and the development of intra-industry trade. The main results can 
be summarised as follows. 
1. Between 1993 and 1998 the foreign trade structure of the CEEC-5 with the EU 
went through on considerable changes. The share of the high-tech products increased 
significantly, first of all in Hungary and Estonia, but also in other countries. Parallel to 
this process the share of traditional, low technology sectors decreased. Similar develop-
ment can be observed in the foreign trade specialisation. The former specialisation of the 
CEEC-5 on low-technology, labour intensive goods strongly lessened and in certain 
cases new specialisation patterns have been developed among the high-tech products. 
The export increase of the high-tech products has been accompanied by an import in-
crease in most cases and it is a result of assembly-like, lower value-added activity espe-
cially in office machinery, telecommunication equipment and electronic products. 
2. The level of intra-industry trade increased in the manufacturing sector in each coun-
tries. This increase was the most spectacular in Slovenia and Estonia and the level of IIT is 
the highest between the Czech Republic and the EU. The increase of IIT in several cases 
meant product quality improvement at the same time, as the results of the unit value calcula-
tions showed. The increase of IIT can be considered a positive phenomenon in the case of 
several high and medium-tech products. Regarding low-tech products, however, in the ma-
jority of the cases the increase of IIT stemmed from the worsening of the trade balance. 
3. Foreign direct investments and the activity of foreign investment companies have 
became increasingly significant in the CEECs in the nineties. FIEs contributed to the re-
structuring of the economy and of the manufacturing sector. Certain branches have been 
similarly attractive for foreign investors in the five countries, where the affiliates of ma-
jor multinational companies are present. After having a look on the foreign trade struc-
ture at a very detailed product level it turns out that those – high and medium-tech – 
products are mainly responsible for the previously described changes in the foreign trade 
which are produced by these foreign companies. Statistical calculations are uncertain be-
cause of the lack of properly detailed data, but they still show a positive correlation be-
tween the extent of foreign presence in the exports and the extent of the successful export 
performance. It can be concluded that FDI exerts a determinant effect on the external 
competitiveness of the CEECs. The extent of this effect is obviously different among the 
countries due to their different FDI-attracting policies in the past and due to their differ-
ent production and location-specific advantage structures. In spite of that one can suggest 
that the external activity of the foreign investment firms in the CEEC-5 has already inte-
grated these economies to the European Union. 
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4. As the foreign trade patterns of the CEEC-5 are quite sensitive to the functioning of a 
few multinational affiliates, the economic policy should focus on the stabilisation and fur-
ther improvement of recent trade structure and external advantages. Regarding the exten-
sive penetration of foreign capital in these economies, foreign investors should be taken into 
account on the long run. In this respect the increase of the domestic value added and the 
maintenance of the attractiveness for foreign investors can be a reasonable policy. 
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ARMS TRANSFERS  
OF THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD, 1987–1997* 
ERVIN R. FRIGYES1 
In this paper the main methodological problems and the characteristic trends of interna-
tional arms transfers, are exposed.  
It has been documented in a quantitative way, that by the end of the eighties the Soviet 
Union (Russia) lost both its economic ability and political intention of arming loyal third 
world countries for sake of influence. This led to the decrease of total arms transfers to the 
developing countries and therefore to the decrease of world total arms transfers. Arms trans-
fers to the developed countries did not show the same systematic changes. The United States 
has a leading position in world total arms transfers and especially in transfers to the devel-
oped world. And there formed a western dominance in respect of deliveries to the developing 
countries  
However the article is focused on a very decisive period 1987–1997, in the final part it 
calls attention to the imminent problems caused by the compelling export drive of the still 
vigorous Russian (and Ukrainian) arms industry faced with the lack of the purchasing power 
of domestic armed forces. This situation could lead to the destabilization of the present world 
military situation. 
KEYWORDS: Arms transfers; International economy; International comparisons. 
rms transfers are a very special kind of foreign trade. The main motives are not 
restricted to economic gains. Seeking prestige and influence has a very important role to 
play. The first part of the article outlines the main methodological problems of the reli-
ability (or completeness) of data, the consideration of dual goods, the discontinuity of 
time series for Eastern Europe, the composition of main groups of countries and with 
the estimation of current and constant price USD values. The second part explains the 
main motives and characteristics of international arms transfers. The mutually inter-
woven issues of illicit arms trade and the weapons of mass destruction of recent times 
 
* The author is indebted to the Bureau of Verification and Compliance of the United States Department of State. To Mr. 
Daniel Gallik, editor of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) 1998 for giving permission to use the 
invaluable information of WMEAT98 for his researches, lectures and publication and, nevertheless for mailing him the printed 
version of that document. He also wants to express his gratitude to the Council of Livable World Educational Fund and person-
ally to Miss Kate Käufer for her valuable information. It should be noted that the views and analyses in this article are of the 
author’s responsibility. 
1 Retired associated professor, at Miklós Zrinyi University of National Defense, lecturer on Department of International 
Military Economics. 
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are small and light arms. The third part deals with the main characteristics of the 
changes in arms deliveries for the years of transition from the cold war to present world 
political and power relations (1987–1997). Supported with several figures and tables a 
concise analysis is attempted to demonstrate the processes of this decisive period. The 
fourth part tries to point out the problems and the possible dangers associated with the 
foreseeable arms exports drive of the major Soviet successor states. Russian (and 
Ukrainian) arms industry still exist and R&D is still going on. At the same time, domes-
tic armed forces cannot purchase new weapons, thus arms industry is compelled to in-
tensify exports. There is an imminent danger that these weapons could find their ways to 
rogue countries. 
1. SOURCES AND BASIC METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. 
In the era of cold war it was quite impossible to collect comprehensive worldwide 
data on this subject. Now the researcher faces another problem: the abundance of (some-
times incongruent) data. The main sources of statistical analysis now are provided mostly 
on the internet. Several institutions and non-government organizations (NGOs) publish 
data and analyses of military expenditures and arms trade on the World–Wide Web. This 
flow of information includes clippings from the world press. 
In respect of basic statistical data this article practically relies upon one single source: 
World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1987–1997 by the Bureau of Verifica-
tion and Compliance of the United States Department of State (WMEAT98). WMEAT98 
comprises data of 172 countries and information from practically all reliable resources. 
This period on which this article is focused (1987–1997) was of very radical changes 
in the international power structure and this had its effect on the arms trade flows too. 
Analyzing these changes one is faced with very complicated problems related to statisti-
cal methodology. 
– The data refer to transfers to armies and law enforcement agencies of legal govern-
ments and do not include those items provided by the opposing great powers to ‘libera-
tion movements’ (as they were called by the providers) or those sent to ‘rebel groups’ (as 
they were called by their adversaries). For the beginning of the decade these transfers 
were – usually – government grants. Soviet arms sent to the PLO, US arms to the Nicara-
guan ‘Contras’ and US and South African arms for the UNITA rebel group in Angola. In 
the nineties the non-government recipients of arms became supplied mostly by arms 
fixers. The bills used to be settled either by sympathizer countries (e.g. Libya, Liberia 
and Burkina Faso) or by special organizations (as in case of UNITA and the RUF – 
‘Revolutionary United Front’ of Sierra Leone). 
– One can hardly believe that there is a generally valid uniform treatment of the dual–
use articles (jeeps, trucks, light aircrafts, electronics, and explosives.) 
– The changes in the international power structure make the comparison of the data 
of the initial and final years very difficult. Political entities (the Soviet Union, the 
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the Warsaw Pact) 
ceased to exist and new entities emerged. There are no data for these new entities for 
the period before the separation and in some cases for the year of separation there are 
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no data at all. For a more or less reliable comparison one of these old entities survived 
in the statistical tables of WMEAT97 (and some entities in this article too), such as the 
countries of (former) Warsaw Pact and the successor states of the former Soviet Union.  
– The German unification makes further problems. Until 1991 the Eastern provinces 
of Germany were considered (as they were) a partner country of the Warsaw Pact and a 
part of the Eastern block. In the latter years they belong to the European part of the 
NATO and to Western Europe. This (perhaps only feasible) ‘actual state’ solution ex-
presses well the post cold war changes of power relations but, at the same time, makes 
less comparable the time series of the former Warsaw Pact countries. 
– There are other problems with the aggregate groups of the countries. This holds true 
for the ‘unorthodox’ treatment of European geographical areas as well. According to 
WMEAT98 Western Europe consists of the European NATO countries (of that time) plus 
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland. NATO Europe (and this way 
Western Europe as well) includes Greece, on the southern tip of the Balkan Peninsula, 
and Turkey, with 97 percent of her territory in Asia. 
There are problems with the two main groups of countries (developed and developing 
ones) as well. According to WMEAT98 classification the 33 country developed group 
includes Western Europe – except Malta and Turkey –, Israel, South Africa Japan, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. As regards Eastern Europe the 
Visegrád Countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and from the 
former Soviet Union only the Russian Federation) belong (in this edition) to the devel-
oped group. The rest of Eastern European countries were considered as developing ones. 
This solution seems to be biased to Slovenia and Estonia with higher per capita GNP and 
much better living conditions than Russia. 
For the necessity of using comparable aggregates in some tables even VMEAT98 
uses a no longer existing group: the (former) Warsaw Pact. Since the time series for the 
Soviet Union ended in 1990 for a better understanding of the provider’s structure and the 
declination of Eastern European arms deliveries the author composed a group for the 
latter years: ‘Successor States of the Soviet Union’. The forming of this group has no 
political aspects. Soviet arms industry was widely scattered in most former Soviet repub-
lics. This way Soviet time series until 1990 cannot be compared with Russian time series 
from 1991 on. 
– There are problems with the (current and constant price) dollar estimates too. Cur-
rent price USD estimates for all countries were estimated in three steps: 
a) In the first step the constant (1997) price values were estimated in national curren-
cies. 
b) In the second step we estimated the values in (1997) constant USD terms, 
c) Finally the values in current USD were estimated. 
Thus in WMEAT98 current price USD estimates were derived from constant (1997) 
dollar estimates. The numerical example for the treatment of price problems in the Statis-
tical Notes of WMEAT98 (p. 207) can be formulated the following way. 
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a) Estimation of constant (1997) price values in national currencies 
Let indicate the original starting value ( )iti currv  the value for the country i in national 
currencies for the year t. 
                                          ( ) ( )( ) 11997,1997, −= tiitiiiti Deflcurrvconstw ,  /1/ 
where ( )iiti constw 1997,  is the value in constant 1997 prices for the country i in the year t 
in national currency, and ( )1997,tiDefl  is the implicit GNP price deflator for the country i 
for the interval (t….1997). 
b) Estimation of constant (1997) USD values 
                                           ( ) ( ) ( )( )1997$,1997,$ iiititi currcrconstww = ,  /2/ 
where ( )$tiw  is the value for the country i in year t in constant 1997 US dollars, 
and ( )( )1997$, icurrcr  is the currency rate (conversion base) for the national cur-
rency of country i to USD in 19972 , and finally:  
c) Estimation of current price USD values 
                                              ( ) ( )( )1997,$1997$, tUStiiti Deflwv =  ,  /3/ 
where ( )itiv 1997$,  is the estimated value for the country i in the year t in current USD, 
and ( )1997,tUSDefl  is the implicite US GNP price deflator of the United States for the inter-
val (t….1997). 
Current price estimates were determined throughout the whole report by US price de-
flators. Since there were no data available on price indices or PPP3-s for the arms deliver-
ies to and from individual countries there was no other way to approach current value 
data. This method and the 30.7 percent overall price increase between 1987 and 1997 
seems to be a low estimation for the articles of arms trade. 
Arms industry is probably extremely exposed to increases in factor costs, and at the 
same time the increasing share of R&D costs could increase prices more than in other 
sectors of the national economy. Nevertheless, arms industry has quite enough bargaining 
power to obtain reasonable prices. 
 
2 For the countries of former Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia national currencies were converted into dollars on the basis of 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. This equals to the supposition 
that military expenditures and arms transfers have the same purchasing power parities as the rest of the goods and services.  
3 In WMEAT98 there is a reference to a UN research group studying future availability of military PPPs but , ‘practical 
prospects for the future availability of usable military PPPs are poor due to the lack of underlying national data, especially on 
military prices’. (WMEAT98; 1998. p. 208) 
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Due to the described methods the use of constant or current prices does not affect the 
proportions among countries or groups and countries. At the same time, the use of con-
stant 1997 prices gives hints on the considerable changes in the volume of international 
arms trade. WMEAT 98 uses the following (overall) price deflators for estimating con-
stant 1997 price values and these deflators were used throughout all data of the docu-
ment.  
US Implicit price deflators for estimating current price values  
Year Deflator  Year Deflator 
1987 76.54  1992 90.20 
1988 79.12  1993 92.61 
1989 82.17  1994 94.56 
1990 85.59  1995 96.58 
1991 88.28  1996 98.36 
This treatment of currencies and price changes, no doubt, provokes most statisticians 
for a professional criticism. But, at the same time, in lack of necessary detailed informa-
tion the authors of WMEAT98 had the sole alternative: either do their work this way or 
do nothing. Fortunately they opted for doing this way.  
The figures in this article are based on constant 1997 price data. (Data resulted in the 
second step of estimations.) Since the relation between constant and current prices is the 
same throughout the data, structural relations (relative frequencies) are also the same on 
both price levels. The figures of 1–3 are demonstrating the arms transfers by main 
(groups of) suppliers to the developed countries and to the developing ones. The initial 
data in WMEAT98 were in current prices. For transforming them to constant price data 
the author used the price deflators of columnar-setting to transform (back) the data to 
constant (1997) price values. 
Our data refer to legal trade – to be more exact – to legal deliveries only. (In arms 
trade there is a distinction between agreements and deliveries. Agreements usually do not 
mean deliveries in the same year. Deliveries are de facto transactions. ) 
Legal trade covers the overwhelming part of world arms transfers. Not in quantities 
but in regard of consequences legal trade represents the tip of the iceberg only. The post 
cold war Limited Intensity Conflicts or Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC-s) used to be fu-
elled by illegal (and therefore unregistered) arms trade. It is very characteristic that the 
keyword: ‘arms fixers’ produces hundreds of items on an internet browser. The illegal 
trafficking of private arms fixers represents just one type of the clandestine transfers. 
There are states (the ‘rogue states’) sending arms for their clients involved in interstate 
collisions or to subversive groups.  
2. THE MAIN MOTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS  
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 
From mere economic points of view arms transfers – like any other type of the inter-
national trade flows increases the export revenues of the provider country. This is not 
true, however, for the arms exports to most of the developing countries in the cold war 
era. These deliveries were either donations or subjects to hardly recoverable loans. 
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From the importer’s side arms imports represented a necessary burden or (in some 
cases) the exorbitant ambitions of the rulers of the countries. Table 1 and Table 2 give 
some information on the relative importance of arms trade in the total foreign trade for 
some (groups of) countries. From the side of arms producing companies arms exports 
increase both profits and economics of scale. For governments of the exporting countries 
there are other considerations too. 
From points of view of the recipient countries (especially of the countries of the Third 
World) arms imports are parts of the ‘military burdens’. The great majority of those 
countries have chronic and acute problems of the current account of the balance of pay-
ment and international debts. Arms imports are exhausting their (never sufficient) foreign 
exchange revenues.  
But, it should be emphasized, arms imports provide the unique way for small and less 
developed countries to maintain their defense capabilities. At the same time, the international 
division of labor in arms producing has its benefits for the most developed countries too. 
It is a very important indicator of the military balance of any country the relative im-
portance of arms trade in their imports and exports. The data for relative export and im-
port participations of arm transfers for the years 1987, 1991, 1994 and 1997 could be 
seen in Table 1 for the main aggregates and for the United States. 
The intensity of arms transfers in imports decreased in the period 1987–1997. This 
indicator was and (in spite of substantial decrease) remained the biggest for the develop-
ing countries. There was a big, however decreasing intensity in case of the OPEC mem-
bers, and there is a characteristic decrease in the countries of former Warsaw Pact.  
Table 1 
The intensity of arms transfers in foreign trade 
Arms imports (percent of total imports) Arms exports (percent of total exports) 
Main aggregates 
1987 1990 1994 1997 1987 1990 1994 1997 
World total 2.5 1.4 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.0 
Developed countries 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.8 1.8 1.1 1.2 
Developing countries 11.5 6.5 2.6 2.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 
OECD 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.3 
OPEC 19.8 13.2 8.5 10.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 
NATO 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.7 
USA 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 7.0 5.6 4.3 4.6 
NATO Europe 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 
Warsaw pact  2.5 1.3 0.4 0.3 13.4 9.0 1.6 1.7 
Besides the main aggregates it is worthwhile to see the list of the countries with the 
significant import and export intensities. The highest arms import intensities are observed 
in five countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and seven Arab-countries, five OPEC countries, 
one Balkan country, Taiwan, Pakistan, Israel, Myanmar, one NATO-country (Turkey) 
and one ex-Soviet republic (Kazakhstan). 
As regards export intensities the top twenty countries still consists of ten former com-
munist countries (including Serbia and Montenegro and two countries still with communist 
regimes). The United States, the United Kingdom and France represent the NATO. 
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The ranking in Table 2 do not indicate the importance of the countries in the interna-
tional arms transfers. At the same time these data indicate well the role of arms transfers 
in the national economies of the countries in case. 
Table 2 
Countries with the highest intensity of arms transfers in their foreign trade in 1997 
Rank Top importer countries Arms imports  (percent of total imports) Rank Top exporter countries  
Arms exports  
(percent of total exports) 
1 Saudi Arabia 40.4  1 Korea North  8.1 
2 Kuwait 24.3  2 Moldova 7.1 
3 Burundi 16.5  3 Belarus 6.7 
4 Qatar 14.3  4 United States 4.6 
5 Myanmar 13.6  5 Ukraine 3.5 
6 Egypt 12.1  6 Russia 2.6 
7 The Gambia 11.9  7 United Kingdom 2.3 
8 Taiwan 8.1  8 Armenia 2.2 
9 Rwanda 6.7  9 France 2.0 
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.5  10 Uzbekistan 1.7 
11 Iran 5.8  11 Serbia and Montenegro 1.7 
12 Algeria 5.7  12 Israel 1.6 
13 Yemen 5.5  13 Azerbaijan 1.3 
14 Pakistan 5.2  14 South Africa 1.2 
15 United Arab Emirates 4.7  15 Sweden 1.1 
16 Guinea 3.7  16 Swaziland 1.0 
17 Israel 3.6  17 China 0.6 
18 Angola 3.5  18 Spain 0.5 
19 Turkey 3.3  19 Slovakia 0.5 
20 Kazakhstan 3.3  20 Czech Republic 0.4 
Source: WMEAT98. 
Arms exports, or even the use of arms is subject of unilateral or multilateral declared 
controls including prohibitions and embargoes. These embargoes, however, did not work 
properly. Perhaps the oldest example is the prohibition by the Lateran Council of 1139 
the use against Christians a deadly weapon – the crossbow. (All the same, crossbows 
were used frequently until firearms replaced them.) 
There are effectual restrictive and embargo agreements for the proliferation of ABC 
(Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons and (in very critical stage) for the ABM 
(Anti-Ballistic Missiles ) systems. At the same time, the UN Conference in 9 June 2000, 
did not lead to breakthrough on the problems of small and light arms. It should be em-
phasized that small and light arms are the weapons of mass destruction in our time.  
The UN secretariat estimates that small arms were the weapons of choice in 46 of the 
49 major conflicts in the 1990s which caused over 4 million deaths, 90 percent of which 
were civilians, and 80 percent of those were women and children. According to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund for the ease of use and worldwide availability, small 
arms have helped create more than 300 000 child soldiers.  
The problem of land mines should be mentioned here. According to estimations there 
are 87 to 112 million landmines laid world-wide. There are 69 countries affected by 
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landmines and 100 millions of landmines stockpiled. There are approximately 100 com-
panies in 55 countries producing landmines. According to estimations 2–5 million land-
mines planted, and only 100 000 removed annually.4 According to Canadian government 
sources since 1975 one million casualties (mostly civilians) were caused by landmines 
and there are 250 000 landmine amputees worldwide. It should be emphasized, that (with 
the exception of the successor republics of the former Yugoslavia) mines in the most 
affected countries came from abroad.  
In the future de-mining could be a very important item of the exports of military ser-
vices. The problem is that mine affected countries are not solvent ones. Thus the future 
solution of the mine crisis depends on international solidarity. 
3. THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS  
OF THE CHANGES IN ARMS DELIVERIES 1987–1997 
Table 3 summarizes the main tendencies prevailing in course of the decade 1987–
1997. The following interwoven tendencies could be observed: 
– The halving of arms transfers to developing countries. 
– The increase of arms transfers from the NATO countries and, first of all, from the 
United States. 
– The landslide like decrease of Eastern European arms deliveries. 
– The moderate increase of arms transfers to the developed countries. 
– The overall substantial (33 percent) decrease of the world’s arms deliveries. 
Table 3 
The main changes in arms deliveries 1987–1997 
Millions of constant (1997) 
USD  Relative frequencies (percent) Main Supplier Groups 
1987 1997 1987 1997 
1997 index: 
1987=100 
NATO 38 000 47 500 46.6 87.1 125.0 
United States 23 390 31 800 28.7 58.3 136.0 
Other NATO-countries 14 610 15 700 17.9 28.8 107.5 
Eastern Europe 35 940 3 685 44.1 6.8 10.3 
From Eastern Europe      
The Soviet Union* 30 180 3 360 37.0 6.2 11.1 
Russia - 2 300 - 4.2 - 
Rest of the former Warsaw Pact** 4 926  325 6.0 0.1 0.7 
Rest of the World  7 540  3 365 9.3 6.2 48.0 
Main Recipient Groups       
Developed Countries 24 140 26 240 29.6 48.1 108.7 
Developing Countries 57 530 28 320 70.4 51.9 49.2 
Arms Transfers World Total 81 480 54 550 100.0 100.0 66.9 
* For 1997 the successor states of the former Soviet Union. 
** Without The Soviet Union and her successor states and East Germany. 
 
4 See: www.mines.gc.ca/I_C-e.asp and Land Mine Monitor: www.icbl.org/lm/2000. 
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In Table 3 we tried to give a bit detailed view about the arms transfers from Eastern 
Europe. Here the category ‘Former Warsaw Pact’ as well as in throughout WMEAT97 
has no political meaning for the present. The summarizing of the data of the successor 
states of the former Soviet Union has neither the meaning of a political entity. Only this 
way can be produced a collection of data describing the process in more depth.  
These processes described in Table 3 were interdependent ones. Arms production in 
the former Soviet Union was a key industry of competitive products. At the same time 
(besides domestic use and shipments to Warsaw Pact partners) developing countries 
represented the demand side of the market. And this market did not offered solvent de-
mands. The solvent part of the developing countries (Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States) 
bought and buy western, mostly American equipment. The Soviet Union exported weap-
ons by loans or aids for geopolitical purposes. And, as a consequence of this policy in 
1997 Libya owed 4 billion USD (2 billion of this sum were remitted) and Syria 10 billion 
USD, Iraq 7 billion USD to the Soviet Union. Thus the continuation of the arms deliver-
ies could not improve, but would deteriorate the current account of Russia’s balance of 
payments. 
Figure 1 describes the dynamic and structural changes in arms transfers to the devel-
oping countries. 
Figure 1. Arms deliveries to developing countries by main groups of suppliers 
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Arms deliveries to developed countries practically did not decrease until 1994 (see Fig-
ure 2). The decrease of the total sum could be attributed to the drop of Soviet (Russian) 
deliveries to the other former Warsaw Pact countries which were taken at that time un-
equivocally as developed ones. The western part of the world and mainly the United States 
kept its market positions until a transitional decrease in 1994–1995. 1996 was the year of 
recovery and 1997 was of a rapid increase to the highest values of the total period. 
Total arms deliveries formed resultants of the changes on the two (developing and 
developed) aggregate recipient markets. For the predominance of deliveries to develop-
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ing countries the dynamic tendencies of total arms deliveries offer the same sub-periods 
(1987–1990, 1990–1994 and 1994–1997).  
Figure 2. Arms deliveries to developed countries by main groups of suppliers 
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Figure 3. Arms deliveries by main groups of suppliers 















Rest of the World
 
For a more detailed description Table 4 provides information about the (annual aver-
age) dynamic changes of these periods for both exports and imports detailed by main 
aggregates, regions and organizations. 
It should be mentioned that Eastern European arms deliveries were not restricted to 
obsolete weapons for ‘the native’s infantry’ as much people could be inclined to believe 
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other branches of industry of the region. It is enough to have a look at the delivery data 
for some major weapons. 
Table 4 
Percent changes in arms transfers* 
(annual average of the periods) 
Arms imports Arms exports 
Main aggregates 
1987–1990 1990–1994 1994–1997 1987–1990 1990–1994 1994–1997 
World total -7.3 -10.2 9.0 -7.3 -10.2 9.0 
Developed countries 0.2 -5.1 10.1 -6.7 -9.9 8.9 
Developing countries -10.8 -13.8 7.9 -14.5 -15.7 12.8 
Regions:       
Central America 
    and Caribbean -16.7 -51.0 -16.3 - - - 
North America NAFTA 18.9 -7.1 1.0 3.6 -2.3 10.4 
South America -17.6 -3.8 24.9 -52.9 15.9 -48.7 
Africa, all -26.9 -16.4 -9.6 19.0 6.3 14.4 
North Africa -21.1 -24.3 22.8 -8.4 - - 
Central Africa -24.4 -30.3 19.2 - - - 
Southern Africa -32.1 -4.9 -46.2 65.1 21.4 14.4 
Middle East -11.4 -8.6 9.7 -10.0 5.0 -27.0 
East Asia -6.2 1.9 23.3 0.7 -26.2 12.1 
South Asia 6.6 -44.3 16.0 65.6 -8.1 28.9 
Europe, all -3.7 -11.4 1.5 -13.2 -18.3 9.6 
Western Europe 5.9 -7.1 -0.5 -0.1 -5.6 8.9 
Eastern Europe -23.0 -41.3 35.8 -20.4 -38.6 12.6 
Oceanic 5.5 -1.7 -10.0 -12.6 42.2 -52.8 
Organizations:       
OECD 8.0 -5.1 -0.5 2.0 -3.4 9.6 
OPEC -7.5 -10.5 14.9 -5.1 25.7 -32.4 
NATO 8.1 -7.7 -0.7 2.6 -3.7 10.5 
NATO Europe 6.4 -7.7 -1.5 0.9 -6.5 10.7 
Warsaw pact  
(former members of)  -19.9 -34.7 14.8 -20.4 -38.3 13.0 
* Calculated by geometric means of the indices between the years 1t  and 2t . 
Source: WMEAT98. 
Table 5 
US and Eastern European deliveries of selected major weapons 
Years World total US deliveries Eastern European deliveries US share (percent) 
East European 
 share (percent) 
 Tanks 
1986–1988 6 481 1 051 4 490 16.2 44.6 
1989–1991 5 199 699 3 600 13.4 58.9 
1992–1994 3 333 643 1 120 19.3 21.6 
1995–1997 3 045 1 155 780 37.9 16.4 
(Continued on the next page.) 




Years World total US deliveries Eastern European deliveries US share (percent) 
East European 
 share (percent) 
 Major surface combatant naval craft* 
1986–1988 47 0 29 0.0 46.8 
1989–1991 49 0 19 0.0 38.8 
1992–1994 51 2 16 3.9 17.6 
1995–1997 85 13 25 15.3 15.3 
 Supersonic combat aircraft 
1986–1988 1 556 436 680 28.0 43.7 
1989–1991 1 630 340 550 20.9 33.7 
1992–1994 680 350 70 51.5 10.3 
1995–1997 750 310 140 41.3 17.3 
 Helicopters 
1986–1988 1 354 104 860 7.7 43.6 
1989–1991 929 159 420 17.1 39.8 
1992–1994 681 191 230 28.0 29.4 
1995–1997 783 253 290 32.3 34.5 
* The deliveries of major combatant naval crafts are not related to newly built ships, but to the sales of old vessels due to 
the lack of funds of the Russian Navy. Russia is economically unable to maintain her fleet. In the world press there are very 
often news of selling out of active service Russian battleships to India. 
4. SOME SHADOWS OF THE NEAR FUTURE 
The time series of WMEAT98 ends at 1997 and so does our short quantitative analy-
sis. The chief aim of this article, however, is to analyse macro-statistical facts, there is 
quite a great temptation to point out some tendencies which could be decisive ones for 
the near future. One cannot depend on official statistical data on the most recent period. 
Therefore we should resort on deductions from the information provided by news agen-
cies and on reliable news of the world press.  
It seems to be quite obvious that there is no sound hope for further shrinking of the 
arms market. And, it is quite possible that Russian (and Ukrainian) arms industry would 
regain – at least a part of – its position on the world market. The motives would be less 
prestige, or influence oriented, but the insatiable needs for convertible currencies. (Pres-
tige and influence could be taken as valuable fringe benefits only.) 
In the past arms production was the leading (and possibly the only up-to-date) branch 
of the Soviet economy. Most of the structural problems and the technological lagging 
back of the Soviet economy came from the ‘concrete wall’ between military and civilian 
industries. The overzealous protection of the achievements in military technology re-
sulted in the lack of any ‘trickling down’ effect. Thus the technological innovations of 
the arms industry could not find their ways to boost other branches of the Soviet national 
economy. 
The most of the factories, however broken down, still exist. A considerable part of the 
scientists and technicians resisted the temptations of better life and still remained home. 
The Russian school system is still able to provide new generations capable for R&D. One 
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cannot underestimate that fact, that as a contrast to the cold war period, computers be-
come household items in Russia too and the world computer community learnt to fear of 
Russian hackers and virus makers. (A valuable asset of present and future market of 
military goods and services.)  
The decade 1987–1997 was characterized by the decline and the ceasing of the Soviet 
Union. At the same time, Russia and Ukraine (the Soviet successor states having the bulk 
of the armament producing capacities of the former Soviet Union) are in crucial eco-
nomic and financial situation. And the greatest problem comes from the grave contradic-
tion of the post – soviet military economics. On the one hand there is an existing and 
expansive – hungry supply potential of the arms industry and, on the other hand, there are 
the rigid budget constraints of domestic armed forces. As a result in the successor coun-
tries of the Soviet Union (especially in Russia and in Ukraine) there is an insoluble gap 
between the production and R&D capabilities of the arms producers and the miserable 
purchasing power of the armed forces. Thus Russian (and Ukrainian) arms producers are 
forced to exports. The government(s) are forced to export the surpluses of the inventories 
of armed forces too. This situation could bring unforeseeable instabilities not only in the 
international market of armaments but also in world power relations 
According to the report of the Independent (17 August 2001.) on the traditional Zhu-
kowsky air show had its debut the new impressing SU-39-‘Berkut’ stealth fighter. But, 
this precious new fighter has been made in one single copy. The cash strapped Russian 
defense budget cannot afford to order it. The same holds true for the SU-35 supersonic 
fighter with variable thrust engines able to hang motionless in air. This aircraft has been 
offered to South Korea and some Latin American countries. Russia simply cannot order 
any of them. 
There is a quite imminent danger that Russian military export – especially in fields of 
air defense electronics – would reach the ‘rogue countries’ too. One could feel this immi-
nent danger from the words of Vladimir Yarashenko, an air defence expert with Rosobo-
ronexport, who said on the same air show that Iraq and Yugoslavia need not have lost 
their wars against Western forces in the past decade, if only they had upgraded their 
defences in time. 
Russian arms exports valued 2.8 billion USD in 1999 and will reach 3.2 billion USD 
this year. An official of the Russian arms exports giant Rosoboronoexport said that they 
have orders of 13 billion USD and 70 percent of it consists of combat aircraft. 
One should listen (with reservations) to an agnostic opinion too. The same article cites 
Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent defense analyst, who said: ‘It’s a garage sale. The 
whole former arsenal of the Soviet Union is on the block, and the goal is to make money.’ 
‘There is stuff from the eighties that’s has been pulled out of old Soviet warehouses. The 
truth is that Russia’s military industry is incapable any longer of building complete weap-
ons systems. They may sign contracts and take the money, but they cannot deliver’. 
For lack of detailed information this article may neither support nor challenge this 
sceptical opinion. But the modernity of a weapon system cannot be measured simply by 
calendar years. The best selling fighter plane of most recent times is, no doubt, the F-16 
‘flying falcon’. The F-16A single seat model first flew in December 1976. The first op-
erational F-16A was delivered in January 1979. And, it could be taken for granted, those 
planes in active service are not the same as those in the first series. The innovations are 
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hidden under the fuselage. Arms exporters of Soviet successor states have the ambition to 
find markets in the NATO countries too. 
* 
The writing of this paper was completed at the end of August 2001. At the time of fi-
nal edition (mid October) it would be very hard, if not impossible, to draw the conse-
quences of the horrifying events of the 11th September 2001. It seems to be that a tighter 
control could be expected on the illegal arms transfers of small and light arms. At the 
same time some revision on legal transfers would be on the agenda of several states (e. g. 
the Slovak government starts a general audit on arms transfers from 1993 on). 
On the other hand the imperative need for allies against world terrorism resulted in 
waiving some restrictions on legal transfers. The most important is that on the 4th October 
2001. the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate removed the remaining sanc-
tions on U.S. arms exports and military assistance to India and Pakistan. New – and till 
now unimaginable – alliances are being formed. The bipolar world is definitively over. 
Using the cosmological terminology the 11th September 2001 could be taken as a 
point of singularity in the time-space of international relations, generally and especially 
of international military relations. We are waiting what kind of time-space continuum 
would emerge from this black hole. 
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VARIANCE ESTIMATION FOR STRATIFIED
SAMPLES WITH ONE UNIT PER STRATUM
LÁSZLÓ MIHÁLYFFY1
A special case of stratified samples is considered where each stratum has the same
number of units and from each stratum, one unit is selected  in the sample with simple ran-
dom sampling (SRS). The usual SRS estimator for the variance of a mean is biased under
this design, and the size of the bias is estimated in this paper. The problem is related to sys-
tematic sampling.
KEYWORDS: Simple random sampling; Stratified samples; Variance estimation.
n this study a special kind of  stratified samples and variance estimators is analysed.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 summarises the notations used through the
whole paper. Section 2 outlines the problem, while section 3 presents different forms of the
variance of the population. In sections 4 and 5 the expectations of the sample variance and
the variance estimator  are developed in the frame of the investigated sampling design.
1. NOTATIONS
The notations in this paper are borrowed basically from Cochran (1977). In particular,
U = 1, 2, 3, ...., N is a finite universe,
s = 1, 2, 3, ..., n is a sample from U,













1  is the variance of  y in U,
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1   is the sample estimate of  2S  under SRS  (care will be taken to
prevent misinterpreting the square root of this for the notation of a sample),
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2 )(11)( is the variance of syy  where ii yy 1 ,
kii yy 2 , ..., kniin yy )1(  ,   and .iy  is the mean of this sample.
The relation  N = kn is supposed to hold for some integer k throughout the paper. 
2. THE PROBLEM
The research was motivated by the following modification of systematic sampling: for
a fixed order of the units in U, in place of the customary systematic sample
sys =i, i+k, i+2k, ..., i+(n–1)k,
use 
sts =  1i , 2i +k, 3i +2k, ..., ni +(n–1)k                                 /1/
where 1i , 2i , 3i ,  ..., ni   are different random integers between 1  and k. sts  is obviously
a stratified random sample with one unit per stratum. If n and N are fixed,  the numbers of
different systematic samples and  stratified samples with one unit per stratum are k and
nk , respectively, thus one might expect that the latter are superior to the former. How-
ever, the comparison of the two designs in terms of variance turns to be quite hard.
Considering samples of equal size, Cochran (1977) specifies situations where system-
atic sampling is superior to simple random sampling. Among the drawbacks of the
method, he mentions that hidden periodicity in the order of units may result in poor preci-
sion of syy  and no reliable procedure is available to estimate )( syyV  from the sample.
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of the variance of an estimated mean in simple random sampling is widely used to esti-
mate )( syyV . This practice may be supported by a result of  W.G. Madow–L.H. Madow
(1944), quoted also in Cochran (1977); this asserts that




where the expectation is taken over all permutations of the units 1, 2, ..., N of U.
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since each hn = 1, the sampling fraction in each stratum is 1/k, and each stratum weight
hW  equals k/N = 1/n. Taking the expectation of )( styV  over all permutations of the units
of U leads to the same result as in the case of systematic sampling, i.e. the theoretical
variance of the mean under SRS. In other words, comparing systematic sampling and
stratified sampling with one unit per stratum on the basis of the expectations of )( syyV
and )( styV  results in a draw.
Since 2hS  in /3/ cannot be estimated on the basis of a single observation, the usual
sample-based estimator of )( styV  breaks down. Cochran (1977) enlists a number of dif-
ferent approaches to estimate )( styV  from the sample in the case of one unit per stratum;
some of these work with collapsing adjacent strata, while other methods use auxiliary
variables or specific hypotheses on the properties of the units of U.  W.A. Fuller's unbi-
ased estimator (1970) for )( styV  does not use collapsed strata or auxiliary variables, but
randomizes the strata boundaries. The bulk of this paper is the relation between the ex-
pectation of )(yv  in /2/ under the stratified design with one unit per stratum and the vari-
ance )( styV .
3. ALTERNATIVE VARIANCE EXPRESSIONS 
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The statement is proved by routine computation. 
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Equations /4/ and /5/ can be rewritten in matrix-vector form. Denote e.g. I the unit
matrix of order N, E an NN matrix whose entries are all equal to 1, and y the N-vector
with the components 1y ,  2y , ..., Ny . /4/ becomes then
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  is symmetric, positive
semidefinite, having N-1 eigenvalues equal to 1/(N–1) and  one eigenvalue equal to 0.
Lemma 2.  (Decomposition of the Variance). Let  n, N and k  be integers and N=kn.
Decompose the universe U in two parts U1 = 1, 2, 3, ..., N–k and U2 = N–k+1, N–
–k+2, ..., N, and denote S(U1)2 and S(U2)2  the corresponding variances of the study
variable y. 
We have
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The proof  is done by routine computation. 
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Lemma 2, the variance for the subpopulation U2
is given as:
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This identity can be used to estimate  S(U2)2 if none of the units  N–k+1, N–k+2, ..., N
is observed.
4. THE EXPECTATION OF 2s  UNDER STRATIFIED SAMPLING
WITH ONE UNIT PER STRATUM
For sample /1/ replace the indices  1i , 2i +k, 3i +2k, ..., ni +(n–1)k  by 1, 2, 3, ..., n, re-
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Lemma 3. Under stratified sampling with one unit per stratum, the expectation of 2s
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Proof:  There are n strata, each consisting of k units. Therefore:
– nk   is the number of all different samples, thus the probability of each sample s is
(s) = nk  ,
– 1nk   is the number of samples containing a fixed unit  i,
– 2nk   is the number of samples containing a fixed unit i from stratum h and a fixed
unit  j from stratum h , h   h,
– there is no sample containing two different units i and j  from the same stratum h.















11 ,                                        /8a/
multiply both sides by (s), and take the sum over all samples s. By symmetry, the result











22 2  )( .
The first term on the right-hand side contains a factor  (1/n)  nk  , and since each
2
iy  occurs 
1nk  times, and nk = N, it follows that  =1/N. On the other hand,  2s  in /8a/
vanishes for 1y = 2y  = ... = ny , which implies the similar relation for )(
2sE . This results
in  = 1/((N(N–k)). The proof is thereby complete. 
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and the kk matrix  b, whose entries are all equal to  1:
D = a  b.


















0         b  b  b  b
               
b         b  0  b  b
b         b  b  0  b
b   ...   b  b  b  0

Lemma 4. D has
– n-1 eigenvalues equal to –k,
– one eigenvalue equal  to  N–k,
– N–n eigenvalues equal to 0.
Proof: D is a symmetric matrix , hence there is an NN orthonormal matrix U such
that DUU  is a diagonal matrix (here and in what follows, the prime denotes transpose).
Such a matrix U can be defined as follows. Let u and c be the following  kk and  nn
matrices, respectively:
u =  
   ))1()(1(                  0               0          0   
   
         ))1((             123           0          0   
         ))1((                 12    62       0   
         ))1((                 12        6     2













































c =  
   ))1()(1(                  0                0          0   
   
         ))1((             123           0          0   
         ))1((                12     62       0   
         ))1((                12         6     2














































and set U = cu, the Kronecker product of c and u. It is easy to check that uu  = kI  and
IUU  where kI  and I are unit matrices of order k and N, respectively. 
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It is also easy to see that
M = U'DU
is a diagonal matrix such that 
M = diag(1, 2, ..., n-1, n),
the s are kk diagonal matrices, 1 = 2 = ... = n-1 = diag(0, 0, ..., 0, –k), and n =
diag(0, 0, ..., 0, N–k), so the proof is complete. 
Corollary 2. Denote C0 the matrix of the quadratic form in /10/. C0 has
– n–1 eigenvalues equal to n/(N(n–1)), 
– one vanishing eigenvalue and
– N–n eigenvalues equal to 1/N.
Theorem 1. If the conditions of Lemma 3 hold, the relative difference between the ex-
pectation of the SRS variance estimate /8/ and the population variance 2S  does not ex-




SsE   = 2
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Proof:  Let e = (1, 1, …, 1)’ be the N-vector with all components equal to 1, and e
the orthogonal projection of  y onto e where y represents the values of the study variable
on the units of  U. Then y = z +e and  z is orthogonal to e, z’e = 0.  Consider the matrix-





z’z and y’Co y  = z’Co z, and that  the columns of U in the proof of Lemma 4 are
eigenvectors of the matrix E, too. Set  = U’EU. We have

























 z’U’Uz = 
 z’z,
where  
 is the maximum of the absolute values of diagonal entries in the diagonal matrix
within the brackets. The latter will be denoted by T = diag( ),...,, 21 N . Let i  and i
be the ith diagonal entry in  and M, respectively. The following cases occur:
i i i
0 0 1/((N–1)N)
0 –k 1/((N–1)N) –1/((n–1)N)
N N–k 0
LÁSZLÓ MIHÁLYFFY130
Ignoring the term 1/((N–1)N), we obtain 
 =1/((n–1)N )  and









as was to be shown. 
5. THE EXPECTATION OF v( y ) UNDER STRATIFIED SAMPLING
WITH ONE UNIT PER STRATUM












1)11()(                                                     /3/
and that direct estimation of the stratum variance  2hS  on the basis of a single observation
is  not possible. In this section we assume that n >2 and introduce the following estimator
for 2hS :
2


















































































i.e. 2 )( hs   is computed similarly as 
2s  but without the observation from stratum h.  The
properties of  the estimator /11/  will be examined in several steps.











































The result follows with routine computation. 
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This lemma and /3/ result in the following estimator for )( styV

















1(1)11(                          /12/
which is formally the same as the sample estimate of the variance of an estimated mean
y  under simple random sampling. Note that the indices in /12/ come from those reflect-
ing both stratum and position in the same way as at the beginning of Section 4. By
Lemma 3 we have
E v( sty ) = 
21)11(  S
nk
where 2S  denotes the left-hand side of  /9/.
Lemma 6. Set h = n. The expectation of 2 )(ns  under the one-unit-per-stratum design is









































1 .                                        /13/
where (S U 2)  and (S U1 2)  denote the expectation of 2s  under the one-unit-per-
stratum design for the universe U and the union of the first n–1 strata  U1, respectively.
Proof:  The first two terms on the right-hand side of  /13/ are obviously the expecta-
tions of those on the right-hand side of  /11/. The repeat of  a part of arguments in the
proof of  Lemma 3 implies the similar statement for the last three terms on the right-hand
side of  /13/. 

















kNn U1 ()2 S U1 ))2 , /14/
where U is the universe and U1 stands for the union of the strata except for stratum h.
Proof: The Corollary follows immediately from /13/ and /7/.
Lemma 5 and Corollary 3 lead  to the following consequence: 
Lemma 7.
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or, in matrix notations,
Bias v( sty ) = 22
1
kn




1 D –E)y =  22
1
kn
  y’Ky                 /15a/
where y is the vector of the study variable in the universe.
Proof:  /15/  follows from /14/ by adding up the terms    22 hh SsE   for h = 1, 2, …, n
and using the matrix representation for (S . 2)  and  S(. 2) . Note that  the first term on the
right-hand side of  /14/ repeats n times. In the second term, different (N–k)(N–k) ver-
sions of D and E occur; the coefficients in /15/ depend on the number of occurrences of
the kk  submatrices or blocks of these matrices. Off-diagonal blocks of D and E occur
n–2 times and the diagonal blocks of E occur n–1 times. 
Lemma 8. For the orthonormal matrix U introduced in Lemma 4 we have
K = UU ’
where  = diag(1, 2,…, n-1, n), the s are kk diagonal matrices, and 1=2=…=n-1=






kn ),  n = diag(1, 1, …, 1, 0). 
Proof:  The Lemma is an immediate consequence of  the previous results. 
Consider an arbitrary study variable represented by its y vector and decompose it in







z 1 ,    for i  stratum h,
and xy – z. It is easy to see that z = z0+αe, where e=(1, 1,…,1)’, α is the population mean
of the study variable, Y , and Kz0=βz0 with β –n(k–1)/(n–1). z0, e and x are pairwise
orthogonal to each other, and Ex = 0, Dx = 0. It follows that

















The results of this section are summarised in the following. 
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with expectation













and bias given by  /16/.
Remark. From the aspect of stratification, the case where y  z is ideal, the variance of
sty  is zero. Unfortunately, this is the worst case for the estimator /12/, the upward bias
being of the same order as the expectation. If y  x, the variance of stx and the bias of
/12/  are 
kn2




respectively, in this case the relative downward bias is of the order 1/k. In principle there
are cases where the bias vanishes.
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THE ECONOMIC RETURNS TO EDUCATION:
FINITE-SAMPLE PROPERTIES
OF AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATOR
GÁBOR KÉZDI1
This paper evaluates the instrumental variables measurement of the causal effect of edu-
cation on earnings, with special focus on finite sample issues. A simple well-known theoreti-
cal model is presented and the inconsistency of the reduced-form estimator is established.
The problem of weak instruments is examined in details and multiple remedies are consid-
ered. The relevant issues are illustrated through a particular example from a published paper,
including a simulation exercise to inspect weak instruments problems and evaluate the per-
formance of alternative estimators.
KEYWORDS: Returns to education; Instrumental variables; Weak instruments.
nstrumental variables models are very popular in empirical economics for estimat-
ing causal effects on observational data.2 In their clearest form, causal effects can be
stated in the framework of thought experiments. Because of nonrandom assignment,
however, the non-experimental nature of virtually all economic data makes measurement
of the thought experiments difficult. Simple reduced-form models like ordinary least
squares (OLS) can be thought of as generalized versions of comparing means in different
groups. The problem is that self-selection into those groups is typically not random, and
therefore simple between-group comparisons do not measure the intended causal effects.
Economics models often help capturing the non-randomness of the assignment and find-
ing the direction of the resulting bias. Instrumental variables (IV) models offer more than
that: under the necessary assumptions, IV results can be interpreted as estimates of the
causal relationship. Problem is that the required assumptions are quite restrictive, and
their validity is often difficult to assess. For accessible reviews of the IV and ‘natural ex-
periment’ estimators, see Meyer (1995), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) with the
comments and Heckman (1997).
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the IV measurement of an extensively re-
searched question, the causal effect of education on earnings, also known as the (private)
economic returns to schooling. It is a good example that there is a simple economic
1 PhD candidate, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
2 The topic of this paper was suggested by John Bound and Jinyong Hahn. I also thank László Hunyadi and Gábor Körösi
for their helpful comments. All the remaining errors are mine.
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model behind the self-selection story but the estimation raises quite a few econometric
problems. Willis (1986) offers a thorough treatment of the model, and Willis’ (1986) and
Card’s (1999) works are comprehensive surveys of the empirical literature. In this paper,
I illustrate the problems through a specific study by Harmon and  Walker (1995).
As we will see, Harmon and Walker find OLS to be biased downward. This result is not
uncommon: most IV estimates reported by Card (1999) that use of similar instruments es-
timate negative or zero bias. At the same time the conventional theory of educational choice
implies that OLS should be biased upwards. Either the theory is wrong or the estimation
strategy is flawed. A third possibility might be measurement error in reported education
level, which could induce a downward bias. It turns out, however, that the required error is
an order of magnitude larger than what is established in the literature (The paper will show
that in its example it has to be well over 50 per cent of the total variation.) Card (1999)
considers a richer model than Willis (1986) that has predictions broad enough to incorporate
some negative bias of the OLS. Harmon and Walker’s estimates, similar to most estimates
based on compulsory schooling instruments, are nevertheless a lot larger than all other kind
of IV estimates. I am therefore sceptical about their results: I try to find out what could be
wrong with the particular strategy they followed.
Among the possible problems, I will focus mainly on the finite sample properties of
the estimator. In a controversial study, Angrist and Krueger (1991) had used an IV strat-
egy similar to Harmon and Walker’s to estimate returns to schooling. Their estimates also
seem to suggest that OLS is not biased upward. However, Bound, Jaeger and Baker
(1995) have shown that the instruments they used were weak and thus the results may not
tell anything meaningful about the true population relationship of OLS and IV. The fact
that Angrist and Krueger’s IV was estimated on a very large sample but still suffers from
finite-sample problems was suprising to many. The problem of ‘weak instruments’ was
known to econometricians for quite a long time but it was typically ignored by practitio-
ners who thought that large samples are immune to it. Bound et al. (1995), Staiger and
Stock (1997) and others have convincingly shown, however, that weak instruments can
be a problem in seemingly large samples, too. On the other hand, there exist modified IV
estimators that are asymptotically equivalent to the conventional ones but have superior
finite-sample properties. I will show the basic intuition behind the problem and consider
a few of the alternatives.
The objective of this paper is primarily methodological. I would like to draw attention
to the fact that IV can be a powerful strategy if supported by economic theory, but one
should not ignore the econometric problems. In particular, the possible weakness of the
instruments should be taken seriously. I would also like to show how one can detect the
problem and that there are possible remedies. The causal effect of education on earnings
serves a paradigmatic example, and my analysis of the Harmon and Walker (1995) study
is intended to be an illustrative exercise. As it turns out, their instruments are not weak,
and therefore their results are robust to finite-sample corrections. However, their strategy
can be questioned on other grounds. Unfortunately, there is not enough available evi-
dence to address those, but they suggest that it may be a little early to bury the conven-
tional model of educational choice.
The remainder of the paper can be divided into five sections. First, it presents a rela-
tively simple version of the theoretical model. The second part discusses the estimation 
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of the return to schooling. The third section focuses on the finite sample properties of the
IV estimator and introduces some alternatives. The fourth discusses Harmon and
Walker’s (1995) study and presents results of a Monte-Carlo simulation designed for
capturing the finite-sample bias of their estimator. The last part concludes.
1. THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
To fix ideas, consider the following thought experiment. Take an individual, assign
her a random level of education, and then measure her lifetime earnings. Then assign her
a different level of education and measure her lifetime earnings again. The difference of
the two earning levels represents the causal effect of education. Repeating the experiment
enough times on enough randomly chosen individuals, one can get a good estimate for
the average causal effect of education on earnings.
Obviously, this experiment is impossible to carry out. More important is that, as we
will see, we can’t capture anything close to it in observational data. Therefore, the causal
effect of a randomly assigned level of education is impossible to measure. But that may
not be a problem after all. As Willis and Rosen (1979) pointed out, this measure would
have ‘no significance as guides to the social or private profitability of investment in
schooling’ (Willis–Rosen, 1979, p. 11). The gains of a thorough education in economet-
rics with all necessary prerequisites would probably exceed its costs for most people, as
they would find it a meaningless torture. On the other hand, people with appropriate in-
terest, talent, and endurance probably find it very useful.
Instead of the mean return over all possible schooling levels for all people (the ‘aver-
age treatment effect’), it makes sense to focus on the effect on those who have actually
selected those (the ‘average effect of the treatment on the treated’). The economic model
of how people chose their education level helps identifying the problem.
A very simple model of education choice is enough to see why self-selection matters.
In this model, individuals freely choose their schooling level. The only thing they care
about is the present value of their lifetime earnings. They live an infinitely long life and
face to a constant interest rate. They do not necessary face the same interest rate but it is
constant throughout their lifetime. There are no costs of getting education except that
they do not earn while in school. Schooling makes people earn more because it increases
their marginal product. On the other hand, the increase in their marginal product is
smaller and smaller as their schooling level rises. Again, we allow for heterogeneity in
the relationship between marginal product and schooling.
The individuals’ schooling choice is, therefore, the solution of an investment prob-
lem, where the value of the forgone earnings in the near future are weighted against the
value of the increased earnings in the more distant future. The role of the discount rate is
crucial. Let si denote the years spent in school by person i, ri the individual-specific inter-
est rate, and yi(s) the earnings function, also varying from individual to individual. We
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The solution to this problem is given by the first-order condition (the second-order

















The ‘returns to schooling’ is defined as the value of the equality as we stated the first-
order condition. It is the derivative of the logarithm of the earnings function at the opti-
mum, which is equal to the discount rate of the individual faces. Since both the interest
rate and the value of the derivative of the log earnings function can vary across people,
the optimal schooling choice is expected to be different. When other things are equal, a
higher ri implies a lower optimal level of education. If two people differ solely in the in-
terest rate they face, then they will have different schooling levels with the same earnings
function y(s). 
In this case



























so a simple reduced-form model (in this case a Wald regression) consistently estimates
the causal effect, which is the same for both individuals. The estimator is consistent for
the average treatment effect, that is the causal effect of randomly assigned education lev-
els on people’s earnings. The assignment is not random but that is not a problem, since it
is uncorrelated with the effect (because the effect is the same for everybody). There may
be a problem if the effect varies at different levels of education, but effects that are local
to the different levels can be captured anyway. Obviously, the assumption of homogene-
ous earnings capacity is not realistic. If we allow for heterogeneous earnings functions
the result does not hold anymore.
If two people face the same interest rate but have different earnings capacity, the one
with a higher optimal level of schooling must have a higher (lnyi)’ at the optimum of the
other:









because (ln yi)’ is a decreasing function. For the same reason, we have that
   ,lnln ** jjji sysy 
and so




























The reduced-form model is biased upward. This is sometimes called the ‘ability bias’
of the reduced-form estimators, where heterogeneity in ability means heterogeneity of the
earnings functions. Uncorrelated heterogeneity in interest rates has no effect on the bias,
but there are special cases when a negative correlation might have an opposite effect (see
the general setup by Card, 1999). In general, however, reduced form estimates will over-
state the causal effect of education on earnings.
The model has two important implications. First, given people are free to chose the
education they want given ri and yi, the derivative of the earnings function, that is, the
causal effect of education on earnings can be observed only at the optimal level of edu-
cation. Second, differences in earnings that correspond to different education levels over-
state the causal effect of education.
The first point can be illustrated in the thought experiment to measure the causal ef-
fect of education on the earnings of a particular individual. This effect is the derivative
of the lnyi function, but one can only aim at measuring this derivative at the optimal s*.
The following is one appropriate design: let the individual choose an education level.
Observe that: in according to the model, it is s*. Also observe the corresponding earn-
ings, lnyi(si*). Then induce a slightly different schooling level to the individual, and ob-
serve that si and the corresponding lnyi(si). The individual has to change her decision,
so a new si is going to be optimal. One way of doing this would be to change the inter-
est rate she faces, another to constrain her choice to a slightly different previously non-
optimal si. The difference between the two measured points would approximate
dlnyi(si*)/ds. This thought experiment identifies the local average effect of the treat-
ment on the treated. It is not equal to the average treatment effect (the mean over all
different education levels across all people) because for each individual, it is measured
at the person-specific optimum.
In real life, of course, one person chooses some education level only once and gets
lifetime earnings also once in a lifetime. Therefore, the only way to measure any effect is
through inter-personal differences in schooling and earnings. The second implication of
the model means that reduced form estimators like OLS overstate the causal effect, even
in the local sense.
In addition, real-life measurement might contain measurement errors. Measurement
error in the left-hand side variable does not affect consistency of the estimator, but right-
hand side errors do. For the reason mentioned previously, measurement error in the
schooling level variable has received considerable attention in the literature, and there-
fore it will be incorporated in the analysis. In the next section, the ways how these two
econometric problems affect the OLS estimator and how a valid IV can help will be pre-
sented.
2. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Let si be the observed time (years) spent in school, an imperfect measure of real time
spent in school, si*. (The notation is a bit unfortunate: from now on, si is the observed
value of the optimal choice si*, not just any schooling level as before.) Let xi be a k–1 di-
mensional vector of other factors affecting earnings, zi a vector of factors affecting the
schooling outcome but not the earnings, and yi the logarithm of (lifetime) earnings. 
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With the measurement error, the model is specified by three equations:
iiii uxsy  '
* , /1/
iiii vxzs  ''
* ,  /2/
iii wss 
* , /3/
xi and zi are assumed to be uncorrelated with each of the error terms, ui, vi, and wi.
Let us examine the inconsistency of the OLS estimator. OLS estimation of /1/ is in-
consistent because si* is endogenous and may be badly measured. si* is endogenous be-
cause of a nonzero covariance of ui and vi, the unobserved heterogeneity in schooling as-
signment and earnings. A positive correlation is implied by the former simple model: ui
represents unobserved heterogeneity of the earnings functions, while vi represents unob-
served heterogeneity in the interest rate and the earnings function.
       0''*  uviiiiiiii uvEuvxzEusE . /4/
The measured model is:
iiiiiiii xsuxwsy 	 '' , /5/
iiiiiiii xzwvxzs 
 '''' . /6/
The measurement error, wi is independent of all exogenous variables and all other er-
ror terms, by assumption. Therefore, zi and xi are uncorrelated with i and i. Estimates of
the earnings equation by OLS are inconsistent because of the covariance between the
schooling level and the unobserved heterogeneity, and because of the measurement error.
The asymptotic bias is a function of uv, w2, and the moments of the covariates in the
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and >0 is the upper left element of 1 .







OLS          in probability as n  ,
where
       *1*2* ' iiiiiii sxExxExsEsE  .
The OLS estimator is asymptotically biased by the covariance of the structural error
terms in an additive way: the sign of the bias is the same as the sign of uv. The effect of the
measurement error is different: it makes  biased toward zero. In the presence of a positive
correlation (uv>0) and measurement error, the two effects are of opposite direction if >0.
3. THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) STRATEGY
The most commonly used empirical strategy to address these econometric problems is
instrumental variables estimation. This involves using one or more instruments that affect
the schooling decision but are uncorrelated with earnings, conditional on education. In
the thought experiment introduced before, good instruments are those that would induce
some individuals to choose a different education level than they would choose otherwise.
Obviously, the thought experiment itself cannot be carried out, but one can hope to find
two groups of otherwise comparable individuals: one that was affected by the instrument,
and another one that was not. The IV strategy gets around the endogeneity problem.
Moreover, it is consistent regardless of potential measurement error in education.
In general, the IV strategy estimates the parameter of interest for the subpopulation
which was affected by the instruments in the sense that they would have changed their
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behaviour (Imbens–Angrist; 1994). The results are therefore local and they correspond to
the effect of the treatment on the treated.
The validity of the instruments is an assumption: it cannot be inferred from the sam-
ple. Therefore, good instruments are not only hard to find but their quality is not testable.
It is a matter of theoretical and speculative discussion.
Before turning to the alternative IV estimators, let us understand why weak instru-
ments can be a problem. To keep things very simple, assume that z is one dimensional








Formally, the IV assumptions state that the instrument is uncorrelated with the struc-
tural error terms and have some effect on the schooling choice:
      0 iiiiii wzEvzEuzE ,                   0* ii szE . /11/









It is consistent for :
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Why a weak instrument is problematic is not difficult to see. We say that an instru-
ment is weak if it does not predict well the endogenous variable, or, in other words, if the
regression of s on z (the first stage regression) has an R2 close to zero. For given s2 and
z
2, this means that zs is small in the limit, and therefore so will be typically in finite
samples. Since zero population covariances do not mean zero covariances in finite sam-
ples, we can have the IV estimator dominated by covariances with the structural errors if
E[zisi*] is small. The problem of weak instruments is therefore a finite-sample problem.
By definition, finite-sample problems are not relevant if the sample is large enough. How
large is large enough however depends on the particular problem. Angrist and Krueger
(1991) use quarter and state of birth as an instrument of schooling level, arguing that
state-specific compulsory schooling laws might affect final schooling levels. That is,
people born in the fall start school almost a year later than those born in the summer, and
therefore some of them might complete one less class than children of the summer. Their
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sample has 329 000 observations but their instruments predict very little of actual
schooling level (the partial R2 is around 0.0001). Simulations by Bound et al. (1995)
demonstrate that Angrist and Krueger’s (1991) result can easily be an artifact of small-
sample bias and tell nothing about the causal relationship. In fact, the causal relationship
may well be zero. The simulation results are theoretically supported in the alternative
asymptotics of Staiger and Stock (1997). The F-statistic on the excluded instruments in
the first-stage regression is an indicator of how strong the instruments are. An F-statistic
below 10 is usually seen as a sign of warning.
While intuitively appealing, this rule of thumb is not fully justified by econometric
theory. A more careful way to detect weak instruments is by simulation exercises. They
have an additional advantage in that they may tell something about the possible remedies
if needed. I will present such an exercise on Harmon and Walker’s estimator.
The IV estimators
If there are more than one excluded instrumental variables (z), there are more ways to
combine them. In what follows, two different methods will be introduced. Three addi-
tional estimators will be defined as possible remedies for the weak instrument problem.
They are all consistent (under the IV assumptions), but their asymptotic variance and
their finite-sample bias and variance can be quite different.
Some new notation will help in the definitions. As before, bold letters denote sample
matrices (and vectors). Let S denote the sample sum of squares, and  the vector of pa-
rameters of interest,  and :




























Also, let P denote the projection matrix onto the column space of Z, and M matrix
creating the residual:
  '' 1 nnnnn ZZZZP

 ,
nnn PIM  .
The Optimal GMM Estimator
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators are based on moment restric-
tions. 
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Here those involve the covariance of the excluded instruments and the error term in
the earnings equation:
     0'''  iiiiii xsyzEzE
The GMM in general is defined in the following way:





The estimator is consistent with any positive definite matrix A. The optimal GMM
estimator is a special case, where A, the weighting matrix, is the covariance matrix of the
product of the error term and the instruments (in the broad sense):















































The implementation requires an estimate of . Since the estimator is consistent with
any other positive definite matrix, in the first step one can get a consistent estimate for i
by using any appropriate matrix. In particular, the identity matrix meets the required con-
dition. The optimal GMM estimation therefore consists of two steps. The first one con-
sists of estimating   ,''ˆ 1
1 ZyZXZXZXOGMM SSSS

  and taking the residuals
1
ˆˆ OGMMii yy  .  can then be estimated using the estimated residuals and Z. The sec-
ond step is the optimal GMM estimation, by using ̂ . The optimal GMM estimator is
the minimum distance combination of the different instruments if the system is overiden-
tified. It is optimal in the sense that it has the smallest asymptotic variance.
Two Stage Least Squares
The Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator of  is defined by







This estimator is equivalent to the two-stage procedure of first regressing s on all z
and x (‘first stage’), and then regressing y on the first-stage prediction of s and the x vari-
ables (‘second stage’).
SLS2̂  is a GMM estimator with weight matrix 
1
ZZS , and therefore it is consistent.
Moreover, it is equivalent to the optimal GMM estimator if  is homoscedastic. With
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out homoscedasticity, however, the two estimators are going to be different, and there-
fore 2SLS is not optimal. In cross-sectional applications, homoscedasticity is a rare ex-
ception. On the other hand, the 2SLS estimator is a lot simpler to compute, and it is
part of all major statistical packages. For this reason, it remains the most popular IV
estimator.
The k-class estimators
k-class estimators are a generalization of the two-stage least square introduced by
Theil (1958), and are defined as:




2SLS is a k-class estimator, with k=1. Nagar’s estimator (introduced by Nagar; 1959)




q being the dimension of z, that is the number of instruments excluded from the
earnings equation. Nagar’s estimator has the minimum expected bias in finite samples
among the k-class estimators. One of the assumptions behind this result is that the xi are
















Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
Some more notation. Let Y be the sample matrix of the endogenous variables, and
P(x) be the projection onto  nix ' :




P ,    xx n PIM  .
The Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator is derived from the
likelihood function assuming normal errors. It can be expressed, however, as another k-
class estimator with k=, where  is the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix B defined as
    nnnnn x YMYYMYB ''
1
 .
Staiger and Stock (1997) show that in their framework, the LIML estimator has the
best finite-sample properties.
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4. HARMON AND WALKER’S STUDY
Harmon and Walker (1995) follow an instrumental variables approach to estimate  on
British data. They use a pooled sample of the consecutive cross-sectional waves of the
British Family Expenditures Survey (1978–1986). The sample is quite large, n = 34 336.
They use the cohort of the individual as an instrument. Their motivation is the following.
The minimum school-leaving age was increased two times in the relevant period from 14 to
15 in 1947, and from 15 to 16 in 1973. They provide evidence that these changes indeed
changed the behaviour of many individuals: quite a few of those who otherwise would have
left school stayed on because of the new law. This strategy is an example of what the natu-
ral experiments literature calls a difference in differences estimator (Meyer; 1995).
The instrument directly changes the schooling level ‘assignment’ of the individuals
who complete one more class during this time, since it forces them to choose si>si*,
similarly to our thought experiment. It measures the treatment on the treated, those that
would have left school at a younger age but had had to stay in school and completed one
more class. The instrument is strong enough if this sub-population is significant.
Technically, their instrument is a 3-valued vector indicating whether the person is a
member of the cohort that was subject to the first, second, or third minimum school-
leaving age (SLA) requirement (SLA=14, 15, or 16). zi therefore is a vector 2 binary
variables, taking SLA=14 the reference group. The other covariates, the xi-s include a
constant, age, age squared, region (10 categories + 1 reference), and year of survey (8
categories + 1 reference). An important implication of the 2-dimensional zi vector is that
2SLS is equivalent to Nagar’s estimator (kNagar=1+(q-2)/n) and also the Donald–Newey
estimator. Therefore, in this empirical model, the 2SLS estimator is the IV estimator with
the best finite-sample properties in the Nagar (1959) and in the Donald and Newey
(1997) setup. It is dominated by the LIML estimator in the framework of Staiger and
Stock (1997).
The OLS estimate is a lot smaller than the IV:
06.0ˆ OLS , 15.0ˆ 2  SLS .
Taken by face value, the estimated causal effect of education is very large: it states
that an additional year spent in school increases earnings by 15 percent for people at the
very bottom end of the schooling distribution. This is a surprisingly large effect (most
other estimates are at most 10 percent), and one has to be sure that the results are not con-
founded by small-sample effects or other factors before taking it seriously.
Provided that the IV estimate is correct, one can also conclude that OLS is biased
downward by 60 percent. The question our simulation will answer is what combination
of endogeneity and measurement error is needed for this result.
The Monte Carlo exercise
To examine the finite-sample properties of the Harmon and Walker’s 2SLS estimator
and the alternative IV estimators, this paper generated data similar to the original sample.
The artificial samples were drawn from a population with moments that match the re
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ported ones. The Data Generating Process (DGP) of the part of zi (i.e. the two binary
SLA variables) is a multinomial process. The DGP of xi consists of age (a uniform ran-
dom variable in the simulations), its square, and two sets of multinomial variables for the
mutually exclusive categories of the region and the year of the survey. The covariance of
x with z was preserved (except for some simplifying assumptions with negligible conse-
quences). The appendix table compares the simulated moments to the published ones.
The DGP for the structural error terms (ui and vi) was modeled as bivariate normal
with a correlation of uv. si* was generated following the schooling equation with the re-
ported parameters. Observed schooling attainment variable was si = si* + wi, wi ~
iid N(0,w2), representing the measurement error. Finally, yi was generated by the earn-
ings equation, again, with the published parameters. Several combinations of uv and w2
were examined. 
Formally, the generated vectors zi and xi and scalars ui, vi, and wi were used to gener-
ate yi, si*, and si the following way:
iiii uxsy  '
* , 




where Harmon and Walker’s point estimates were used for β, δ, α, and γ. In each run of
the simulation new data were generated, and ̂ was estimated in each dataset. The pur-
pose of the Monte Carlo experiment was to examine the properties of four different esti-
mators (OLS, optimal GMM, 2SLS and LIML) by comparing then to the ‘theoretical’
value of beta used in the data generating process.
Multiple measures of the bias were considered: the mean error (Bias) and the mean
squared error (MSE) are reported in the following, the median and mean absolute error


















where M is the number of Monte Carlo replications, and j̂ is the estimate of  in the j-th
replication.
The following tables summarize the results of twelve simulations, each with different
parametrization of the econometric problems uv and w2, each from 1000 replications.
With no econometric problems (uv =0, w2=0), OLS is the best. IV estimators beat OLS
in terms of the bias even with relatively small problems (uv =0.05, or w2=0.1). The dif-
ference among the alternative IV estimators are small. All of these indicate that Harmon–
Walker’s estimator delivers the asymptotic results. LIML seems to slightly outperform
the 2SLS (which is here equivalent to the Nagar and also the Donald–Newey estimator),
but this result is not robust.
Besides these results, I also carried out simulations on smaller samples. These might
be interesting because of two reasons. First, it helps to see what sample size is ‘large
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enough’ and in what sense it is large in our setup. Second, the relative performance of the
2SLS (Nagar) and the LIML estimator would probably show better results in smaller
samples. The results for n = 1 500, n = 3 000, n = 6 000, n = 9 000, and n = 15 000, are
available on request. The simulations suggest that the IV estimators dominate the OLS
estimator in terms of bias even with weak endogeneity or measurement error, and even in
relatively small samples (n = 1 500). Their superiority disappears in terms of MSE. In
fact, a rather serious econometric problem is needed to get smaller MSE for any of the IV
estimators, if the sample size is small: uv = 0.2 if n = 1 500, and uv = 0.1 if n = 3 000.
Note that with any reasonable scale of measurement error, all IV estimators underper-
form OLS in an MSE sense, unless the sample size is very large (n >10 000).
The small-sample results are not clear about the relative performance of the 2SLS
(Nagar and Donald–Newey) and the LIML estimators in terms of the bias. On the other
hand, the MSE and mean absolute error results seem rather robust. The LIML estimator
underperforms 2SLS (Nagar) in small samples in terms of these measures. These results
are consistent with the general notion that, even if it is better in expectation, the variance
of the LIML estimator does not converge to zero (the asymptotic variance of the root-n
magnified estimator is infinite).





OLS OGMM 2SLS LIML
Bias
0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.05 0.00 0.049 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.10 0.00 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.15 0.00 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.20 0.00 0.195 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.00 0.10 -0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.00 0.20 -0.046 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.00 0.50 -0.099 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.10 0.10 0.057 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
0.20 0.10 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002
-0.10 0.10 -0.107 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
-0.20 0.10 -0.190 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
MSE
0.00 0.00 0.0000 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
0.05 0.00 0.0024 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
0.10 0.00 0.0096 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
0.15 0.00 0.0216 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
0.20 0.00 0.0382 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
0.00 0.10 0.0006 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
0.00 0.20 0.0022 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
0.00 0.50 0.0097 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
0.10 0.10 0.0033 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
0.20 0.10 0.0195 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
-0.10 0.10 0.0115 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
-0.20 0.10 0.0360 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015
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5. CONCLUSION
Harmon and Walker’s IV estimate is more than twice larger than their OLS result not
because their instruments are weak. Their model may give misleading results, though, for
a different reason. The instrument they use is people’s birth cohort. As it is often the case
with similar difference in different natural experiment estimators, there are other things
that might be varied between those groups, other than the compulsory schooling laws
they faced. For one thing, the quadratic age-earnings profile may not be the right specifi-
cation to use even if differences in age purely reflect variety in labor market experience
(see Murphy–Welch; 1990). Moreover, in this cross-sectional setup, the joint effect of age
and birth cohort on earnings may reflect time effects in earnings (cycles and trends). An-
other possible problem is the time path of employment in the unskilled group they focus
on: their employment rate fell through the time considered in the developed world, there-
fore probably in Britain, too. That might have introduced selection problems into ob-
served wages because the sample became more ‘able’.
If we accept the results these problems notwithstanding, they tell us that those that
would have left school at the minimum school age (14 or 15) but stayed one year longer
because of the new law earn 15 per cent more because of this extra year. This is a classi-
cal local effect of the treatment on the treated. Generalizing these effects to the rest of the
population is not justified by the empirical model itself: we need some theory for that.
However, in the model presented previously (or, for that matter, in Card 1999), this is not
possible without making more structure on the heterogeneity in the costs of education
and the earnings function. The large literature on educational choice has not provided
enough evidence for that yet.
The instrument in the illustrative example stood well in the simulation exercise but
may be problematic for other reasons. I believe that one should carry out a similar analy-
sis if there is enough reason to worry about the finite sample properties of the estimators,
and one should check the robustness of the estimators to the other problems. Moreover,
one has to be explicit in what exactly the results mean in terms of the locality of the
causal effect and the characteristics of the treatment group. There is no free lunch in
econometrics either: the real benefits of the instrumental variables estimation strategy can
be exploited only by careful analysis.
APPENDIX
Sample moments from Harmon and Walker (1995) and the simulated DGP (1000 replications)
Whole Sample SLA=14 SLA=15 SLA=16
Variable
H&W Simul H&W Simul H&W Simul H&W Simul
Ln(wage) 1.913 1.907 1.902 1.837 1.995 2.003 1.584 1.644
Std(lnwage) 0.445 1.035 0.434 3.296 0.416 1.983 0.426 4.126
Age 38.7 38.7 55.8 55.8 35.6 35.6 21.6 21.6
Std(age) 12.7 12.8 4.5 6.9 7.3 3.0 2.7 5.2
Region1 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.085 0.088 0.101 0.088
Region2 0.110 0.110 0.105 0.110 0.109 0.110 0.119 0.110
(Continued on the next page.)
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(Continuation.)
Whole Sample SLA=14 SLA=15 SLA=16
Variable
H&W Simul H&W Simul H&W Simul H&W Simul
Region3 0.075 0.075 0.073 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.082 0.075
Region4 0.099 0.099 0.103 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.090 0.099
Region5 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.037
Region6 0.306 0.306 0.317 0.306 0.300 0.306 0.311 0.306
Region7 0.074 0.074 0.070 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.080 0.074
Region8 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.054 0.051
Region9 0.089 0.089 0.081 0.089 0.101 0.089 0.050 0.089
Region10 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.013
Year1 0.116 0.116 0.143 0.143 0.118 0.118 0.062 0.062
Year2 0.116 0.116 0.140 0.140 0.116 0.116 0.075 0.075
Year3 0.121 0.121 0.129 0.129 0.122 0.122 0.102 0.102
Year4 0.118 0.118 0.113 0.113 0.119 0.119 0.118 0.118
Year5 0.101 0.101 0.084 0.084 0.105 0.105 0.113 0.113
Year6 0.104 0.104 0.091 0.091 0.103 0.103 0.135 0.135
Year7 0.101 0.101 0.069 0.069 0.102 0.102 0.159 0.159
Year8 0.102 0.102 0.058 0.058 0.100 0.100 0.192 0.192
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COMPARISON OF ESTIMATORS FOR PROBABILITY
OF DEATH USED IN ACTUARIAL SCIENCE*
KOLOS ÁGOSTON1
In this paper a brief summary of the estimators for probability of death is given. Three
estimators will be investigated, two of them are parametric ones. To derive a parametric es-
timator a distribution has to be assumed. Unfortunately the distributions occurring in real
life differ from these assumed ones. It will be investigated how can these estimators be ap-
plied if we assume other distributions. The bias and efficiency of the estimators are analysed
by using Monte Carlo simulation. 
The maximum likelihood estimator is the most common in the actuarial practice due to
its appealing point estimation properties. The Kaplan–Meier estimation is a better choice, if
the purpose is to give a better confidence interval. 
KEYWORDS:  Actuarial sciences; Estimators; Simulation.
he estimation of probabilities of death (or other failures, for instance disability) is
crucial in the life insurance industry. The most often used probability2 is that a person
aged exactly x, will die in a year, denoted by qx. The main goal of this paper is to give a
good estimator for this probability. There is a simple estimator for ratios, and this esti-
mator can be used for estimating the probability of death as well: d/n, where d is the
number of deaths, and n is the number of insured lives (where everyone is exactly x year
old at the beginning). This estimator has good properties: in the frame of  a binomial
model it is a maximum likelihood estimator (consistent, asymptotically unbiased, and
asymptotically most efficient), and it is unbiased in small samples too.
Though this estimator has very attractive properties, its application has special re-
quirements as well. The most important one says that there is only one reason for exit,
and this is death (or failure in general). Let us suppose that there are n elements (persons)
at the beginning, d of them die within a year, and the others survive. It means that there is
no lapse or censoring, as statisticians say. Furthermore, let us assume that a person – say
Mr. Smith – buys an insurance policy, but after half a year he withdraws his policy. From
* The author is indebted to Professor Erzsébet Kovács, Professor Angus Macdonald, László Papp and Krisztina Szőke for
their help.
1 Assistant of the Department of Operations Research, Budapest University of  Economic Sciences and Public Admini-
stration.
2 These probabilities can be found in the life tables. The premium calculation is based on these probabilities as well.
T
ÁGOSTON: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATORS IN ACTUARIAL SCIENCE 151
that time the company has no information whether Mr. Smith has died or survived the
year. Given that we do not know this, the ratio estimator cannot be applied any more.
There are many estimators that can handle this deficiency, but there is not an universal
one. The paper will compare the properties of the three most widely used estimators.
These are the Kaplan–Meier estimator, which is a non-parametric one, the actuarial esti-
mator, and the maximum likelihood estimator.
1. PROPERTIES OF THE THREE COMMONLY USED ESTIMATORS
In this section the derivation and the properties of the three mentioned estimators will
be given.
The Kaplan–Meier estimator can be derived as follows. Let us divide the one-year
interval into sub-intervals, so that only one event occurs in any of these sub-intervals: a
failure or a censor event. If within the sub-interval a censor event occurs, one can say that
the estimated probability (of failure) is 0 for this interval. If there is only a failure within
the sub-interval, the ratio estimator can be applied. The estimated probability for the
whole year is one minus the product of the estimated survival probabilities (equals one
minus the estimated probability of failure).
It should be noted that the observed lifetime is the difference between the starting time
and the time of exit. The cause of exit can either be death or censoring. Let us arrange the
observed lifetimes in standing order, and let t1 be the smallest and tn is the largest ob-
served lifetime; di is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ith person died, oth-



















If dn is 1 (i.e. that the last person died) then the estimator gives 1 for the probability of
death. In this case it is said that estimation of the probability of death is not defined.
In a small numerical example three persons buy a specified insurance policy. The first
one withdraws his contract at the one third of the year. The second dies at the two thirds
of the year, while the third survives the year. The estimated probability for the first third
year is 0, for the second third year is 1/2 and for the third year is also 0. So the estimated








The actuarial estimator is a parametric one. Here it has to be assumed a rule of how
the probability of death in a fraction of year is related to the probability of death in the
whole year. According to the common actuarial notation sqx+t means the probability of
failure during the interval (x+t, x+t+s) for a person who is alive at the time x+t (0  t,s 
1, t+s  1). It is also common that if the length of the interval is a whole year and this year
begins on the investigated person’s birthday, we do not need to write the left index:
qx=1qx. Using these notations the assumed relation between the probabilities is: 
1–tqx+t=(1–t)qx,
which is called the Balducci assumption. If the probability of death is 0.003 in a year, the 
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probability of death in the interval (x+2/3, x+1) for a person who is alive at the time
x+2/3 is: 1/30.003=0.001.
The idea behind the actuarial estimator is to adjust the estimator d/n. The number of
deaths is given, so n has to be modified. It is better if one says that n means n years in-
stead of n persons. So if somebody withdraws his contract, he does not stand in risk for a
whole year, only for a fraction of year. If the person in the previous example withdraws
his contract at one third of the year, he stands in risk for one third year. If somebody dies,
he stands in risk for the whole year. The explanation for this is that in the case of estima-
tor d/n, if somebody dies, he stands in risk for the whole year as well. Then the actuarial
estimator is as follows: the number of deaths divided by ‘standing in risk’, which is called
‘initial exposed to risk’ in the actuarial literature. If no censoring event occurs, the actu-
arial estimator is equal to the common ratio estimator d/n.
Using this estimator for the previous example, the initial exposed to risk is
1/3+1+1=7/3, the number of deaths is 1, so the estimated probability is 1/(7/3)=0.43. 
The next question is that how is this connected to Balducci hypothesis. Let us con-
sider a small example. At the beginning there are l+w members, w of them withdraw their
contract after one third year. The expected number of deaths is (l+w)qx, but the insurance
company does not know about the deaths of the those who withdrew after the withdrawal.
We can calculate the expected number of these deaths by using the Balducci hypothesis:
w2/3qx. 
The expected number of deaths known by the insurance company equals the expected
number of deaths in a year minus the expected number of deaths the company does not
know about:
d=(l+w)qx–w(2/3)qx=lqx+(1/3)wqx /1/








To derive the actuarial estimator we used the Balducci assumption. It can be proved
that if the Balducci hypothesis is true then the actuarial estimator is asymptotically unbi-
ased. (It was believed for quite a long time that the actuarial estimator is a moment esti-
mator, but it was proved 20 years ago that this is not true.)
The maximum likelihood estimator is a very popular one too. Its main idea comes
from realizing that however the probability of death is a good measure, it has a disadvan-
tage as well, namely it is related to an interval. Sometimes it is better to use a measure for




, which is denoted by x
and called as the force of mortality. The probability of death can be calculated by using
the force of mortality:
     txxxt dq exp1 .
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The assumption of constant force of mortality means that  x  in the investigated
interval.  In other words:
sqx+t=1–(1–qx)s.
If we assume the constant force of mortality, we get a maximum likelihood estima-
tor:
)/exp(1 cxEd ,
where cxE  is called ‘central exposed to risk’ in the actuarial literature. The ‘central ex-
posed to risk’ is the sum of observed times. It can easily be calculated: if somebody with-
draws his contract, the calculation is the same as in the case of the initial exposed to risk,
but if somebody dies, he stands in risk only until the time of death.
Calculating the estimated probability of death for the previous example:
– Central exposed to risk: (1/3+2/3+1)=2.
– Estimated probability: 1–exp(–1/2)=1–0.61=0.39.
As it was mentioned, in the case of maximum likelihood estimator, we assume a con-
stant force of mortality. Therefore, if the constant force of mortality is appropriate then
this estimator is asymptotically unbiased and asymptotically efficient. 
Up to this point we wanted to derive an estimator which we can handle easily, this is
the reason for using these assumptions instead of believing that the data follow these as-
sumptions. In real life the probability of death is increasing with age3 so it is a good hy-
pothesis that the force of mortality also increases during the one-year time interval. Un-
fortunately, the force of mortality does not increase either in the case of Balducci as-
sumption or in the case of constant force of mortality. It is necessary to investigate the
behaviour of these estimators under more realistic assumptions such as uniform distribu-
tion of deaths4 or a Gompertz mortality law.5
2. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
In order to compare the properties of the former described estimators Monte Carlo
simulation are used. Three scenarios for the probability of failure (1%, 5%, 30%), and
three scenarios for the sample size (5, 30 and 1 000) are chosen. The uniform distribution
of death does not have any parameter, so the situation in the case of these assumption is
simple. 
3 This statement holds for all ages greater than 6 in Hungary, and holds for ages greater than 25 in western countries as well.
4 Uniform distribution of death means that the (expected) number of deaths is the same for all intervals whose lengths are
equal. Let us suppose that the probability of death is 0.1 and the sample size is 100 (for instance). It means that 10 deaths will
occur (expectedly), 5 of them in the first half-year, 5 of them in the second half-year. The probability of death in the first half-year
is: 5/100, and in the second half-year 5/95 (because 5 persons died in the first half-year, so there are only 95 persons alive at the
beginning of the second half-year). We can see that the probability of death increases during the year.
5 Gompertz described an expression for the force of mortality: xx Bc . B > 0, and B is close to 0, c > 1 and c is close to
1. In this case the force of mortality increases so the probability of death increases as well.
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The Gompertz mortality law has two parameters but one of them (B) is irrelevant for
our analysis.6 The other parameter was fixed as c = 1.1.7
Two numbers are simulated for each person. One for failure time8 and one for cen-
soring time, and results are stored. We will investigate the described assumptions for fail-
ure time, but we will use the constant force of mortality for censoring time (to reduce the
number of scenarios). The probability of censoring (the probability that a censoring event
occurs within a year) is 10 percent (for the same reason). A censoring time and a survival
time for each member of the sample will be simulated. So we can calculate simulated es-
timates. We will repeat it 100 000 times, so 100 000 simulated values for each estimates
will be got. 
For each estimator the mean and standard deviation will be presented and the estima-
tors will be compared by means of the mean square error (MSE).
It has been mentioned that parametric estimators perform better because their variance
is smaller. For this reason we start the simulation by comparing the Kaplan–Meier esti-
mator and the actuarial estimator when the Balducci hypothesis holds for the failure
times, then we will compare Kaplan–Meier estimator with the maximum-likelihood esti-
mator when constant force of mortality holds for the failure times. The results can be seen
in Tables 1,2,3 and 4.9
Table 1
Probability of death 
(estimated by actuarial versus Kaplan–Meier estimators)




parameter Mean Standarddeviation MSE Mean
Standard
deviation MSE
0.01 .00984106 .04687197 .0021970068 .00989700 .04761310 .0022670183
0.05 .04951430 .10266833 .0105410215 .04998000 .10514971 .0110564611
5
0.30 .29686623 .21397758 .0457962241 .29901983 .22096043 .0488244723
0.01 .01003072 .01929079 .0003721355 .01004699 .01938276 .0003756935
0.05 .05005749 .04202622 .0017662061 .05012668 .04229819 .0017891531
30
0.30 .29949622 .08721694 .0076070486 .29985433 .08878433 .0078826779
0.01 .00999492 .00332315 .0000110434 .00999542 .00333146 .0000110986
0.05 .05001927 .00727703 .0000529556 .05001958 .00730579 .0000533750
1000
0.30 .30005796 .01506360 .0002269155 .30006824 .01529334 .0002338910
Note: Numbers in bold mean that the mean differs from the theoretical parameter value at a 5 percent significance
level.
6 We have to know how t qx is related to qx. In case of Gompertz mortality law









cccBdBcp . So        1/1ln/ln  ccpp txxt        1/1lnexp  ccpp txxt .
7 This value is appropriate for the Hungarian life tables.
8 In the simulation first a random probability is simulated (rnd). If this number is greater than the probability of failure then
the person survives the interval, so the failure time is 1. Else a t value is sought so t qx equals the simulated number (probability).
This t will be the simulated failure time.
9 When the last person died we defined the value of Kaplan-Meier estimator as 1. This event does not occur when the sam-
ple size is 30 or 1000. It occurs a few times when the sample size is 5 but the probability of death is small. It occurs in 0.5 per-
cent of the cases when the sample size is 5 and the probability of death is 30 percent.
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Table 2
t and p-values for testing means in  Table 1
Maximum likelihood estimator Kaplan–Meier estimatorSample
size
Probability
of death t p t p
0.01 -1.072 0.284 -0.684 0.494
0.05 -1.496 0.135 0.060 0.952
5
0.30 -4.631 0.000 -1.403 0.161
0.01 0.504 0.614 0.767 0.443
0.05 0.433 0.665 0.947 0.344
30
0.30 -1.827 0.068 -0.519 0.604
0.01 -0.484 0.628 -0.434 0.664
0.05 0.837 0.403 0.847 0.397
1000
0.30 1.217 0.224 1.411 0.158
Table 3
Probability of death 
(estimated by maximum likelihood  versus Kaplan–Meier estimators)




parameter Mean Standarddeviation MSE Mean
Standard
deviation MSE
00.01 .00998304 .04590550 .0021073153 .01003533 .04634266 .0021476433
0.05 .04978460 .09999569 .0099991834 .05005150 .10099568 .0102001306
5
0.30 .29751627 .20653649 .0426634866 .30079983 .21285520 .0453079778
0.01 .01008313 .01874080 .0003512246 .01008447 .01875697 .0003518311
0.05 .05025774 .04094795 .0016768008 .05026694 .04101747 .0016825041
30
0.30 .29936770 .08510391 .0072430761 .29965704 .08605093 .0074048795
0.01 .00999778 .00322633 .0000104092 .00999807 .00322852 .0000104234
0.05 .05002049 .00704600 .0000496465 .05002204 .00705419 .0000497620
1000
0.30 .30003392 .01479451 .0002188786 .30004775 .01492556 .0002227747
Note: Numbers in bold mean that the mean differs from the theoretical parameter value at a 5 percent significance
level.
Table 4
t and p-values for testing means in Table 3 
Maximum likelihood estimator Kaplan–Meier estimatorSample
size
Probability
of death t p t p
0.01 –0.117 0.907 0.241 0.810
0.05 -0.681 0.496 0.161 0.872
5
0.30 -3.803 0.000 1.188 0.235
0.01 1.403 0.161 1.424 0.154
0.05 1.990 0.047 2.058 0.040
30
0.30 -2.349 0.019 -1.260 0.208
0.01 -0.217 0.828 -0.189 0.850
0.05 0.920 0.358 0.988 0.323
1000
0.30 0.725 0.468 1.012 0.312
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Some conclusions can be made from Table 1 and Table 3. According to the theory there
is a bias for each estimator (if the sample size is finite). In case of actuarial and maximum
likelihood estimator we can verify this result for small samples and large probabilities. One
cannot reveal this bias (with t-test) in case of Kaplan-Meier estimator. According to the the-
ory all three estimators are asymptotically unbiased. It can be seen that the simulated esti-
mates are getting closer to their true value as the sample size increases. Not only the bias de-
creases with the sample size, but also the t-value (in absolute terms) decreases (see Table 2
and Table 4), although this statement holds for large probabilities only.
The MSE for the parametric estimators are smaller than those for the Kaplan-Meier
estimator. For small samples the Kaplan-Meier estimator is more precise, but as the sam-
ple size increases the bias becomes smaller in case of parametric estimators. However the
standard deviation is smaller for the parametric estimators and it will result in that the
mean square error is smaller for these estimators in any (of these) cases.  In both cases the
differences in efficiency are tiny.
After investigating the properties of the estimators, when the appropriate distribution
was assumed, we can analyse how they behave when other distributions fitting better to
real life practice are assumed. The results of this sensitivity analysis can be seen in Table
5 and Table 7, while Table 6 and Table 8 contain t and p values.
According to the results shown in Table 5 and Table 7, the Kaplan–Meier estimator can
be considered as an unbiased estimator, while actuarial estimator and maximum likelihood
estimator are biased. This bias becomes significant when both the probability of failure and
the sample size are large. The bias is decreasing with the sample size (in case of actuarial
and maximum likelihood estimators), but the t-statistics is increasing (in absolute terms), so
we can conclude that there are significant biases in case of these estimators.
The standard deviations are smaller in case of actuarial and maximum likelihood es-
timators. The MSE for the actuarial and maximum likelihood are smaller than that for the
Kaplan–Meier. However the parametric estimators are not unbiased any more, they are
preferred to the non-parametric estimator (with respect to MSE), but the difference is tiny
again. When the probability of death is small, the actuarial estimator is more efficient
than the maximum likelihood estimator.
Table 5
Probability of death 
(estimated by Monte Carlo simulations – uniform distribution of deaths)









0.01 .01004973 .04603766 .0021194683 .01006415 .04615370 .0021301681 .01007950 .04635700 .0021489781
0.05 .04941703 .09926364 .0098536101 .04937001 .09923540 .0098480609 .04969042 .10034615 .0100694465
5
0.30 .29758266 .20853141 .0434911915 .29278514 .20245981 .0410420288 .30011650 .21253080 .0451693556
0.01 .01007813 .01872772 .0003507335 .01008056 .01873355 .0003509522 .01009136 .01876892 .0003522808
0.05 .05016675 .04085613 .0016692513 .05017393 .04086155 .0016696964 .05023810 .04098634 .0016799370
30
0.30 .29839330 .08518692 .0072593935 .29619100 .08362243 .0070072192 .30012069 .08619878 .0074302436
0.01 .00999218 .00323165 .0000104436 .00999311 .00323222 .0000104473 .00999366 .00323391 .0000104582
0.05 .04993466 .00706568 .0000199281 .04994595 .00706792 .0000499584 .04997909 .00708180 .0000501523
1000
0.30 .29846589 .01476271 .0002202910 .29663580 .01451429 .0002219826 .30004328 .01492269 .0002226885
Note: Numbers in bold mean that the mean differs from the theoretical parameter value at a 5 percent significance level.
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATORS IN ACTUARIAL SCIENCE 157
Table 6
t and p-values for testing means in Table 5
Actuarial estimator Maximum likelihood estimator Kaplan–Meier estimatorSample
size
Probability
of death t p t p t p
0.01 0.342 0.732 0.446 0.656 0.542 0.588
0.05 -1.857 0.063 -2.008 0.045 -0.976 0.329
5
0.30 -3.666 0.000 -11.269 0.000 0.173 0.863
0.01 1.319 0.187 1.360 0.174 1.539 0.124
0.05 1.291 0.197 1.346 0.178 1.837 0.066
30
0.30 -5.964 0.000 -14.404 0.000 0.443 0.658
0.01 -0.765 0.444 -0.674 0.500 -0.620 0.535
0.05 -2.924 0.003 -2.418 0.016 -0.934 0.350
1000
0.30 -32.861 0.000 -73.291 0.000 0.917 0.359
Table 7
Probability of death 
(estimated by Monte Carlo simulations – Gompertz mortality law)









0.01 .00993604 .04561098 .0020803653 .00994494 .04571968 .0020902923 .00998842 .04607912 .0021232851
0.05 .04977052 .09976533 .0099531747 .04968104 .09965294 .0099308098 .05002325 .10075283 .0101511326
5
0.30 .29766343 .20906922 .0437154001 .29520474 .20511519 .0420952368 .29964883 .21270307 .0452427209
0.01 .00996515 .01861666 .0003465813 .00997956 .01865877 .0003466912 .00997956 .01865877 .0003481502
0.05 .05000431 .04072089 .0016581909 .04999852 .04070856 .0016571870 .05009891 .04087626 .0016708781
30
0.30 .29891286 .08491974 .0072125444 .29871793 .08441351 .0071272851 .30007567 .08581999 .0073650771
0.01 .00998985 .00322569 .0000104052 .00998997 .00322570 .0000104052 .00999882 .00323103 .0000104396
0.05 .04993295 .00704448 .0000496292 .04993493 .00704485 .0000496342 .04999675 .00706198 .0000498715
1000
0.30 .29898562 .01478491 .0002196227 .29905454 .01472266 .0002176507 .29998348 .01492052 .0002226223
Note. Numbers in bold mean that the mean differs from the theoretical parameter value at a 5 percent significance level.
Table 8
t and p-values for testing means in Table 5




t p t p t p
0.01 -0.443 0.658 -0.381 0.703 -0.079 0.937
0.05 -0.727 0.467 -1.012 0.312 0.073 0.942
5
0.30 -3.534 0.000 -7.393 0.000 -0.522 0.602
0.01 -0.592 0.554 -0.582 0.561 -0.346 0.729
0.05 0.033 0.974 -0.012 0.990 0.765 0.444
30
0.30 -4.048 0.000 -4.803 0.000 0.279 0.780
0.01 -0.995 0.320 -0.984 0.325 -0.116 0.908
0.05 -3.010 0.003 -2.921 0.003 -0.145 0.885
1000
0.30 -21.696 0.000 -20.307 0.000 -0.350 0.726
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In real life practice, the exact variances of the estimators are unknown, so they have to
be estimated as well using the following variance estimators:
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In case of actuarial estimator the estimated variance is appropriate when there is no
censoring event (binomial model). In practice it is common to say that this estimation also
holds when there are censoring events as well. The estimated variance of maximum like-
lihood estimator is derived by using the Cramer–Rao lower bound. Estimated standard er-













Uniform distribution of deaths
0.01 .04063340 .04062139 .04076844
0.05 .08851087 .08822361 .08898437
5
0.30 .18657172 .18334180 .18753764
0.01 .01839034 .01839380 .01842987
0.05 .04017906 .04017366 .04028098
30
0.30 .08406086 .08312117 .08474512
0.01 .00322649 .00322677 .00322877
0.05 .00706318 .00706393 .00707581
1000
0.30 .01480634 .01465886 .01492114
Gompertz mortality law
0.01 .04041854 .04037235 .04064237
0.05 .08870958 .08835855 .08916791
5
0.30 .18640674 .18383433 .18713953
0.01 .01828577 .01828596 .01832763
0.05 .04012449 .04010929 .04024556
30
0.30 .08410439 .08355575 .08466530
0.01 .00322613 .00322615 .00323082
0.05 .00706322 .00706269 .00707853
1000
0.30 .01481115 .01473583 .01490333
* If the last person died, the expression of estimated variance is not correct (we have to divide by 0). In this case we set the
variance 0. As it was mentioned earlier, it did not occur when the sample size is 30 or greater.
In Table 9 we can see that the variance is under-estimated for small samples. This bias
decreases as the sample size increases, but it does not disappear.
Our further purpose is to give an interval estimation for the probability of death. So
for each case a 95 percent probability interval will be calculated for the estimated prob
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ability, i.e. we have 100 000 confidence intervals for each scenario. Then we count the
number of cases when the confidence interval does not contain the estimated parameter. If
the estimation process is appropriate, the number of these cases has to be very close to
5000, that is their share must be close to 5 percent. Table 10 presents the results.
Table 10
Share of cases when the confidence interval












Uniform distribution of deaths
0.01 95.32 95.33 95.33
0.05 78.59 78.60 78.60
5
0.30 21.56 21.60 21.90
0.01 74.99 74.99 74.99
0.05 23.30 23.31 23.30
30
0.30 6.13 6.58 6.21
0.01 9.63 9.62 8.72
0.05 5.48 5.46 5.47
1000
0.30 5.17 5.61 5.01
Gompertz mortality law
0.01 95.35 95.36 95.36
0.05 78.49 78.50 78.50
5
0.30 21.63 21.92 21.95
0.01 75.21 75.21 75.21
0.05 23.21 23.21 23.21
30
0.30 6.08 6.62 6.12
0.01 9.55 9.55 8.56
0.05 5.36 5.37 5.38
1000
0.30 5.11 5.18 5.09
We can see that the results are very poor, especially  for small sample sizes. This is an
important reason why these estimators cannot be used for small samples. According to
Table 10, maximum likelihood estimator achieves the worst results. If the probability of
death is small (which is the most relevant case in insurance problems) and the sample size
is large enough, the performance of Kaplan–Meier estimator is the best. In case of Kap-
lan–Meier estimator the confidence interval is wider (since the estimated variance is
larger), but this wider interval adheres more to the facts.
3. CONCLUSION 
All these three estimators have almost the same properties. The parametric estimators
are more robust, i.e. they perform well when the inappropriate distributions are assumed.
They are preferred to Kaplan–Meier estimator with respect to MSE, but the difference in
efficiency is rather small. As we have seen, the confidence interval for Kaplan–Meier es-
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timator is wider, but this wider interval covers the true value more frequently. The differ-
ences in frequency are small again. If the sample size tends to infinity, the MSE for Kap-
lan–Meier estimator tends to 0 (since it is a consistent estimator), but the MSE for para-
metric estimators keeps to a positive value, since there is a (significant) bias in this case.
Based upon  these results the use the Kaplan–Meier estimator can be suggested in life in-
surance statistics.
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